



Commonwealth Edison
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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 Morris, Illinois 60450
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D. Sanlam

FILE

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August 28, 1978

BBS LTR #78-1223

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 799 Roosevelt Road
 Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence "Update Report" #78-017/01X-1, Docket #050-249 is being submitted to your office to correct the Cause Code and Cause Subcode (Items 12 and 13) used in the original Licensee Event Report 78-017/01T-0. The report concerned a potential problem which had been postulated with the designed logic system.

Only items (12) & (13) on the original report form have been reclassified to indicate a design error. No other changes have been made. This event was reported to you under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.(1), performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.

B.B. Stephenson
 B.B. Stephenson
 Station Superintendent
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/deb

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
 Director of Management Information & Program Control
 File/NRC

AUG 31 1978

*1002
 5/11*

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Update Report Previous
Rep. Date: 5/5/78

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] [I][L][D][R][S][3][0][0]-[0][0][0][0][0]-[0][0][4][1][1][1][1] [5]
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
[0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L][6][0][5][0][0][2][4][9][0][4][2][1][7][8] [8][0][8][2][8][7][8] [9]
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0][2] [During normal Unit 2 operation and routine Unit 3 refueling operations on April 21,
[0][3] 1978 the NRC requested immediate actions be taken to mitigate the potential for a
[0][4] spurious closure of a recirculation loop suction valve. This situation has not been
[0][5] previously analyzed and is reportable per section 6.6.B.1.(i) of the Technical
[0][6] Specifications
[0][7]
[0][8]

[0][9] SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
[S][F][11] [B][12] [A][13] [X][X][X][X][X][X][14] [Z][15] [Z][16]

[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7][8] EVENT YEAR [21] [22]
[] CAUSE CODE [] SHUTDOWN METHOD [] HOURS [] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [] REPORT TYPE [] REVISION NO. []
[0][1][7] [] [0][1] [X] [] [1]

ACTION TAKEN [F][18] FUTURE ACTION [Z][19] EFFECT ON PLANT [Z][20] SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z][21]
HOURS [0][0][0][0][22] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y][23] NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [N][24] PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [Z][25] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [Z][9][9][9][26]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1][0] [On April 21, 1978, to comply with the NRC request a Mod. was initiated for each unit
[1][1] which will defeat that portion of the LPCI Loop Select Logic which auto closes the
[1][2] suction valves. This Mod. is presently pending SNED approval. As an interim solution
[1][3] both recirc. loop suction valve circuit breakers will be taken O.O.S. in the open
[1][4] position.

[1][5] FACILITY STATUS [H][28] % POWER [0][0][0][29] OTHER STATUS [NA][30] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [D][31] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [NRC Notification][32]

[1][6] ACTIVITY CONTENT [Z][33] RELEASED OF RELEASE [Z][34] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA][35] LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA][36]

[1][7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0][0][0][37] TYPE [Z][38] DESCRIPTION [NA][39]

[1][8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0][0][0][40] DESCRIPTION [NA][41]

[1][9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z][42] DESCRIPTION [NA][43]

[2][0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N][44] DESCRIPTION [NA][45] NRC USE ONLY
NAME OF PREPARER J. Wujciga PHONE: 265

7-926

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-017/01X-1
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT-3 (ILDRS-3)
DOCKET #050-249

During normal Unit 2 operation at 820MWe and routine Unit 3 refueling operations on April 21, 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that adequate action be taken immediately to mitigate the potential for a spurious closure of a recirculation Loop Suction Valve with a LOCA occurring between the loop discharge and suction valves. This situation, which had not been considered in the current LOCA analysis, could decrease the reactor water inventory while reactor pressure remained high. Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.(i) requires reporting of performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.

On April 21, 1978, to comply with the above NRC request, a modification was initiated for each unit. The modification will defeat only that portion of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Loop Select Logic which automatically closes the recirculation loop suction valves. The Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) is currently reviewing the modification. The Unit 3 modification will not be completed until a later unit outage of sufficient duration occurs following SNED approval. As an interim solution, both recirculation loop suction valve circuit breakers will be taken out-of-service with the valves in the open position. While in this condition the LPCI System will continue to function as originally analyzed. Operation of the suction valves will be permitted per operating order #27-78 if an operational event occurs which requires the suction valve to be closed. In this case both the loop discharge valve and discharge bypass valve will also be closed thereby isolating the recirculation loop.