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 FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 LYONS,E.E. Florida Power & Light Co.
 SAGER,D.A. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 94-010-01:on 941124,inadvertent B train ESFAS due to deficient instrument & control test procedure.B train safeguards equipment was reset.W/950406 ltr.

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Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 128, Fort Pierce, FL 34954-0128

April 6, 1995

L-95-109
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Re: St. Lucie Unit 1
Docket No. 50-335
Reportable Event: 94-010 - Revision 1
Date of Event: November 24, 1994
Inadvertent B Train Engineered Safeguards Features
Actuation Signal (ESFAS) due to a Deficient Instrument
and Control Test Procedure

The attached Licensee Event Report is being revised pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide an update on the subject event.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. A. Sager'.

D. A. Sager
Vice President
St. Lucie Plant

DAS/EJB

Attachment

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant

10000:
9504140145 950407
PDR ADOCK 05000335
S PDR

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MIBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) St. Lucie Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000335	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4) **Inadvertent B train Engineered Safeguards Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) due to a deficient Instrument and Control Test Procedure.**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	24	94	94	--010--	1	4	7	95	Unit 2	05000389
									N/A	

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME Edward E. Lyons, Shift Technical Advisor	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (407) 465-3550 x3151.

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 24, 1994 St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 5 during a scheduled refueling outage with Pressurizer level at 36%. At 1412 an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) occurred on the B train of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and on the B train of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS). The A train of SIAS and CIS had been placed in block per the Instrument and Control test procedure. Therefore, the A train of SIAS and CIS did not inadvertently actuate.

The cause of the event was a deficient Instrument and Control (I&C) test procedure. The Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables are removed to bypass the trip input received during response time testing. The Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables were not removed far enough away from the circuit board to prevent inadvertent contact. When inadvertent contact occurred the bypass was removed and the B train SIAS and CIS components actuated.

Corrective actions were: Operations reset the B train Safeguards Equipment. I&C has revised "Reactor Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing" to ensure appropriate channels are bypassed by using additional ESFAS bypass keys. I&C has reviewed other applicable procedures to ensure bistables are withdrawn sufficiently.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
St. Lucie Unit 1	05000335	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		94	--010--	1	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On November 24, 1994 St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 5 during a scheduled refueling outage with Pressurizer level at 36%. Utility Instrument and Control (I&C) personnel were performing I&C Procedure 1-1400053 "Reactor Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing". At 1412 an inadvertent Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) (EIIS:JE) occurred during the test on the B train of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) (EIIS:JE) and on the B train of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) (EIIS:JM). The A train of SIAS and CIS had been placed in block per the I&C test procedure. Therefore, the A train of SIAS and CIS did not inadvertently actuate. Prior to blocking the B train SIAS and CIS per the I&C test procedure an inadvertent actuation occurred.

The B train SIAS and CIS components actuated as expected for this Mode of operation. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Ventilation (EIIS:VI) systems went on recirculation as required. At 1414 Operations reset the B train SIAS and CIS. At 1451 Operations secured the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK).

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of the event was a deficient test procedure. The purpose of the response time test is to determine the time interval from when a monitored input to the ESFAS exceeds its trip input until the protective actuation has been actuated. During response time testing a single channel is tripped while the other three channels are bypassed by removing their measurement bistables. Three of the Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables were partially removed from the cabinet drawer to bypass the trip input received during response time testing. One of the Pressurizer pressure measurement bistables was not withdrawn sufficiently from its seated position to prevent inadvertent contact. When inadvertent contact occurred the bypass was removed. This resulted in two ESFAS channels being in the tripped state which made up the required two of four logic for a SIAS and CIS Actuation.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is reportable as an actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

This event did not adversely affect Plant Operations because: 1) The plant was in Mode 5 during a refueling outage with 36% level in the Pressurizer. 2) The B train SIAS and CIS components actuated to their proper position in this mode of operation. 3) Reactor Coolant makeup was not required as a result of this event. 4) The B train SIAS and CIS actuation did not interrupt shutdown cooling (EIIS:BP).

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) Operations reset the B train SIAS and CIS components.
- 2) A 50.59 Safety Evaluation performed as a result of this event and other similar events concluded that simultaneously bypassing all four channels of ESFAS during Modes 5 and 6 is acceptable for Reactor safety. This should prevent reoccurrence of similar events.
- 3) Operating procedures were changed on 3/22/95 to bypass certain measurement inputs of all four channels of ESFAS during Modes 5 and 6.
- 4) I&C has revised I&C procedure 1-1400053 "Reactor Protective and Engineering Safeguards System Response Time Testing" to ensure appropriate channels are bypassed by using additional ESFAS bypass keys.
- 5) I&C has reviewed other applicable procedures to ensure bistables are withdrawn sufficiently.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Component Failures

None

Previous Similar Events

LER 389-90-004 "Inadvertent Actuation of Engineered Safeguards Equipment during Time Response Testing due to personnel error"

LER 389-84-007 "Inadvertent Containment Isolation Signal Actuation"