



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-335/87-16 and 50-389/87-15

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
 9250 West Flagler Street
 Miami, FL 33102

Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389

License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16

Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: July 6-10, 1987

Inspectors:	<u>M. D. Hunt</u>	<u>7/29/87</u>
	M. D. Hunt	Date Signed
	<u>G. R. Wiseman</u>	<u>7/28/87</u>
	G. R. Wiseman	Date Signed
	<u>T. F. McElhinney</u>	<u>7/29/87</u>
	T. F. McElhinney	Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: M. N. Miller

Approved by:	<u>T. E. Conlon</u>	<u>7-31-87</u>
	T. E. Conlon, Section Chief	Date Signed
	Engineering Branch	
	Division of Reactor Safety	

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI) Unresolved Items (URI), Violations and Deviations related to Electrical and Fire Protection Systems. The inspectors also reviewed the heat shrinkable tubing and motor operated valve internal wiring qualification programs.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- *N. Sipos, Services Manager
- *J. Krumins, Site Engineering Manager
- *H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- *J. Scarola, Assistant Superintendent
- *C. F. Leppla, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
- *C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor
- *J. B. Harper, Superintendent of QA
- *R. J. Young, Mechanical Maintenance
- *M. J. Rhoades, QC
- *E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineer
- *R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- *L. W. Pearce, Operations
- *T. A. Dillard, Superintendent Maintenance
- *M. S. Dryden, Juno Nuclear Licensing
- *J. Barrow, Fire Protection Supervisor
- *B. Dawson, Electrical Maintenance

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, operators, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

- *R. Crlenjak
- *H. Bibb

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 10, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

During this exit interview, the licensee made a verbal commitment to the actions described in the closure paragraph for unresolved item 50-389/85-06-06 (paragraph 3).

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

- a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (389/83-02-01), Are Storage Requirements Being Met For The Reactor Internals As Of January 7, 1983: The concern at the time this item was identified was the assurance that the reactor internals were clean at the time of installation. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of QC cleanliness inspections of the internals prior to assembly dated March 14, 1983. This item is closed.
- b. (Closed) Unresolved Item (389/83-38-01), Automatic Sprinkler Protection Does Not Cover Entire Fire Areas Required By 10 CFR 50, Appendix R: The licensee issued Revision 2 to the Appendix R submittal report to the NRC/NRR for review on July 22, 1983. Additional information was provided in letters to the NRC dated December 27, 1985 and FSAR Amendment No. 14. This information included a submittal of requests for deviations from the fire protection guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 and Appendix R as related to partial sprinkler coverage in Fire Areas H, I, and O. The NRC issued Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) dated December 5, 1986 which found the above noted deviations acceptable. Based on this review and acceptance, this item is closed.
- c. (Closed) Deviation (389/83-57-01), Substandard Automatic Sprinkler Systems: A NRC Region II letter to the licensee dated April 25, 1986 provided a NRC/NRR evaluation of the sprinkler systems located in plant fire areas containing redundant safe shutdown systems, and requested from the licensee a description of the corrective actions to be taken to correct the deviation and a schedule of completion for these actions. A walkdown of the St. Lucie Unit 2 fire areas provided with sprinkler protection was conducted by the Region II fire protection staff on June 10 and 11, 1986.

During the walkdown of plant fire areas, criteria was developed and used to identify those plant locations where sprinkler deviations existed. Documentation of these walkdowns were provided in FPL letter dated July 3, 1986 (letter L-86-270). Four plant areas were identified where sprinkler deviations existed. Corrective actions for these deviation areas are provided in Plant Change/Modification (PCM) 92-286. The inspectors reviewed this Plant Change/Modification package which indicated that additional sprinklers were installed below cable trays, and HVAC duct obstructions in several areas in the Reactor Auxiliary Building. Several cables in the Cable Spreading Room were rerouted to provide Appendix R separation. In addition, the Safe Shutdown Analysis was revised to indicate cables which have been removed from the Essential Cable List or were isolated by transfer switches and no longer require sprinkler or fire barrier protection.

Installation of the additional sprinkler heads and revision of the Essential Cable List have been completed. The inspector's walkdown of Fire Area H, Zone 39; Fire Area I, Zone 51W; and Fire Area O, Zone 19, indicated that the sprinkler installations are acceptable to provide adequate fire protection to affected safe shutdown systems. Completion of the required corrective actions is being tracked by the licensee by Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. 011487. Based on the inspectors review of the PCM packages, CAR and sprinkler installations, this item is closed.

- d. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-389/85-06-06), Failure to Provide Fire Proofing Material to Structural Steel Supporting Protected Conduits in Unsprinklered Plant Areas: This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a walkdown of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. Elevation 43.00', Fire Zone 34, Fire Area C for Unit 2. This walkdown was performed to determine the adequacy of the fire barrier enclosures for conduits which are required to be protected in order to achieve Appendix R compliance.

The inspectors noted that the structural steel supports which support the fire barrier enclosure assemblies protecting these conduits were not protected with a fire resistive structural steel fire proofing material. A fire could cause structural deformation to these steel supports which could lead to the failure of the conduit fire barrier enclosures. Thus, the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown could be jeopardized.

The licensee requested deviations from Section III.G.2a of Appendix R for Fire Areas A, B, C, H, I and O because fire proofing materials are not applied to the structural steel supporting these conduits required to be protected. The deviation requests for Fire Areas A, B, C, H, I, and O were determined acceptable by the NRC as described in a Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER), dated December 5, 1986. This report denied the deviation request for Fire Area M. FPL letter L-87-20 to the NRC indicated that the engineering for the modifications to the structural steel supports in Fire Area M will be completed by October 1987. FPL management committed to completing the modifications by April 2, 1988, at the NRC exit meeting on July 10, 1987 and as documented in FPL letter L-87-303. This fire area is being patrolled by a roving fire watch until the modifications have been completed. The inspectors find FPL's measures adequate. This item is closed.

- e. (Closed) Violation (389/85-06-07), Inadequate Fire Protection Features Separation for Redundant Trains as identified in FPL letter L-85-78: The licensee's letter (L-85-24), dated June 21, 1985, acknowledged this violation, described the interim corrective actions and the long term corrective actions. The corrective actions were performed by Plant Change Modification (PCM) 57-285 which was closed April 11, 1986, after all testing and inspections were completed and documented. Additional fuses were installed in the 125V DC BUS 2AB (tie bus to the 125V "A" Bus) to provide isolation in case of fire damage in the B switchgear room.

- f. (Closed) Violation (389/85-06-10), Procedure Errors Affect Safe Implementation of EOP 2-0030144, Alternate Shutdown: The procedure EOP-2-0030144 has been renumbered, retitled and reissued as off-normal Operating Procedure 2-0030134, "Alternate Shutdown." The licensee acknowledged this violation and outlined the corrective actions to be taken to correct the procedure. A review of Revision 2 of Operating Procedure 2-0030134 was made and it was found that Section 5.3, was revised to provide adequate steps for the operators use to MAINTAIN PRIMARY PLANT PARAMETERS as described below:

8. If the RCS is $> 200^{\circ}\text{F}$ subcooled, reduce pressure by removing pressurizer heaters from service and utilize auxiliary spray followed by the following NOTES: "A" auxiliary spray valve (SE-02-03) is available. SE-02-01 isolation valve (V2484) may require manually closing so that auxiliary spray may be utilized. SE-02-02 (A train charging isolation valve) can be operated from the HSOP."

Instructions were also added to require the Nuclear Operator in the Reactor Auxiliary Building as follows:

"Isolation of PORV's must be accomplished within 2½ minutes"

This action is to ensure that spurious operation of any PORV will not reduce RC inventory.

This item has been sufficiently resolved by the corrective actions taken and is closed.

- g. (Closed) Violation (389/85-06-11), Failure to Fully Implement Appendix R as Required By License Condition 2.C.13: The licensee submitted the reply to this violation as part of a letter, dated June 21, 1985. The licensee concurred with the violation and advised that personnel had failed to recognize the requirement for an alternate shutdown procedure to meet the requirements of Section 9.5.1.11(a) and (b) of Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 3. The SSER, dated April 1983, described the requirements that should have been in effect at that time but were not implemented until September 1984. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Inspector Followup Items (IFI) (92701)

- a. (Closed) IFI (335/83-17-01), Revise Procedure CEP-E-3 to Provide for QA Review and Record Storage: Procedure CEP-E-3 has been replaced by Administrative Site Procedure No. CPL:ASP-17 which establishes the controls to be observed when temporarily breaching an established Fire Rated Assembly, and applies to contractors working under

direction of the Site Project Manager for backfit. The inspector reviewed Revision 2 of the procedure and verified that it requires breach requests and fire watch sign-off sheets be included as part of the turnover package documentation. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) IFI (335/85-06-12), Review Plant Procedures and Equipment for Unit 1 Implementation of Appendix R: Unit 1 is scheduled to be inspected for compliance to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R in the near future. The procedures and equipment will be examined at that time. This item is closed.
- c. (Closed) IFI (50-389/83-02-02), Sample Lines Open Just Above Shutoff Valves: The concern noted by the NRC inspector was that several sampling lines were directed up and open such that dirt and debris could have entered the sampling lines. This item was identified during the construction phase and since that time the sampling lines have been completed, therefore, they are no longer open to dirt and debris. Discussions with cognizant chemistry personnel indicates that there has not been any problems obtaining samples due to dirt and debris in the sampling lines. The inspectors also performed a walkthrough inspection of the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) sampling room which verified that this problem no longer exists. This item is closed.
- d. (Closed) IFI (50-389/83-13-02), Permanent Conduit Tags: The concern noted by the NRC inspector was that conduits 20211Y, 20211X and 20211R did not have permanent identification tags attached. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Surge Tank Room, Elevation 62'00" and Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Fan Room 62'0" to verify that the conduits have permanent identification tags affixed. The inspectors also compared the "as-built" configuration of the conduits with Drawing 2998-G-395, Revision 11. This review indicated that the conduits are properly identified and that the drawing and "as-built" configuration coincide. This item is closed.
- e. (Closed) IFI (389/85-06-01), Completion of Fire Damper Installation in Unprotected HVAC Openings Located in Thermolag Fire Barriers: The licensee has provided three-hour fire-rated dampers manufactured by Air Balance. All fire damper installations throughout Unit 2 utilize the fire damper sleeve and internal expansion assembly. The fire damper assemblies have been fabricated and tested in accordance with Underwriters Laboratory Standards 555 and 10B. The installation of the fire damper assemblies are controlled by PCM-226-284. Based on the inspector's review of the PCM packages and walkdown of several damper installations, these assemblies appear adequate. This item is closed.

- f. (Closed) IFI (389/85-06-02), Sprinkler Head Discharge Obstructed by HVAC Duct in Fire Zone 19: This item was identified by NRC inspectors during the Appendix R walkdown of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The sprinkler head discharge was obstructed such that an exposure fire could impact the sprinkler systems ability to adequately control the fire. The licensee has added an additional sprinkler head in this area under the obstructing HVAC ductwork such that the area is adequately covered. The change was performed by PCM-081-285 which was closed March 13, 1986, after all testing and inspections were completed and documented. Based on the inspector's review of the PCM and walkdowns, this item is closed.
- g. (Closed) IFI (50-389/85-06-03), Conduits Protected for Appendix R Improperly Identified: This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a walkdown of the conduit fire barrier assemblies in Fire Zone 51W for Unit 2. The inspectors noted that conduits 25052P and 25052K were improperly tagged. When comparing Drawing 2998-411, Sheet 1, Revision 2 to the "as-built" plant configuration, the conduit identification tag for conduit 25052P was attached to conduit 25052K. The licensee informed the inspectors that since this condition was identified, conduits 25052P and 25052K were removed from the list of conduits required to be protected for Appendix R safe shutdown. The inspectors reviewed Drawings 2998-411, 6A and 6J which shows the conduits as being removed from the list. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of Fire Zone 51W. This walkdown verified that the conduits are now properly identified with the appropriate tags. This item is closed.
- h. (Closed) IFI (389/85-06-05), Inadequate Fire Door Assembly Installed on Power Panel 201 Fire Rated Enclosure: This item was identified by NRC inspectors during the Appendix R walkthrough of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. Power Panel 201 which is located in the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Area B, Zone 52) is enclosed in a one-hour fire barrier. The enclosure barrier design did not appear to be installed in accordance with approved tested configurations. Corrective actions for this issue were implemented by PCM-259-284 which was closed March 5, 1985. The change included the removing and rerouting of all essential shutdown cables from power panel PP-201 to power panel PP-201A located in a separate fire area. This modification provided adequate cable separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and eliminated the need to provide an additional fire barrier enclosure for power panel 201. Based on the inspector's review of the PCM package and a walkdown of the relocated cabling, this item is closed.
- i. (Closed) IFI (389/85-06-08), Review Licensee's Program with Regard to Common Fuses in Hot Shutdown Control Circuits (IEN 85-09): The inspectors reviewed Plant Change/Modification (PCM) No. 120-285, Supplement I which covers the installation of redundant fuses, isolation switches and fuse blocks to various control circuits

identified by the licensee's AE on the "Essential Equipment List for Alternate Shutdown." The system description outlined the change made and the function of the modification. The installation records for this PCM were reviewed and found in order and QC accepted. The PCM was closed on March 18, 1986. The inspector examined the following redundant fuse installations:

Changing Pump 2A
 Component Cooling Water Pump 2A
 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A
 Intake Cooling Water Pump 2A
 MOV-09-9 Aux FW Pump 2A Discharge Valve
 Incoming Feed to 4160V Bus 2A From 4160V Bus 2A2
 Diesel Generator 2A Control Transfer

All were identified at the fuse blocks and name plates identified the transfer switches and the functions.

This program appears to have addressed the redundant fuse and control transfer issue related to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R adequately. This item is closed.

- j. (Closed) IFI (389/85-06-09), Add Caution Note EOP 2-0030141 Concerning Potential Need To Use EOP-2-0030144: The EOP 2-0030141 has been renumbered to 0030135 and contains the following caution note "If spurious events are taking place such that they inhibit the use of equipment, the operators will consider using EOP-2-0030134" (Note: EOP-2-0030144 is now 0030135). This item is closed.
- k. (Closed) IFI (50-389/85-06-13), Review of Identified Emergency Lighting Modifications for Appendix R, Section III.J: This item was identified by NRC inspectors during a walkdown of the emergency lighting units for Unit 2. The following discrepancies were noted:
- (1) No eight-hour battery powered lighting unit was provided for the Unit 2 stairwell area exiting the control room and the vestibule area.
 - (2) The lighting unit provided for the Emergency Reactor Trip Switchgear was mounted behind a cable tray obstruction which eliminated its effectiveness to illuminate the required safe shutdown equipment.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 stairwell area exiting the control room and the vestibule area. The licensee has added an eight-hour battery unit which will provide adequate lighting for access and egress to these areas. The licensee has also provided adequate lighting for the Emergency Reactor Trip Switchgear by moving one light head below the cable tray obstruction. The inspectors performed a walkthrough of the switchgear room to verify that the lighting is now adequate for operator actions. This item is closed.

1. (Closed) IFI (389/85-19-01), "Inadequacies During Breaker Maintenance Demonstration: Maintenance Procedure No. 1-0110060, Revision 17 and No. 2-0110060 Revision 9, titled "Periodic Maintenance of Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drive Equipment," both approved August 30, 1985, have been completely revised to eliminate the portion for the "Reactor Trip Switchgear and Breakers." These procedures are now specifically for the CEA motor-generator (MG) sets.

Maintenance Procedure No. 1-0110062, Revision 2, approved September 15, 1986 and No. 2-0110062, Revision 2 approved December 2, 1986, titled "Periodic Maintenance of Reactor Trip Switchgear and Breakers", have been developed specifically for the "Reactor Trip Switchgear and Breakers."

The inspectors have reviewed these procedures Nos. 1(2)-0110060 and 1(2)-0110062 and have found them to be satisfactory. All concerns have been eliminated by using two procedures at the present time instead of one procedure combining both functions as was previously done.

The inspectors have investigated and found that the policy and training for Florida Power and Light Company, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Power Plants, is to perform the steps in sequential order for the Maintenance Procedures as well as other procedures unless a "disclaimer" clause is provided allowing the steps to be deleted or performed out of sequence. This item is closed.

- m. (Closed) IFI (335, 389/85-33-01), "Failure to Provide Sufficient Guidance Regarding the Maximum Quantities of Combustible Materials and Flammable and Combustible Liquids Allowed in Safe Shutdown Areas: The inspectors have reviewed Administrative Procedure No. 0010434, Revision 20, approved April 15, 1987, titled "Plant Fire Protection Guidelines." Section 8.2.1 provides that quantities that exceed 100 pounds of class "A" solids or 10 gallons of class "B" liquids in a safety-related area is required to be reviewed in advance by supervisory personnel and documented on the plant work order. Section 8.6.6 states that safety cans (not exceeding five gallons capacity) shall be used for storing and dispensing small quantities of flammable liquids. Section 8.6.7 states that not more than 60 gallons of flammable liquid may be stored in approved storage cabinets in the following locations:

- (A) H. P. calibration cubicle Unit 1 - 19.5 elevation
- (B) Mechanical Maintenance cubicle Unit 2 - 0.5 elevation
- (C) Storage cabinets Units 1 and 2 - 0.5 elevation
- (D) Liquid sampling storage locker Units 1 and 2 - 19.5 elevation.

Storage of combustibles in safety-related areas listed in (A), (B), (C), and (D) above were walked down by the inspectors and found to be satisfactory. Since the controlling procedure has been satisfactorily revised as noted above, this item is closed.

- n. (Closed) IFI (335, 389/85-33-02), "The Overall Site Fire Protection Implementation Responsibilities and Organization are not Properly Identified in AP180022 (For Rev. 6): The inspectors have reviewed Administrative Procedure No. 180022 titled "Fire Protection Program", Revision 9, approved November 5, 1986, and found it has been satisfactorily revised to include and properly identify the site management organization and site Vice President, Services Manager, Fire Protection Coordinator and the Fire Protection Inspector with regard to the implementation of the site fire protection program. This item is closed.
- o. (Closed) IFI (335, 389/85-33-03), 18 Month Fire Pump Surveillance not Being Conducted Following the Guidance of NFPA-20: The field test guidance of NFPA-20 for a centrifugal fire pump is the test data should include the pumps discharge flow and pressure and the motors speed. It is also to test peak load [150% capacity] conditions.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

1. Technical Specifications 4.7.11.1.f.2 "Verifying that each (fire) pump develops at least 2350 gpm at a system head of 232 ft."
2. Technical Specifications 4.7.11.1.f.4 "Verifying that each fire suppression pump starts and maintains the suppression pump starts and greater than or equal to 85 psig."
3. St. Lucie Plant Operating Procedure No. 1800053 titled "Fire Protection Water System - Annual, 18 Month and three year tests.
 - a. Revision 17 Test completed January 30, 1987.
 - b. Revision 18 Approved April 15, 1987 (latest Revision).

Note: Both Revision 17 and 18 include the NFPA-20 guidance requirements and the Technical Specifications requirements per 1 and 2 above.

Operating Procedure No. 1800053, Revision 18, approved April 15, 1987, has been satisfactorily revised to include the guidance of NFPA-20 for test peak load (150% capacity) conditions and the pumps discharge flow and pressure and motor condition. The pumps speed is indirectly measured by measuring the motor current (amperes). This item is closed.



6. a. Temporary Instruction 2500/17 Inspection Guidance for Heat Shrinkable Tubing (HST)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for proper procedures and instructions, installation inspections, and quality documentation. The program also included separate technician training and inspector training.

The heat shrinkable tubing process used to insulate splices is specified by the licensee's engineering personnel who have had training in the proper application techniques. The instructions specified the kit, or if a modified kit is used, the materials and provides sketches and a bill of material for each application.

The installation inspection check lists contains a check sheet which includes the following item for inspection and verification:

1. Terminating/Splicing Materials and Tools Proper Size and Type
2. Termination Connection Points as Specified
3. Wire/Cable Identification, Color Code as Specified
4. Minimum Bend Radius not Exceeded
5. Routing/Tie-Downs/Support as Specified
6. Wires/Connectors/Cable not Damaged or Cut during Stripping Process
7. Insulation Not Sliced or Damaged
8. Separation/Grouping Criteria Maintained
9. Spare Conductors Identified, Taped, and Protected from Damage
10. Drain and Shield Wires Grounded as Specified
11. Instrument/Tool Calibration Current
12. Connections Requiring Taping/Hardware Buildup Corrosion Inhibitors as Specified
13. Connectors Fastened Properly to Cables (i.e. Crimp Indentation Proper, Torque as Specified, Etc.)

Documentation

The licensee chose to replace all splices in Unit 1 containment and other specified harsh areas due to the lack of adequate documentation to support the EQ requirements.



During the last outage, this work was accomplished. Process records for the installation and inspection of the replacement of 36 cable splices were reviewed. These records included QC hold points and identified the QC inspection report which was the detailed item for item check off as the work progressed.

The inspectors reviewed the training records for the craftsmen performing the HST installation and the QC inspectors who received training in the inspection requirements and the accept/reject criteria.

The licensee was able to produce QC records for Unit 2 HST installations which verified the following items:

1. Lugging and crimping tools are as specified.
2. Tools have a current calibration status.
3. Wire stripping tools are as specified and have caused no damage to the leads.
4. Connectors fastened properly to cables.
5. Correct size of lugs or connectors are utilized and are free of damage.
6. Torque values and technique is as specified.
7. Routing is as specified.
8. Minimum bend radius is adhered to.
9. Separation and grouping criteria has been adhered to.
10. Approved supports and ty-raps utilized.
11. Proper identification has been attached at the specified locations.
12. Color coding has been utilized.
13. Spare conductors identified and protected from damage.
14. Have drain and shield wires been grounded as specified.
15. Have cable connections been made to the specified termination points.
16. Are all connections to termination points fastened as specified?

17. Approved tape and technique is as specified.
18. Corrosion prohibitor used as specified.
19. No other damage has occurred to connectors, cable or equipment.

The inspection record also identified the splice kit number, or if modified, the added/replacement item trace numbers. When kits were modified, the design justification calculation was made part of the documentation package.

The inspectors reviewed training records for the craftsmen and six QC inspectors for the Unit 2 installations. No discrepancies were found in the records reviewed.

The licensee informed the inspector that during 1984, the inspection acceptance criteria overlooked verification that the sleeve lengths and bend radius requirements had been met. The licensee stated that there was confidence that the splices meet the acceptance criteria but would inspect these splices during the next outage. If these splices do not meet the specifications the licensee committed to report the condition to the NRC.

- b. Temporary Instruction 2515/75 - Inspection of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring to Determine if Wiring is Environmentally Qualified.

A review of Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/86-08 and 50-389/86-07 disclosed that the documentation of Limitorque Valve operators for both units had been examined and certain Unit 1 operators inside and outside containment had been visually inspected. A potential Unresolved Item (50-335/86-08-07 and 50-389/86-07-05) was opened for the failure to have qualification documentation for the "TFF" wire and failure to ensure that Unit 1 outside containment and Unit 2 inside and outside containment operators contain qualified jumper wires.

The licensee's response letter, dated March 10, 1987, addressed the items listed in the inspection report. The actions taken consisted of both immediate and long term actions.

The licensee had a program in place which test the valve operator (MOVATS) but also requires identification of the type of jumper wire used in the operator. All MOV's identified as EQ (10 CFR 50.49) have been inspected.

Spare valve operators stored in the warehouse are identified. The environmental area is listed on the storage records to ensure proper installation. This program appears to be adequate to ensure proper inspection and control of MOV operators installed in EQ areas.

7. Licensee Identified Items, 10 CFR 50.55(e) (92700)

(Closed) CDR 82-14, Reactor Shutdown Cooling Bypass Valves Failed to Respond to Command Signals. The licensee reported this deficiency on June 30, 1982. The licensee later determined that while the valves responded erratically in the manual mode of operation, the safe operation of the plant would not have been affected and the condition would not have gone undetected; therefore, the issue was not a reportable with respect to 10 CFR 50.55(e). The licensee changed the valve motor/operators, the control switches (modules) and the power and control cables to provide the desired response of the valves to maintain the proper cooldown rate during unit shutdown. The valves (FCV 3301 and 3306) were rebuilt, inspected and documented in accordance with PCM No. 39-283 which was completed and closed on May 23, 1985. This item is closed.