

ATTACHMENT I

MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE

3/4 6-14

8703030277 870224
PDR ADOCK 05000389
P PDR

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

1966

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be OPERABLE and:

- a. Each 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be sealed closed.
- b. The 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for purging and/or venting as required for safety related purposes such as:
 - 1. Maintaining containment pressure within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.4.
 - 2. Reducing containment atmosphere airborne radioactivity and/or improving air quality to an acceptable level for containment access.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With a 48-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) open or not sealed closed, close and/or seal close the open valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With an 8-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) open for reasons other than those stated in Specification 3.6.1.7.b, close the open 8-inch valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With a containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) having a measured leakage rate exceeding the limits of Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.7.3 and/or 4.6.1.7.4, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 Each 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be sealed-closed at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 Documentation shall be reviewed every 18 months to confirm that purging and venting were performed in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.7.b.

4.6.1.7.3. At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS each sealed closed 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.05 L_a$ when pressurized to P_a .

4.6.1.7.4 Each 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.05 L_a$ when pressurized to P_a prior to entering MODE 4 from COLD SHUTDOWN if not tested within the previous 31 days.

At least once per 92 days,

ATTACHMENT 2

SAFETY EVALUATION

INTRODUCTION

The existing Surveillance Requirement for Technical Specification 4.6.1.7.4, Containment Ventilation System, requires that each 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust valve with resilient material seals be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leak rate is less than or equal to 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4) from COLD SHUTDOWN (MODE 5). The test is not required if the valves have been tested within the previous thirty-one days.

The proposed Surveillance Requirement for Technical Specification 4.6.1.7.4, Containment Ventilation System, will require that each containment purge supply and exhaust valve with resilient material seals be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by verifying that the measured leak rate is less than or equal to 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa. This test will be required for MODEs 1 through 4.

The NRC required in License Condition 2.C.8 of the St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License, NPF-16, that the Continuous Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Penetrations be modified to allow local leak rate testing (LLRT) during normal operation from outside containment instead of each time the unit returns to power after COLD SHUTDOWN. These modifications were completed per the License Condition and reported as such to the NRC in FPL letter L-84-433, dated November 20, 1984.

DISCUSSION

Details of the modifications were submitted to NRC in FPL letter L-84-266, dated September 28, 1984 and L-84-280, dated October 19, 1984. The NRC approved these modifications in Amendment No. 10 to the Unit 2 Operating License. Because modifications have been completed which will allow LLRT during normal operation, a Technical Specification change is proposed which will require testing the valve every 92 days instead of after every time the unit returns to HOT SHUTDOWN from COLD SHUTDOWN. The proposed Technical Specification requirement will be more restrictive in that a leak test surveillance is required at a greater frequency during MODEs 1 through 4. In addition, the proposed change will make this Surveillance Requirement the same as the Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactors, NUREG-0212.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

The first part of the document discusses the general situation of the country and the role of the government. It mentions the need for a strong and stable government to ensure the well-being of the people and the progress of the nation. The text is somewhat repetitive and lacks clear structure.

In the second part, the author talks about the economic challenges facing the country and the need for reform. It suggests that the government should focus on improving the economy and providing better services to the citizens. The language is very general and does not provide specific details or data.

The third part of the document deals with the social and cultural aspects of the country. It emphasizes the importance of education and the role of the family in shaping the future of the nation. The text is again very broad and lacks concrete examples or evidence.

SECRET

The final part of the document concludes with a call for unity and cooperation among all sectors of society. It states that only through collective effort can the country achieve its goals and overcome its challenges. The text ends with a strong statement of confidence in the future of the nation.

ATTACHMENT 3

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission's regulation, 10 CFR 50.92, which states that no significant hazards considerations are involved if the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Each standard is discussed as follows:

- (1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated as the increased frequency of testing provides additional assurance that these valves will function as designed.

- (2) Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed because the proposed increased testing frequency does not affect the original design functions or operation of these containment penetrations.

- (3) Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This amendment will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety as the increased frequency of testing provides greater assurance that containment isolation can be accomplished and the leakage from these containment penetrations will not exceed the required leakage criteria.

Based on the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety; and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Reference is made to the report of the Special Agent in Charge, [redacted], dated [redacted], and the report of the Special Agent in Charge, [redacted], dated [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].

The information contained in the above reports is being furnished to you for your information and for the information of the [redacted].