

Regulatory File Cy

BBS Ltr. #41/2

DOCKETED USARG

May 27, 1976

Mr. James G. Keppter, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations -Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137



Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence number 50-249/1976-7. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:smp

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
 Director of Management Information & Program Control
 File/NRC

5591

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) LICENSEE LICENSE TYPE LICENSE NUMBER 00-0000-00 0 9 2 8 7 6 69 DOCKET NUMBER REPORT DATE 050-0249 **EVENT DESCRIPTION** operation Following The removal of The normal 80 80 80 Fillers were received COMPONENT COMPONENT MANUFACTURER COMPONENT CODE VIOLATION CAUSE DESCRIPTION 08 The explosion is not known. 80 the hydrogen ignited WAS 80 10 electricity. 80 METHOD OF DISCOVERY OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION % POWER STATUS a 46 CONTENT OF RELEASE ACTIVITY RELEASED AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE |V|282<u>5</u> 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 13 000 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION NUMBER OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES GSEP offsite alert For environs LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY DESCRIPTION TYPE 10 80 **PUBLICITY** ress 80 **ADDITIONAL FACTORS** lease 0500 80 Sargen PHONE: 942- 2920

## EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued)

and reactor power was reduced to clear the alarms. After the alarms had cleared, power was slowly increased until 0450 hours, when an apparent off-gas explosion occurred. Reactor power was further reduced to approximately 360 MWe. Standby steam jet air ejector (SJAE) "3A" was placed in service. However, further investigation indicated that the rupture diaphragm in both SJAE's had been damaged, and a unit shutdown was initiated and completed by 1038 hours. Off-gas system explosions have occurred previously on both units 2 and 3. Corrective action implemented was replacement of the failed diaphragms and the "3B" off-gas filter. (050-249/76-7)

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION (continued)

The explosion apparently failed both SJAE diaphragms at the same time. It is assumed that the pressure wave failed the rupture diaphragms in both the operating SJAE "3B" and the standby SJAE "3A" due to leakage through the discharge valve. Although personnel on shift at the time reported hearing two explosions, no evidence could be found to support this theory. The "3B" off-gas filter in service at the time of the explosion was damaged and subsequently replaced. Prior to the unit startup, both filters were tested and off-gas system valve lineups were verified to be correct.

An investigation of this and other previous off-gas explosions has been initiated. The investigation will address the origin and prevention of off-gas system explosions.