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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-244

POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Subsequent to the TMI-2 incident, the need was recognized for an improved post-accident sampling system (PASS) to determine the extent of core degradation in the event of a severe reactor accident. Criteria for an acceptable sampling and analysis system are specified in NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3. Evaluation criteria guidelines were provided to the licensee with letter dated September 2, 1982.

The system should have the capability to obtain and quantitatively analyze reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples without radiation exposure to any individual exceeding 5 rem to the whole body or 75 rem to the extremities (GDC-19) during and following an accident in which there is core degradation. Materials to be analyzed and quantified include certain radionuclides that are indicators of severity of core damage (e.g. noble gases, isotopes of iodine and cesium, and nonvolatile isotopes), hydrogen in the containment atmosphere and total dissolved gases or hydrogen, boron, and chloride in reactor coolant samples.

To comply with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, the licensee was requested to (1) review and modify his sampling, chemical analysis, and radionuclide determination capabilities as necessary; and (2) provide the staff with information pertaining to system design, analytical capabilities and procedures in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the criteria are met.

By letter dated February 6, 1984, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)(the licensee) provided information on the PASS.

2.0 EVALUATION

Criterion (1):

> The licensee shall have the capability to promptly obtain reactor coolant samples and containment atmosphere samples. The combined time allotted for sampling and analysis should be three hours or less from the time a decision is made to take a sample.

The licensee has provided sampling and analysis capability to promptly obtain an analyze reactor coolant samples and containment atmosphere samples within three hours from the time a decision is made to take a sample. During loss of off-site power, alternate power sources are available for both the gas and liquid sampling systems that can be energized in sufficient time to meet the three hour sampling and analysis time limit. The staff finds that these provisions meet Criterion (1) and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (2):

The licensee shall establish an onsite radiological and chemical analysis capability to provide, within the three-hour time frame established above, quantification of the following:

(a) Certain radionuclides in the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere that may be indicators of the degree of core damage (e.g., noble gases, iodines and cesiums, and non-volatile isotopes);

(b) hydrogen levels in the containment atmosphere;

(c) dissolved gases (e.g., H_2), chloride (time allotted for analysis subject to discussion below), and boron concentration of liquids;

(d) Alternatively, have in-line monitoring capabilities to perform all or part of the above analyses.

The PASS provides grab sample analysis for pH, conductivity, chloride, and dissolved oxygen and hydrogen in the reactor coolant, and in-line monitoring of hydrogen in the containment atmosphere. The PASS also provides the capability to collect diluted or undiluted liquid and gaseous grab samples that can be transported to the radiochemical laboratory for hydrogen, pH, conductivity, boron, chloride, and radionuclide analyses. The licensee's core damage estimation procedure based on fission product activities is acceptable for the interim. The final procedure should include other physical parameters in addition to fission produce activities to provide a realistic estimate of core damage.

The staff finds that the licensee partially meets Criterion (2) by establishing an on-site radiological and chemical analysis capability. However, the licensee should provide a procedure, consistent with the clarification of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling System, transmitted to the licensee on September 2, 1982, to estimate the extent of core damage based on radionuclide concentrations and taking into consideration other physical parameters such as core temperature data, pressure vessel liquid level and containment radiation levels and hydrogen concentrations. The licensee is a participant in a working group under the

Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) that has developed a methodology of a generic core damage assessment based on measurements of radionuclide concentrations and other plant indicators. By letter dated April 9, 1984, the licensee has committed to provide a plant specific procedure by August 1, 1984.

Criterion (3):

> Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during post-accident conditions shall not require an isolated auxiliary system (e.g., the letdown system, reactor water cleanup system) to be placed in operation in order to use the sampling system.

Reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling during post-accident conditions does not require an isolated auxiliary system to be placed in operation in order to perform the sampling function. The pass valves which are not accessible after an accident are environmentally qualified for the conditions in which they need to operate. These provisions meet Criterion (3) of Item II.B.3 in NUREG-0737 and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (4):

> Pressurized reactor coolant samples are not required if the licensee can quantify the amount of dissolved gases with unpressurized reactor coolant samples. The measurement of either total dissolved gases or H_2 gas in reactor coolant samples is considered adequate. Measuring the O_2 concentration is recommended, but is not mandatory.

Dissolved gases are stripped from the pressurized reactor coolant sample into a previously evacuated expansion chamber. Hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the stripped gases are measured by gas chromatography and oxygen analyzer, respectively. The staff has determined that these provisions meet Criterion (4) of Item II.B.3 in NUREG-0737 and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (5):

> The time for a chloride analysis to be performed is dependent upon two factors: (a) if the plant's coolant water is seawater or brackish water; and (b) if there is only a single barrier between primary containment systems and the cooling water. Under both of the above conditions the licensee shall provide for a chloride analysis within 24 hours of the sample being taken. For all other cases, the licensee shall provide for the analysis to be completed within 4 days. The chloride analysis does not have to be done onsite.

Chloride analysis of reactor coolant is performed within 96 hours on a diluted sample by ion chromatograph for an initial scoping chloride concentration. Additional accuracy will be obtained by analyzing an undiluted sample that has been decayed sufficiently to be in conformance with ALARA. These provisions meet Criterion (5), and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (6):

> The design basis for plant equipment for reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling and analysis must assume that it is possible to obtain and analyze a sample without radiation exposures to any individual exceeding the criteria of GDC-19 (Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50) (i.e., 5 rem whole body, 75 rem extremities). (Note that the design and operational review criterion was changed from the operational limits of 10 CFR Part 20 (NUREG-0578) to the GDS-19 criterion (October 30, 1979 letter from H.R. Denton to all licensees.)

The licensee has performed a time-person-motion study to ensure that operator exposure while obtaining, transporting, and analyzing a PASS sample is within the acceptable limits. This operator exposure includes entering and exiting the sample panel area, operating sample panel manual valves, positioning the grab sample into the shielded transfer carts, and performing sample dilutions. Post-Accident Sampling System personnel radiation exposures from reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling and analysis are within 5 rem whole body and 75 rem extremities, which meet the requirements of GDC-19 and Criterion (6) and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (7):

> The analysis of primary coolant samples for boron is required for PWRs. (Note that Rev. 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 specifies the need for primary coolant boron analysis capability at BWR plants.)

Reactor coolant boron analysis is performed in-line using an Ionics digichem boron analyzer which has a capability of measuring boron concentrations from 20 to 6000 ppm with an accuracy of ±5%. This provision meets the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 and Criterion (7) and is, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (8):

> If in-line monitoring is used for any sampling and analytical capability specified herein, the licensee shall provide backup sampling through grab samples, and shall demonstrate the capability of analyzing the samples. Established planning for analysis at offsite facilities is acceptable. Equipment provided for backup sampling shall be capable of providing at least one sample per week until the accident condition no longer exists.

In-line sampling and analysis is provided for pH, conductivity, dissolved oxygen and hydrogen, boron and hydrogen concentrations in the containment atmosphere. A backup grab sample, diluted or undiluted reactor coolant, containment sump, containment air and reactor coolant stripped gas can also be taken. Provisions are provided to flush the in-line probes with demineralized water to facilitate access for repair. The staff finds these provisions meet Criterion (8) and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (9):

The licensee's radiological and chemical sample analysis capability shall include provisions to:

(a) Identify and quantify the isotopes of the nuclide categories discussed above to levels corresponding to the source term given in Regulatory Guides 1.3 or 1.4 and 1.7. Where necessary and practicable, the ability to dilute samples to provide capability for measurement and reduction of personnel exposure should be provided. Sensitivity of onsite liquid sample analysis capability should be such as to permit measurement of nuclide concentration in the range from approximately 1μ Ci/g to 10 Ci/g.

(b) Restrict background levels of radiation in the radiological and chemical analysis facility from sources such that the sample analysis will provide results with an acceptably small error (approximately a factor of 2). This can be accomplished through the use of sufficient shielding around samples and outside sources, and by the use of a ventilation system design which will control the presence of airborne radioactivity.

The radionuclides in both the primary coolant and the containment atmosphere will be identified and quantified. Reactor coolant samples are diluted to minimize personnel exposure. The PASS can perform radioisotope analyses at the levels corresponding to the source term given in Regulatory Guides 1.4, Rev. 2 and 1.7. Radiation background levels will be restricted by shielding. Ventilated radiological and chemical analysis facilities are provided to obtain results within an acceptably small error (approximately a factor of 2). The staff finds these provisions meet Criterion (9) and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (10):

Accuracy, range, and sensitivity shall be adequate to provide pertinent data to the operator in order to describe radiological and chemical status of the reactor coolant systems.

The accuracy, range, and sensitivity of the PASS instruments and analytical procedures are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, and the clarifications of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, Post-Accident Sampling Capability, transmitted to the licensee on September 2, 1982. Therefore, they are adequate for describing the radiological and chemical status of the reactor coolant. The analytical methods and instrumentation were selected for their ability to operate in the post-accident sampling environment. The standard test matrix and radiation effect evaluation indicated no interference in the PASS analyses.

The PASS was designed for both normal and post-accident operation. The PASS will be used on a daily basis, if practical, thus providing an up-to-date status of equipment and trained operators. The staff determined that these provisions meet Criterion (10) of Item II.B.3 in NUREG-0737, and are, therefore, acceptable.

Criterion (11):

In the design of the post-accident sampling and analysis capability, consideration should be given to the following items:

(a) Provisions for purging sample lines, for reducing plateout in sample line, for minimizing sample loss of distoration, for preventing blockage of sample lines by loose material in the RCS or containment, for appropriate disposal of the samples, and for flow restrictions to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line. The post-accident reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples should be representative of the reactor coolant in the core area and the containment atmosphere following a transient or accident. The sample lines should be as short as possible to minimize the volume of fluid to be taken from containment. The residues of sample collection should be returned to containment or to a closed system.

(b) The ventilation exhaust from the sampling station should be filtered with charcoal adsorbers and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.

The licensee has addressed provisions of purging and recirculation back to containment to ensure samples are representative, and redundant isolation valves to limit reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line. To limit iodine plateout, the containment atmosphere sample line is heat traced. The PASS sample panel is exhausted to a HEPA and charcoal filter ventilation system. By purging to containment, the licensee is minimizing discharges of radioactivity during sampling. The staff determined that these provisions meet Criterion (11) of Item II.B.3 of NUREG-0737, and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the evaluation of the licensee's submittal, the staff concludes that the Post-Accident Sampling System meets ten of the eleven criteria of Item II.B.3 in NUREG-0737. The licensee partially meets Criterion (2) by establishing an onsite radiological and chemical analysis capability for estimation of reactor core damage. This is acceptable on an interim basis. The licensee has committed to provide a plant specific procedure to estimate the extent of core damage by August 1, 1984, in order to fully meet Criterion (2). The procedure will be reviewed by the staff upon submittal.

4.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

F. Witt prepared this Safety Evaluation.

Dated: April 24, 1984