



**Commonwealth Edison**  
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
 R.R. #1  
 Morris, Illinois 60450  
 Telephone 815/942-2920

*D. Sanham*

FILE

July 14, 1978

BBS Ltr. #78-1030

James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 799 Roosevelt Road  
 Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DIS. DIVISION SERVICES  
 HANSON

1978 JUL 26 PM 5 14

REG. DIST. UNIT  
 SERVICES UNIT

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-059/01X-1, Docket #050-249 is hereby submitted to your office to supplement Licensee Event Report 77-059/01T-0 concerning the Unit 3 Diesel Generator Feed Breaker to Bus 34-1 pulled to lock. It addresses the corrective actions implemented to prevent a recurrence. This event was reported to you under Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.(f), personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR.

*B.B. Stephenson*  
 B.B. Stephenson  
 Superintendent  
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/kmh

Enclosure

CC: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
 Director of Management Information & Program Control  
 File/NRC

JUL 18 1978

*A002  
 S/11*

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [1][2][3][4][5][6] ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	I	L	D	R	S	3	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4	5
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	LICENSE NUMBER						25	26	LICENSE TYPE						30	57	CAT	58	

0	1	R	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	4	9	7	1	2	2	8	7	7	8	0	7	1	4	7	8	9		
7	8	REPORT SOURCE		60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE						74	75	REPORT DATE						80

#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

② While Unit 3 was at steady-state operation, 2/3 diesel was taken out of service for

③ inspection. However, the operator mistakenly pulled the U3 D/G to Bus 34-1 switch to

④ lock and placed the out-of-service card there, thus making the U3 D/G inoperable in

⑤ that the feedbreaker would not close in case of loss of offsite power. The mistake

⑥ was discovered and corrected in three hours and in this period offsite power was

⑦ available. This is not a repetitive event.

0	8	7	8	9
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0	9	E	E	11	A	12	A	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16	7	7	7	7	0	5	9	0	1	X	1
7	8	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE						COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		
33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	47	ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	H	H	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	N	Z	Z	9	9	9		

#### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ⑳

⑩ Mistake was promptly corrected and operator was instructed of the error. Operating

⑪ personnel have been made aware of the importance of avoiding operating errors.

⑫ Shift starting times have been moved up 1/2 hr. In addition, the station will continue

⑬ the policy of independently verifying all safety related equipment outages.

1	4	7	8	9
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1	5	E	28	0	7	0	29	NA	30	A	31	NRC Personnel Inspection	32					
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	METHOD OF DISCOVERY				DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION				80	
1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36	ACTIVITY CONTENT				LOCATION OF RELEASE				80
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES				PERSONNEL INJURIES				80		
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				PUBLCITY				80
7	8	9	10	11	12	44	45	80	ISSUED DESCRIPTION				NRC USE ONLY				80	
1	9	Z	42	NA	43	NAME OF PREPARER				PHONE								
7	8	9	10	11	12	44	45	68	69	80	J. Chan		222					

NAME OF PREPARER J. Chan

PHONE: 222

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-059/01X-1  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT 3 (ILDRS-3)  
DOCKET # 050-249

At 0545 on December 28, 1977, while Unit 3 was at steady-state operation, the Unit 2/3 diesel generator was taken out of service for a monthly maintenance inspection. The diesel was taken out of service locally, and the 2/3 D/G to Bus 33-1 feed breaker was racked out. However, the operator in the Control Room mistakenly put the out-of-service card on the 3 D/G to Bus 34-1 breaker switch and placed that switch in the pull to lock position. In doing this the 3 D/G was made inoperable because in the event of a loss of offsite power, the diesel would not auto close to Bus 34-1. The mistake was discovered at 0850 on the same date and was immediately corrected. In the 3-hour period Unit 3 diesel generator was inoperable, off-site power was available. In addition, the Unit 3 diesel could have been returned to operation by placing the breaker control switch (to Bus 34-1) to the normal position had offsite power been lost, because the feed breaker was not racked out. This is not a repetitive event.

Immediately after discovery of the mistake, proper corrective action was taken. The operator was instructed of the error. All diesel generator switches in the control room have been color coded to identify different diesel generators. Through the company Professionalism Program, the Station has made operating personnel aware of the importance of avoiding operating errors. Shift starting times have been moved up ½ hour to enable the control room operators to conduct a more thorough operational walk down of their control boards before the peak periods of surveillance and maintenance related work. Additionally, the station will continue to use double independent verification to ensure the proper removal and return to service of safety related and technical specification related equipment.