UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
DOCKET NO. 50-244
R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 33
License No. DPR-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated November 21, 1988 and supplemented on November 29, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 33 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective immediately.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard H. Wessman, Director
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: MAR 3 0 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 33

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18

DOCKET NO. 50-244

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3.2-1	3.2-1
---	3.3.2a*
3.3-4	3.3-4
---	3.3-4a*
3.3-14	3.3-14
4.5-3	4.5-3
4.5-8 thru 4.5-10	4.5-8 thru 4.5-10
---	4.5-11*

*Denotes new page

3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System

Applicability

Applies to the operational status of the chemical and volume control system.

Objective

To define those conditions of the chemical and volume control system necessary to assure safe reactor operation.

Specification

3.2.1 When fuel is in the reactor there shall be at least one flow path to the core for boric acid injection. The minimum capability for boric acid injection shall be equivalent to that supplied from the refueling water storage tank.

3.2.2 The reactor shall not be taken above cold shutdown unless the following Chemical and Volume Control System conditions are met.

a. At least two charging pumps shall be operable.

b. Both boric acid transfer pumps shall be operable.

c. The boric acid tanks together shall contain a minimum of 2000 gallons of a 12% to 13% by weight boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 145°F (See also Specification 3.3.1.1.j).

j. At or above a reactor coolant system pressure and temperature of 1600 psig and 350°F, except during performance of RCS hydro test, the boric acid tanks together shall contain a minimum of 3110 gallons of boric acid above the setpoint for switchover to the RWST. This solution shall be 12% to 13% by weight boric acid at a temperature of at least 145°F. Below 1600 psig or 350°F the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 apply.

b. One residual heat removal heat exchanger may be out of service for a period of no more than 72 hours.

c. Any valve, interlock, or piping required for the functioning of one safety injection train and/or one low heat safety injection train (RHR) may be inoperable provided repairs are completed within 72 hours (except as specified in e. below).

d. Power may be restored to any valve referenced in 3.3.1.1.g for the purposes of valve testing provided no more than one such valve has power restored and provided testing is completed and power removed within 12 hours.

e. Those check valves specified in 3.3.1.1.h may be inoperable (greater than 5.0 gpm leakage) provided the inline MOVs are de-energized closed and repairs are completed within 12 hours.

3.3.1.6 The requirements of 3.3.1.1.j may be modified to allow one boric acid tank to be out of service provided a minimum of 3110 gallons of boric acid above the setpoint for switchover to the RWST is contained in the operable tank. This solution shall be 12% to 13% by weight boric acid at a temperature of at least 145°F. If the modified requirement cannot be met within one hour, be in hot shutdown and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours.

3.3.1.7 Except during diesel generator load and safeguard sequence testing or when the vessel head is removed, or the steam generator primary system manway is open, no more than one safety injection pump shall be operable whenever the overpressure protection system is required to be operable.

3.3.1.7.1 Whenever only one safety injection pump may be operable by 3.3.1.7, at least two of the three safety injection pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable a minimum of once per twelve hours by verifying that the control switches are in the pull-stop position.

a single PORV.

The limitation on boric acid storage tank volume is based on the assumption that 2000 gallons of 12% to 13% solution is delivered to the RCS during a large steam line break associated with the containment integrity analysis.[10] The 3110 gallons specified is sufficient to accommodate the losses associated with the recirculation flow to the RWST and the sweep volume in the SI pump suction line and still deliver 2000 gallons to the RCS.

References

(1) Deleted

(2) UFSAR Section 6.3.3.1

(3) UFSAR Section 6.2.2.1

(4) UFSAR Section 15.6.4.3

(5) UFSAR Section 9.2.2.4

(6) UFSAR Section 9.2.2.4

(7) Deleted

(8) UFSAR Section 9.2.1.2

(9) UFSAR Section 6.2.1.1 (Containment Integrity) and UFSAR Section 6.4 (CR Emergency Air Treatment)

(10) Westinghouse Analysis, "Report for the BAST Concentration for R.E. Ginna", August 1985 submitted by RG&E letter from R.W. Kober to H.R. Denton, dated October 16, 1985.

b. Acceptable levels of performance for the pumps shall be that the pumps start, operate, and develop the minimum discharge pressure for the flows listed in the table below:

PUMPS	RECYCLE FLOW RATE	DISCHARGE PRESSURE	Notes
Containment Spray Pumps	35 gpm	240 psig	
Residual Heat Removal Pumps	[200 gpm] 450 gpm	[140 psig] 138 psig	(1)
Safety Injection Pumps	[50 gpm] 150 gpm	[1420 psig] 1356 psig	(2)

Table 4.5-1

Notes

(1) Items in square brackets are effective until the installation of the new residual heat removal minimum flow recirculation system.

(2) Items in square brackets are effective until installation of the new safety injection minimum flow recirculation system.

4.5.2.2 Valves

a. Except during cold or refueling shutdowns the spray additive valves shall be tested at intervals not to exceed one month. With the pumps shut down and the valves upstream and downstream

and verification made that the components receive the safety injection in the proper sequence. The test demonstrates the operation of the valves, pump circuit breakers, and automatic circuitry.[1]

During reactor operation, the instrumentation which is depended on to initiate safety injection and containment spray is generally checked daily and the initiating circuits are tested monthly. In addition, the active components (pumps and valves) are to be tested monthly to check the operation of the starting circuits and to verify that the pumps are in satisfactory running order and develop the minimum required pressure to meet accident conditions.[2] The minimum discharge pressure values listed in Table 4.5-1 are based on an assumed degradation of the pump head-capacity (characteristic) curve adjusted to water temperature of 60°F as follows:

Containment Spray Pumps	5%*
Residual Heat Removal Pumps	5%*
Safety Injection Pumps	3%*

*Percentage is based on the head at the best efficiency point of flow.

The test interval of one month is based on the judgement that more frequent testing would not significantly increase the reliability (i.e., the probability that the component would operate when required) and would result in increased wear over long periods of time.

Other systems that are also important to the emergency cooling function are the accumulators, the component cooling system, the service water system and the containment fan coolers. The accumulators are a passive safeguard. In accordance with the specifications, the water volume and pressure in the accumulators are checked periodically. The other systems mentioned operate when the reactor is in operation and by these means are continuously monitored for satisfactory performance. The reactor coolant drain tank pumps operate intermittently during reactor operation, and thus are also monitored for satisfactory performance.

The air filtration portion of the containment air recirculation system is a passive safeguard which is isolated from the cooling air flow during normal reactor operation. Hence the charcoal should have a long useful lifetime. The filter frames that house the charcoal are stainless steel and should also last indefinitely. The pressure drop, filter efficiency, and valve operation test frequencies will assure that the system can operate to meet its design function under accident conditions. As the adsorbing charcoal is normally isolated, the test schedule, related to hours of operation as well as elapsed time, will assure that it does not degrade below the required adsorption

efficiency. The test conditions for charcoal sample adsorbing efficiency are those which might be encountered under an accident situation.[3]

The control room air treatment system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere (recirculation and intake air) during control room isolation conditions. HEPA filters are installed before the charcoal filters to remove particulate matter and prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal filters reduce the airborne radioiodine in the control room. Bypass leakage must be at a minimum in order for these filters to perform their designed function. If the performances are as specified the calculated doses will be less than those analyzed.[4]

Retesting of the post accident charcoal system or the control room emergency air treatment system in the event of painting, fire, or chemical release is required only if the system is operating and is providing filtration for the area in which the painting, fire, or chemical release occurs.

Testing of the air filtration systems will be, to the extent it can, given the configuration of the systems, in accordance with ANSI N510-1975, "Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning Systems."

References:

(1) UFSAR Section 6.3.5.2

(2) UFSAR Figures 15.6-12 and 15.6-13

(3) UFSAR Section 6.5.1.2.4

(4) UFSAR Section 6.4.3.1