


UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199



Report Nos.: 50-335/96-05 and 50-389/96-05

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company

Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16

Facility Name: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Inspection Conducted: April 30 - May 3, 1996

Inspector: Lori C. Stratton  
Lori C. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector

5/31/96  
Date Signed

Approved by: Paul Fredrickson  
for Paul Fredrickson, Chief  
Special Inspection Branch  
Division of Reactor Safety

5/31/96  
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine announced inspection was conducted in the various aspects of the Physical Security Program for Power Reactors; specifically, training and qualification. In addition, a portion of the Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization Programs was reviewed.

Results:

In the areas inspected, one non-cited violation was identified in the area of failure to compensate a protected area during a security system failure within the regulatory timeframe and discovery of a unprotected pathway via an open manway in the protected area. LERs 95-S01 and 95-S02 were closed. Training and qualification is noted as a strength. The licensee informed the inspector that the Fitness for Duty Program will be transferred to each site for responsibility in the near future.



## REPORT DETAILS

### 1.0 Persons Contacted

#### 1.1 Licensee Employees

- J. Becker, Access Control Manager, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (SLNP)
- \*W. Bohke, Vice President, SLNP
- \*G. Boisse, Director of Nuclear Services, Florida Power and Light (FPL)
- D. Bonthron, Access Program Supervisor, FPL
- A. Cummings, Fitness for Duty Program Supervisor, FPL
- \*T. Plunkett, President, Nuclear Division, SLNP
- \*E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager, SLNP
- \*B. White, Security Manager, SLNP

#### 1.2 Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

#### 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- \*P. Fredrickson, Branch Chief, Region II
- \*M. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector

\*Attended Exit Interview

### 2.0 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors (81700)

#### 2.1 Training and Qualification

Currently the licensee is committed to the provisions outlined in the NRC approved Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), Revision 17, dated June 7, 1995. The inspector toured the newly refurbished firing range, which became operational March 1995. The licensee now provides training using SmartRange, a PC-based system which utilizes air with an attached regulator. A moving track system of 30 targets are available. Sections of six targets turn in approximately .25 of a second. In addition to the fixed rotating targets, the licensee has installed Track Runner, a running target system to simulate "shoot-no shoot" situations.

The range is comprised of a tactical course which also contains six action targets that can be moved for versatility. A simulated pipe and a 20 foot elevated platform are utilized to better imitate plant conditions.

The inspector reviewed 15 randomly selected training records of SLNP security force members to verify the licensee was training in accordance with their NRC approved T&QP. Documentation of the positions reviewed by the inspector included armed responder, access control officer, Electronic Security System (ESS) technician, and Lieutenant. All records reviewed were in accordance with the commitments described in the licensee's TQ&P.

Through direct observation, interview with security personnel, and record review, the licensee determined the licensee was meeting the commitments specified in Revision 17 of the T&QP.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

### 3.0 Fitness for Duty/Access Authorization Programs (81502/2515-127)

The inspector reviewed IP-901, "Nuclear Division Access Authorization Procedure," Revision 0, dated December 10, 1992 and AI-2, "Guidelines for Determining Suitability for Unescorted Access," Revision 1, dated January 3, 1994. The inspector randomly selected 12 access authorization/fitness-for-duty files from St. Lucie and Turkey Point Nuclear Stations to determine if the above procedures and commitments described in the licensee's NRC approved Physical Security Plan were being followed.

Upon record review, the inspector noted that an individual's access authorization was put on administrative hold at Turkey Point for fitness-for-duty/access authorization concerns. The individual was given 45 days to meet the elements required for access authorization. Further review revealed the individual was terminated after 45 days notification due to his inability to maintain his unescorted access. The inspector noted that at the time of termination, the individual's access was not denied; therefore, an appeal had not been proposed. The individual's access continues to be on administrative hold pending resolution of the fitness-for-duty/access authorization concerns.

All records reviewed reflected appropriate documentation to demonstrate the licensee had followed their procedures and commitments described in the NRC approved Physical Security Plan.

### 4.0 Action on Previous Inspection Findings

CLOSED - LER 95-S01-00, Failure to Dispatch and Post an Officer Within 10 Minutes. On September 14, 1995, the licensee's Electric Security System (ESS) aborted, causing the licensee to dispatch and post officers within 10 minutes as required by Procedure 0006125, "Reporting of Safeguards Events," Revision 9, dated April 20, 1995. One officer was found not to be in his designated position, therefore leaving a vulnerability at the protected area. Zones 33-40 were to be compensated; however, the mispositioning of the officer left Zone 40 vulnerable. Approximately 24 minutes after the event occurred, the officer was at the correct location for his intended post. The security computer was determined to be operational 23 minutes after the initial computer failure.

In addition to the officer's failure to be at the correct location, the licensee determined that a field supervisor failed to follow Security Force Instruction (SFI) 7, "Compensatory and Temporary Measures for Complete ESS Failure." This procedure specifically states to physically check all compensatory posts before verbally confirming all officers were in place. The licensee concluded this portion of the procedure was not completed by the supervisor.



The licensee determined there were no attempted entries to gain access to the protected area. Cameras were still operational during the ESS failure. Although the system was not fully operational for approximately 23 minutes, alarms were being received after six minutes.

As corrective action, the licensee retrained all security force members on correct post locations during a ESS failure and the supervisor was recertified in Task 81, which covers his responsibilities during such an event. SBI, the licensee's contract security guard force, distributed a memorandum outlining the event and root causes to prevent reoccurrence.

CLOSED - LER 95-S02-00, Discovery of an Unprotected Pathway Into the Protected Area. On October 9, 1995, a licensed operator noted an open manway, which provided an unprotected pathway into the protected area. Upon discovery, the vulnerability was immediately compensated with a security force member. The licensee later determined that a non-licensed operator failed to close a butterfly valve before removing the waterbox manway cover, as required in SFI 6, "Security Operations."

The licensee determined there were no attempted entries into the protected area through the open manway. Substantial current created by circulating pumps would have made an attempt by an intruder difficult. The inspector noted also that to gain entry, the intruder would have to defeat 700 feet of water-filled piping. In addition to immediately posting an officer at the manway, the licensee did protected and vital area sweeps for both units to ensure unauthorized persons did not enter. The licensee has now stenciled the manway to inform personnel to notify security prior to removal.

These licensee identified violations are being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (96-05-01).

## 5.0 Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 3, 1996, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. The licensee was informed there was one potential violation of regulatory requirements due to the two LERs regarding vulnerable protected areas. The inspector noted the excellent range facilities and professionalism of the security force. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description and Reference</u>
LER 95-S01-00	Closed	Failure to compensate within 10 minutes a portion of the protected area during an ESS failure.
LER 95-S02-00	Closed	Discovered open manway into the protected area.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description and Reference</u>
NCV 96-05-01	Open/ Closed	Failure to properly protect portions of the protected area.