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April 21, 1978

BBS LTR #758-78

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #78-015/03L-0, Docket #050-249 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(b), conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

B. B. Stephenson

Station Superintendent

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:cac

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Birector of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	EICENSEL EVENT REFORM
	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
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CON'T	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9 7 0 3 3 0 7 8 8 0 4 2 1 7 8 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
.	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2	During required inspection to check 10% of all hydraulic snubbers during refueling,
0 3	one snubber in drywell was functionally inoperable by bench test. Safety implications
0 4	were minimal because there have been no seismic events requiring the shock arresting
0 5	capability of the failed snubbers and redundant ECCS systems were available.
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, 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
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	LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 17 REPORT NUMBER 21 23 23 24 26 27 28 29 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT METHOD HOURS 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER MANUFACTURER 23 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. PRIM
110	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Failures resulted from heat and radiation which promote fluid leakage from deal deter-
	ioration and possible change in fluid viscosity. This operability test is in addition
1 2	to the accessible and inaccessible snubber inspections performed earlier and provides
1 3	additional means of verifying operability. Snubber was subsequently replaced with
14	Mechanical snubber.
7 . 8	9 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
1 5	H 28 0 0 0 0 29 NA B 31 Observation during test
	10
7 8	9 10 11 44 45 80.:
1 7	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) O 0 2 37 E 38 100 MR-Contractors
, 8 	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41
7 8	9 11 12 80
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION NA
7 8	9 10 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY
2 0	
7 8	9 10 80 5

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-015/03L-0 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE) DRESDEN UNIT 3 (ILDRS3) DOCKET #050-249

In accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.I, 10% of the safety-related hydraulic snubbers were functionally tested during refueling outage to verify their operability. These tests were performed in addition to and separate from the prior inaccessible and accessible snubber inspections and were performed to further verify reliability of snubbers. Five (5) snubbers were removed for testing--Three (3) from the drywell, one (1) from the torus and one (1) from the isolation condenser pipeway. Of these five, one snubber (#15) from the drywell failed to perform as intended. As required by Tech Specs a work request was then initiated to remove an additional 10% for operability testing as required by Technical Specification. These additional five (5) were subsequently bench tested for operability and all performed satisfactorily.

The characteristics of failure for this snubber are the same as explained in Licensee Event Report #78-10-01T-0. This report described the reasons for the failure of six (6) snubbers that were tested under the "Inaccessible Snubber Inspection" requirements.

The snubber was for seismic protection of LPCI Line 1506-16", which connects into the "B" recirc loop for injection into the reactor vessel. Safety implications were minimal because there has been no need for seismic protection during this operating cycle and redundant ECCS systems were available.