


William E. Caldwell  
Vice President


Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003  
Telephone (212) 460-5181

Regulatory

File Cy.



June 15, 1973



Re Indian Point Unit No. 2  
AEC Docket No. 50-247  
Facility Operating  
License DPR-26

Mr. John P. O'Leary  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary

The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-8 is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1.B of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On June 7, 1973, while performing periodic tests and calibration checks relating to reactor coolant flow, it was determined that the flow trip settings were below those required by Technical Specification 2.3.1.B-(6). At the time of occurrence, the reactor was critical at zero power for zero power physics testing.

The discrepancy is believed to have resulted from an improper initial calibration, or possibly, instrument drift. To correct the situation, the instruments were reset so that their outputs would initiate a trip at the reactor coolant flow condition prescribed by these setpoints in the Technical Specifications. During future calibration checks, particular attention will be paid to these instruments to enable a more definitive determination as to the cause of the problem.

Safety implications relating to this occurrence are considered to be slight. The discrepancies in the flow instrument outputs were detected during a routine surveillance test which is performed monthly. Furthermore, there are two additional trip circuits providing reactor protection against a loss of coolant flow incident. Even if two of the three flow instruments in a particular coolant loop failed to detect a low coolant flow in that loop, a signal from the pump circuit breaker opening or from low voltage or low frequency on the pump power supply bus would also trip the plant. It should also be noted that

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Mr. John P. O'Leary  
Atomic Energy Commission


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June 15, 1973

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the low coolant flow trip circuitry only serves to protect the reactor in the event that one or two reactor coolant pumps become inoperative while the reactor is operating at or near rated power. Operation of the reactor up until the time the discrepancy was noted had not involved power levels in excess of 5% of the rated value. Finally, none of the setpoints were found to be set below 87% of full reactor coolant flow. In the accident analysis discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report, it was assumed that the trip signal was initiated at 87%. Hence, the related safety implications to this occurrence are slight.

Very truly yours



Peter Zarakas  
Assistant Vice President

md