

→ file

Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:
POST OFFICE BOX 767 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

50-249

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
July 26, 1971

Mr. Boyce Grier, Director
A.E.C. Compliance Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject: DPR-25 Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
Letter in lieu of telegram because of Western Union employee strike. Confirming conversations with Mr. E. A. Jordan and H. Dance on July 26, 1971

Dear Mr. Grier:

At 0153 on 7/25/71, the upper isolation valve for Scram Discharge Tank level switch 302-8A was found closed. This was discovered during investigation of discharge tank draining difficulties following a planned reactor scram at 2242 on 7/24/71 as part of STI 25 at 25% reactor power. The valve was reopened immediately.

The valve was verified open during system valve checks on 6/11/71 and 7/3/71. The valve was closed and then reopened on 7/10/71 for surveillance required by Table 4.1.1 of the Technical Specifications. The time and method of closing the valve is unknown at this time.

Amplifying information will be reported as required by Section 6.6.B of the Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

H. K. Hoyt
Superintendent

HKH:GPW:ls
cc: Dr. P. Morris

Regulatory File Cy.

50-249

Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
July 18, 1971

RECEIVED
JUL 22 1971
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Regulatory Mail Section

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT #3
SECTIONS 6.6.A.1 AND 6.6.B.2 OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Dear Dr. Morris:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the station wherein, during initial 350 psig plant startup testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine stop valve would not reset. Failure of the stop valve to reset rendered the system incapable of providing coolant injection as required by Section 3.5.C.1 of the Dresden Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Problem and Investigations

Planned HPCI startup testing was initiated at a reactor pressure of 350 psig on July 10, 1971. At 2130 hours it was found that the HPCI turbine stop valve would not open. The required surveillance program was then initiated. Subsequent investigation revealed the trouble was caused by a misaligned limit switch on the HPCI control valve which was in the solenoid circuit for the stop valve. The relay logic associated with the system had actuated normally. Repositioning of the limit switch was completed by 2400 hours on the same day and the HPCI tests were begun at 0030 hours on July 11, 1971. The runs, successfully completed, included both manual and automatic starts.

3268

DV

Conclusion

Previous tests of the HPCI system were conducted on July 6, 1971. The operation lasted almost two hours and it is believed that the limit switch became misaligned at that time. Subsequently, tests of the HPCI system have been conducted at 650 psig reactor pressure on July 15, manual and automatic starts, and today at 1000 psig, manual start.

Since the subsequent tests have been satisfactory, no further action is planned.

Sincerely,

H. K. Hoyt
Superintendent

HKH:ls