



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)

ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-335/389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on a steam generator low-low level condition during plant startup. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant facility. The result of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem, Unit 1 incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events.

This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by Florida Power & Light Company, the licensee for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28. Item 2.1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 provided responses to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.1 (Part 1) in submittals dated November 8, 1983 and May 26, 1987. The licensee stated that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are included in systems which are treated as safety related for plant activities, such as maintenance, work orders and part replacement. Also, these components are identified as safety-related on documents and in information handling systems used in the plant. These documents and control systems ensure that work documents and procedures contain requirements commensurate with the safety classification of the system or component.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we conclude that a program exists for identifying, classifying, and treating components as safety-related when they are required for the successful performance of a reactor trip function. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhower to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events" (Generic Letter 83-28), July 8, 1983.
2. Letter, J. W. Williams, Jr., Florida Power & Light Company to D. G. Eisenhower, NRC, November 8, 1983.
3. Letter, C. O. Woody, Florida Power & Light Company to Document Control Desk, NRC, May 26, 1987.

Dated: January 10, 1989

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