Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

D. LANHAM

BBS Ltr. #76-599

August 9, 1976



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Iperations - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1976-49. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

Arthur M Roberts
for B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:jo

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

8298

AUG 12 1976

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	ILDRS2	00-000000-00	4 1 1 1 1	03
(7–8)	(9–14)	(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T		L	L	050-0237	071176	080976
(7–8)	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 DURING CORE SPRAY SYSTEM VALVE OPERABILITY TESTING (REQUIRED FOR REMOVING
03 THE UNIT 2/3 DIESEL GENERATOR FROM SERVICE), CORE SPRAY OUTBOARD INJECTION VALVE
04 MO 2-1402-24B LOST OPEN/CLOSED INDICATION AND COULD NOT BE ELECTRICALLY REOPENED.
05 THE REDUNDANT CORE SPRAY LOOP WAS OPERABLE, AS WERE BOTH LPCI SUBSYSTEMS. SIM-
06 ILAR FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED TWICE IN THE PAST: ON 2/5/71 (MO 2-1402-24B), AND
(SEE ATTACHED SHEET)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	SF	E	VALVOP	N	P195	N
(7–8)	(9–10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 THE VALVE FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY A BROKEN LIMIT SWITCH CONTACT BLOCK IN
09 THE VALVE OPERATOR. THE PLASTIC BLOCK, WHICH HAD BEEN TESTED BY THE MANUFAC-
10 TURER WITH A FORCE OF UP TO 8 G'S IN ALL DIRECTIONS, APPARENTLY SUSTAINED SOME
(SEE ATTACHED SHEET)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	E	095	NA	B	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	NA	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000	Z	
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 NA

19

NAME: J. KOLANOWSKI PHONE: EXT. 265

GPO 881-667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)

on 11/27/74 (MO 3-1402-24A).
(50-237/1976-49)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)

damage from water hammer in the core spray system. Before installation of the ECCS jockey pump charging system, inadequate system venting caused several water hammer incidents to occur on both Units 2 and 3 during normal core spray system surveillance tests. During these incidents, it is conjectured, the valve limit switch block was jarred to the point of cracking, and eventually failed after many subsequent valve cycles. Since May, 1971, surveillance procedures which require system venting prior to testing have been used in conjunction with the ECCS charging system to prevent a recurrence of water hammer conditions. No further action is considered necessary.

The failed limit switch block was replaced, and valve MO 2-1402-24B was cycled normally several times before being returned to service. Valve 1402-24B is a 10-inch Crane model 783U gate valve; the valve operator is a Limitorque model SMB-1, manufactured by Philadelphia Gear Co.