Regulatory File Cy.



Con Edison
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003

January 28, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
Operating License DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-5



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations, Region I
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly,

In accordance with the requirements of Section 6.12.2a of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following report is submitted.

On January 23, 1974 at approximately 1538 hours a slight reactor coolant system pressure transient above the Technical Specifications limit was experienced in the course of placing a reactor coolant pump in service. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted and a reactor coolant system temperature of about 190^{0}F.

In order to heat the reactor coolant system to 547^{0}F preparatory to returning the plant to service following completion of repairs associated with the November 13, 1973 feedwater line break incident, the first reactor coolant pump was placed in service following prescribed procedures. These procedures entailed the establishment of a nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer to act as a surge volume for the start of the first pump. Upon starting the pump, the reactor coolant system pressure increased to 525 psig. and 510 psig. as indicated on two installed drag pressure gages. The pressure was immediately brought down to the desired 425 psig. by operator action. Technical Specification 3.1.B.1.a states that for indicated temperatures at or below 220^{0}F the maximum indicated pressure shall not exceed 500 psig.

There was no damage incurred to any system or component as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude nor was there any reason to expect any. The transient experienced was much less

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than those previously reported and demonstrates the effectiveness of a gas blanket in eliminating or minimizing pressure surges when starting the first pump. We believe this particular transient was due to an insufficient volume of nitrogen in the pressurizer and we plan to modify our procedure to insure the proper amount.

Mr. Anthony Fasano of your office was informed of this occurrence by Mr. John Makepeace on January 24, 1974.

Very truly yours,

Warren R. Cobean

Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. John F. O'Leary