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
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Commonwealth Edison Company


ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
July 14, 1971



Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject: License DPR-25, Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3
Sections 6.6.A.1 and 6.6.B.2 of the Technical Specifications

Dear Dr. Morris:

This is to report a condition relating to primary containment suppression chamber water level and temperature, which occurred during the startup testing program. The level and temperature limits defined by Section 3.7.A.1 of the Technical Specifications were exceeded.

Incident Description and Immediate Action

Unit 3 was in the initial heating phase of the Startup Test Program at a reactor pressure of 152 psig. After completion of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System hot functional testing and preliminary startup tests at 0735 hours on July 6, 1971, the suppression chamber water volume exceeded the maximum of 115,615 cubic feet by approximately 1900 cubic feet. This total volume corresponds to a level indication of 2.5 inches higher than the maximum limits corresponding to the Technical Specifications.

The level rise was due to the extended operation, approximately 3.5 hours, of the HPCI System. This extended duration was incurred because the HPCI turbine would not engage its turning gear properly following operation and had to be kept in operation to prevent damage to the shaft

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and bearings. The lowering of the suppression chamber level was accomplished by pumping torus water to the condenser hotwell. The water was returned to within specification limits by 1200 hours of the same day.

At 2200 hours on July 6, during daily surveillance, the suppression chamber water temperature had reached 105°F. (Specification limit is 95°F maximum). The previous day's surveillance data indicated 84°F.

The temperature increase was due to a combination of previous HPCI testing and "A" electromatic relief valve leaking. The relief valve was reseated by manual actuation. Because of problems with the HPCI System, as mentioned, cooling was not initiated until early on the morning of July 7, 1971. Cooling was accomplished by using two Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System pumps, circulating through the LPCI Coolant heat exchangers. The temperature was returned to within limits at 0630 hours on July 7.

Corrective Action

Currently, the primary containment suppression chamber water level annunciation is set to alarm at the maximum and minimum limits of the Technical Specifications. The alarm set points will be reset to alarm approximately 457 ft³ prior to reaching maximum and minimum levels to allow for appropriate corrective measures.

At present, the only indication of suppression chamber temperature is a temperature recorder with no audible means of warning of eminent problems. An annunciator is being designed into the system to alarm at about 90°F. The new annunciator will alert the operator of high water temperature before it reaches specification limits.

Sincerely,

H. K. Hoyt wew

H. K. Hoyt
Superintendent

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