




ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649

LEON D. WHITE, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE  
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June 3, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: IE Bulletin No. 80-06, "Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls"  
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit #1  
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Grier:

In response to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 80-06 dated March 13, 1980, concerning return of ESF equipment to normal mode upon resetting, a review has been completed at Ginna Station for all systems serving safety-related functions. This review was conducted at the schematic level to determine whether all associated safety-related equipment would remain in its emergency mode upon the reset of an engineered safety feature actuation signal. In May during the recent annual refueling maintenance shutdown these systems were tested by qualified personnel using approved procedures to verify that actual installed instrumentation and controls were consistent with the schematics reviewed. The following summarizes the results of this review and testing.


1. Safety Injection Circuit:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting safety injection one minute or longer after initiation. Actuation of the reset switch in itself does not change the state of any equipment, but permits the operator to place the equipment affected by safety injection to the position desired.

Motor operated valves MOV-841, MOV-878A, MOV-878B, MOV-878C, MOV-878D and MOV-865 response to a safety injection signal are not verified by a test procedure. These valves are positioned to their emergency mode position per Precritical Technical Specifications Check Sheet Procedure O-1.1C and their Breakers placed in the OFF position with control fuses left in for valve position indication.

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DATE June 3, 1980

TO Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director

## 2. Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuit;

This circuit has just been modified (SM 80-2605) to ensure that no equipment changes state upon the actuation of the containment ventilation isolation reset switch. Once the reset switch has been actuated the operator must then operate the control module switch/indicator on the containment isolation reset pushbutton panel for equipment requiring change of state.

## 3. Containment Isolation Circuit:

This circuit has just been modified (SM 80-2605) to ensure that no equipment changes state upon the actuation of the containment isolation reset switch. Once the reset switch has been actuated the operator must then operate the control module switch/indicator on the containment isolation reset pushbutton panel for equipment requiring change of state.

## 4. Containment Spray Circuit:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment spray. Once the reset switch has been actuated the spray additive tank discharge valves will return automatically to the position called for by their controllers. The containment spray pumps and their discharge valves would require operator action to change state.

This capability is necessary so the operator has the flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within containment (i.e., LOCA or steam line break).

## 5. Feedwater Isolation Reset:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting the isolation signal to the feedwater bypass valves only. Once the reset switch is actuated the feedwater bypass valves will assume the position called for by their control circuit. The main feedwater valves will remain closed until the isolation logic clears, and then they will automatically assume the position called for by their control circuit.

It should be noted that a safety injection signal also causes the main feedwater pumps to be tripped and their discharge valves automatically close; therefore, closing the feedwater valves on a safety injection signal is redundant.



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP.  
DATE June 3, 1980  
TO Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director

SHEET NO. 3

Based on the results of this review and testing, no inconsistencies were found between schematics and actual installations and no areas were identified that require modification or design change.

Very truly yours,

*L. D. White, Jr.*

L. D. White, Jr.

Subscribed and sworn to me  
on this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of June, 1980.

*Sharon G. Cavaleri*

SHARON G. CAVALERI

NOTARY PUBLIC, State of N. Y., Monroe County

My Commission Expires March 30, 1981

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Washington, D. C. 20555

