




**Commonwealth Edison**  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R.R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
Telephone 815/942-2920

*D. Lankam*

# REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

November 23, 1977

BBS LTR #1095-77



James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-047/03L-0, Docket #050-249 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.(c), observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in engineered safety feature systems.

B.B. Stephenson  
Station Superintendent  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:dlz

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement  
Director of Management Information & Program Control  
File/NRC

NOV 30 1977

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE: ILDRS3; LICENSE NUMBER: 000-00000000000000000000; LICENSE TYPE: 41111; CAT 58: 4

REPORT SOURCE: L; DOCKET NUMBER: 05000249; EVENT DATE: 102677; REPORT DATE: 112377

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES: During normal Unit 3 operation, surveillance program review revealed violation of T.S.1.0.CC.b maximum combined interval time by 3.5 days for HPCI monthly valve and pump operability. This event had little safety significance since the HPCI pump and valves operated normally when the late surveillance was performed. Previous surveillance interval discrepancies were reported in LER's 50-237/77-6; 50-249/77-6, 31; 50-237/76-71; 50-249/76-36.

SYSTEM CODE: ZZ; CAUSE CODE: A; CAUSE SUBCODE: B; COMPONENT CODE: ZZZZZZZZ; COMP. SUBCODE: Z; VALVE SUBCODE: Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 77; EVENT YEAR: 77; SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 047; OCCURRENCE CODE: 03; REPORT TYPE: L; REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: H; FUTURE ACTION: X; EFFECT ON PLANT: Z; SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z; HOURS: 0000; ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y; NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N; PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z; COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z999

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Manual tracking of HPCI surveillance combined interval was overlooked resulting in its late performance. A new computer surveillance tracking system has been instituted which provides each department a weekly list of surveillances due based on both single and combined interval requirements. This corrective action should be sufficient.

FACILITY STATUS: E; % POWER: 096; OTHER STATUS: NA; METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B; DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Review of Surveillance Records

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE: Z; AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA; LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 000; TYPE: Z; DESCRIPTION: NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 000; DESCRIPTION: NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z; DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION: N; NAME OF PREPARER: M. Parcell; PHONE: 265

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-047/03L-0  
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)  
DRESDEN UNIT 3 (ILDRS-3)  
DOCKET # 050-249

During normal Unit 3 operation, a review of completed surveillances revealed that the intervals between completion of the HPCI monthly valve and pump operability surveillance had exceeded the maximum combined time interval for any three consecutive intervals of 3.25 times the specified single surveillance interval by (T.S.1.0.CC.b)

The surveillance was performed on the following dates:



D-3  
(May 11)  
(June 14)  
(July 20)  
(Aug. 22)

When the HPCI surveillance is performed within the maximum single interval period, it is still possible to exceed the maximum combined interval for any three consecutive intervals. The manual tracking of the HPCI surveillance combined interval was overlooked, resulting in late performance of the surveillance. In order to prevent surveillance interval discrepancies, a new computer surveillance tracking and monitoring system was instituted on 8-1-77. This system utilizes both the single interval and combined interval requirements to determine a due date and a latest date due. A weekly surveillance list is sent to each department listing the surveillances due the next week. As the surveillances are performed, the completion date is entered into the computer for use in future due date determinations. After initiation of the new system, however, three intervals are required for the system to become effective in preventing exceeding the combined interval requirements. This is the reason the surveillance interval was exceeded after implementation of the new computer system. No additional corrective action is planned.

This event had little safety significance since the HPCI pump and valves operated normally when the late surveillance was performed. Previous surveillance interval discrepancies were reported in LER's 50-237/77-6; 50-249/77-6, 31; 50-237/76-71; 50-249/76-36.