Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

August 26, 1977

BBS Ltr. #77-781

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Regulatory File Cy.

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report #50-237/1977-28. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. R. Shelton for 8/26
B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

7725001 18

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	1LDRS2	00-00000-00	4111	03
(7–8)	(9–14)	(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T	[ ]	L	L	050-0237	072877	082677
(7–8)	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During routine operator plant inspection at 1830 hours on July 28, 1977 the water
03 tight buckhead door which provides flood protection to the containment cooling service
04 water (CCSW) vault was found open. During the previous shift, a water hose was run
05 through the water tight door to allow flushing of the condenser sodium hypochlorite
06 injection lines. The hose was immediately removed and the door closed. The door had

(OVER)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	SB	A	ZZZZZZ	Z	Z999	N
(7–9)	(10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The event was caused by personnel error. The maintenance personnel who flushed the
09 sodium hypochlorite lines were unaware that the door was required to be closed when
10 left unattended. To ensure personnel will be aware of this requirement, permanent

(OVER)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	E	065	NA	B	During Routine Operator Inspection
(7–8)	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	NA	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA
(7–9) (80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA
(7–9) (80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 NA
(7–9) (80)

19
(7–9) (80)

NAME: Pietryga PHONE: 265

GPO 881-667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued)

been left open for approximately four (4) hours. The safety implications of the event were minimized since the water tight bulkhead door leading to the condensate pit was closed and the redundant level switches in the condenser pit were operable. Inaddition, the condensate pump room high level alarm switch was operable and would have alerted the control room operator to a flooding condition. This event is not a repetitive occurrence (50-237/1977-28).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (continued)

signs will be posted at the bulkhead doors on both units 2 and 3. The signs are currently on order and are expected to be posted by January, 1978.