Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

FILE
D. Lanham

50-
237

August 7, 1978

1978 AUG 22 PM 1 2
US NRC DISTRIBUTION SERVICES BRANCH
INFO DISTRIBUTION SERVICES UNIT

BBS Ltr. #78-1148

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #78-042/03L-0, Docket #050-237 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

AUG 9 1978

A002
S
11

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	Licensee Code (2)	I L D R S 2
01	License Number (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
01	License Type (4)	4 1 1 1 1
01	CAT (5)	
01 CON'T	Report Source (6)	L
01	Docket Number (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7
01	Event Date (8)	0 7 0 8 7 8
01	Report Date (9)	0 8 0 3 7 8

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On 7-8-78 at 2330 hrs during weekly turbine control vlv exercising #3 control vlv failed to fast close at the 10% vlv position. This event is contrary to Technical Specifications which require two channels be operable per trip system in case of a generator load reject. The fast acting solenoids are utilized to close the control valves. A load reduction began immediately. The reactor scram was automatically by-passed at less than 45%. This has not happened before at Dresden.

System Code (11)	Cause Code (12)	Cause Subcode (13)	Component Code (14)	Comp. Subcode (15)	Valve Subcode (16)
H A	E	B	I N S T R U	C	Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17)

Event Year		Sequential Report No.		Occurrence Code	Report Type		Revision No.
7 8	—	0 4 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

Action Taken (18)	Future Action (19)	Effect on Plant (20)	Shutdown Method (21)	Hours (22)	Attachment Submitted (23)	NPRD-4 Form Sub. (24)	Prime Comp. Supplier (25)	Component Manufacturer (26)
A	Z	B	Z	0 0 8 0	Y	N	X	X 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Investigation of the #3 control vlv revealed that an electrical terminal lug on the fast acting solenoid had become deteriorated and had finally broken off. The terminal lug was replaced and the vlv tested satisfactorily. Unit returned to higher power operation. No further corrective action necessary.

Facility Status (28)	% Power (29)	Other Status (30)	Method of Discovery (31)	Discovery Description (32)
E	0 8 9	NA	B	Turbine Control Vlv Exersing

Activity Released (33)	Content of Release (34)	Amount of Activity (35)	Location of Release (36)
Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Number (37)	Type (38)	Description (39)
0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Number (40)	Description (41)
0 0 0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

Type (42)	Description (43)
Z	NA

PUBLICITY

Issued (44)	Description (45)
N	NA

NRC USE ONLY

M. Korchynsky X-265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-042/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-2 (ILDRS-2)
DOCKET # 050-237

During weekly turbine control valve exercising per DOS 5600-2, #3 control valve failed to fast close from 10% valve position. Valve was exercised four times without fast closure operation. Tech Spec 3.1 requires two trip channels operable in case of a generator load reject. The fast acting solenoids are utilized to close the control valves following a generator load reject condition. Since the #3 control valve would not fast close at the 10% position load reduction was begun immediately with the unit at 700 MWe. The reactor scram was by-passed when the reactor was less than 45% power. This event has not occurred previously at Dresden.

Investigation of the #3 control valve revealed that an electricial terminal lug on the fast acting solenoid had become deteriorated and had finally broken off. The terminal lug was replaced and the valve tested satisfactorily. Unit returned to higher power operation. No further corrective action necessary.