




Commonwealth Edison
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Regulatory


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WPW Ltr. #27-74



Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, IL 60450

January 11, 1974



J. F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSES DPR-19 & 25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 & 3, SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

References: 1) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations

Telephone: Mr. Maura, 1500 hours, January 2, 1974
Mr. Maura, 1445 hours, January 3, 1974
Mr. Maura, 1500 hours, January 4, 1974
Telegram: Mr. Keppler, 1625 hours, January 3, 1974

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of the units at about 2030 hours on January 1, 1974. At this time it was observed that two 5 inch diameter electrical penetrations through the turbine building to the reactor building wall were open. This condition appeared to be contrary to section 3.7.C.1 of the Technical Specifications which requires that the Standby Gas Treatment System be capable of maintaining a $\frac{1}{2}$ inch of water vacuum on the reactor building. Subsequent testing, however, verified that during the period the penetrations were open the Standby Gas Treatment System would have been capable of meeting the requirements of section 3.7.C.1.

PROBLEM

While conducting a plant tour on Unit #2 it was noted that a 5 inch diameter electrical penetration between the reactor building and turbine building was open. The penetration was opened to route one 3/8 inch cable for torus to drywell vacuum breaker "open" alarms in the control room. Inspection of the similar penetration on Unit #3 revealed the same situation. At the time of discovery both units were operating with power at 704 MWe and 638 MWe on Units #2 and #3 respectively. Operating Department personnel immediately made a temporary seal for both penetrations and at 2142 hours started the Standby Gas Treatment System to verify the capability of maintaining secondary containment ($\frac{1}{2}$ inch of water vacuum). The test was successful.

January 11, 1973

On January 3, 1973 secondary containment testing was conducted with the temporary seal on the electrical penetrations open to determine if secondary containment could have been maintained prior to the discovery of the open penetrations. Testing at this time indicated that a $\frac{1}{2}$ inch of water vacuum could not be maintained. This test failure was reported in the referenced telegram to Mr. Keppler. Later the same day the two penetrations were permanently sealed with silicone sealant "RTV". Further investigation into the testing problem revealed that the reactor building ventilation isolation valves had not been isolated as specified by the test procedure. Consequently, outside air was being drawn into the reactor building by the Standby Gas Treatment System. This infiltration flow is not part of the secondary containment test.

Two similar spare penetrations were opened the following day, January 4, 1974, and another secondary containment test conducted. The ventilation isolation valves were isolated as would be the case if a high radiation level were monitored in the reactor building. This time the reactor building did maintain the required $\frac{1}{2}$ inch of water vacuum. A test manometer was utilized on the four reactor building walls to determine the building D/P.

The readings were: north wall - 0.26" H₂O
east wall - 0.26" H₂O
south wall - 0.24" H₂O
west wall - 0.27" H₂O
avg - 0.2575" H₂O

INVESTIGATION

Investigation into the open penetrations revealed that the cables were routed by contractors July 1, 1973. At that time the contractors did not have any silicone sealant "RTV" available. At that time, as a temporary measure, Johns-Manville Duxseal was used. Somehow, during the six month interval, the duxseal became dislodged.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

On January 3, 1974, the two electrical penetrations were permanently sealed.

EVALUATIONS

This situation did not endanger public health or safety. Because it was initially believed that secondary containment could not be maintained with two open penetrations the deviation was reported as an abnormal occurrence requiring reporting in 10 days. However, upon additional testing it was determined that secondary containment could still have been maintained, thus negating the reporting requirement. Consequently this deviation is being reported as a 10 day letter even though it is not required.

January 11, 1974

To minimize the possibility of a recurring situation, the responsible contractor has been made aware, in writing, of the seriousness of his failure to make a permanent seal or make periodic inspections of his temporary seal. Also, the company's cognizant engineer following this particular job has had the importance of secondary containment explained to him by station management. Continued operation during the six month interval has been justified and with the permanent sealing of the two penetrations the secondary containment has been restored to a normal condition.

Sincerely,

W. P. Worden

W. P. Worden
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

WPW/slb