D. Lanham

Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
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Telephone 815/942-2920



September 1, 1977

BBS Ltr. #77-783

Regulatory File Cy

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence Report #50-237/1977-29. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

for Arthur M Roberts
B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

SEP 6 1977

7725C0100

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	ILDRS 2	00–00000–00	4 1 1 1 1	0 3
	(7–8 / 9–14)	(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T		L	L	0 5 0 – 0 2 3 7	0 8 0 2 7 7	0 9 0 1 7 7
	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During routine one-half core scram testing, control rod drives (CRD's) F-5 & H-7 un-
03 coupled and overtravelled when withdrawn to position 48 following testing. This
04 event has little safety significance since uncoupled CRD's still retain the same
05 capability to scram as before uncoupling. This event occurred previously with CRD
06 F-5 on December 12, 1976 (Reportable Occurrence #50-237/1976-68). CRD's F5 & H-7
(CONTINUED)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	R B	E	C R D R V E	N	G 0 8 0	N
	(9–10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Inspection of control rod drives (CRD's) which have previously experienced this event
09 indicates that improper inner filter installation is probably responsible for the un-
10 coupling. If the inner filter becomes unlatched, full withdrawal of the CRD to
(CONTINUED)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	E	0 6 6		B	NA
	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	NA	NA
	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	0 0 0	Z	NA
	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	0 0 0	NA
	(9–11)	(12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA (9–80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	NA
	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA (9–80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 NA (9–80)

19 [ ] (9–80)

NAME: Michael Parcell PHONE: 265

GPO 881-667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued)

were recoupled according to procedure and recoupling verified by observing no overtravel indication when each CRD was twice withdrawn to position 48.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (continued)

position 48 can result in uncoupling. Symptoms of this event indicate that CRD's F-5 and H-7 have the same inner filter problem. As a result they are scheduled for an overhaul which will include a detailed disassembly inspection at the next unit 2 refueling outage.

If inner filter unlatching is determined to be the problem, C.E.Co. Quality Control will perform future inner filter installation and testing. For a more detailed discussion of the corrective action mentioned above, refer to a recent letter from M.S. Turbak on May 10, 1977 to D.K. Davis, Acting Chief Operating Reactors, Branch #2, Division of Operating Reactors.