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 FACIL: 50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335
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 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 THADANI, A. C. PWR Project Directorate B

SUBJECT: Application for amend to License DPR-67, revising Tech Spec
 Pages 3/4 6-10, 3/4 6-11 & B3/4 6-1 re containment air locks.
 Fee paid.

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EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRUSKE, S		1	1		LPDR 03		1	1
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
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OCTOBER 10 1986
L-86-412

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Ashok C. Thadani, Director
PWR Project Directorate #8
Division of PWR Licensing - B
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Thadani:

Re: St. Lucie Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-335
Proposed License Amendment
Containment Air Locks


In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Florida Power and Light Company submits herewith three signed originals and forty copies of a request to amend Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-67.

The proposed change to the St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications make the Unit 1 Technical Specifications the same as the St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications. The proposed changes are shown in the accompanying Technical Specification Pages 3/4 6-10, 3/4 6-11, and B3/4 6-1. A discussion of the changes is included in the attached safety evaluation and no significant hazards considerations determination.

The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the St. Lucie Plant Facility Review Group and the Florida Power and Light Company Nuclear Review Board.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), a copy of the proposed amendment is being forwarded to the state designee for the State of Florida.

In accordance with 10 CFR 170.21, FPL Check No. 2347 is attached as remittance for the license amendment application fee.

Very truly yours,

C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

COW/RJS/gp

Attachments

cc: Mr. Allan Schubert, Dept. of Health & Rehabilitation Services
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman & Holtzinger

A001

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PDR

Rec'd w/ check #150.00

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The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on
the subject of the land in question.

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

The land in question is situated in the
County of [redacted] State of [redacted].

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
[redacted]

STATE OF FLORIDA)
)
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH) ss.

J. W. Dickey being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is Vice President, Nuclear Operations of Florida Power & Light Company, the Licensee herein;


That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements made in this document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.



J. W. Dickey

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

10 day of October, 1986.


Dennis M. Dabnis
NOTARY PUBLIC, in and for the County
of Palm Beach, State of Florida

My Commission expires: NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA
MY COMMISSION EXP SEPT 18, 1989
BONDED THRU GENERAL INS. UND.



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Safety Evaluation/No Significant Hazards Considerations Determination

The proposed changes make the St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications the same (except for the plant specific information) as the St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications. These changes are administrative in nature as described below:

The changes on page 3/4 6-10 consist of deleting the existing ACTION: and adding the St. Lucie Unit 2 ACTION:. Editorial changes are also made to 3.6.1.3 b. to make it the same as Unit 2.

The changes on page 3/4 6-11 consist of deleting the existing SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS and adding the St. Lucie Unit 2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. Unit 1 plant specific information was included as appropriate.

The changes on page B3/4 6-1 make the Unit 1 BASES exactly like the Unit 2 BASES.

The proposed changes are consistent with the approved St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications, and are in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J III.D.2.(b)(iii) and the latest C-E Standard Technical Specifications.

The proposed amendment is similar to Example (i) of Amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations, identified in the staff procedure for determination of no significant hazards in that the proposed amendment is a purely administrative change to the technical specifications to achieve consistency between St. Lucie Units 1 & 2.

It has been determined that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations because there are no changes to the Containment Air Locks and that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications provide for the surveillance testing of the air lock seals to assure that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

Therefore,

1. There is no change in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created.
3. There is no reduction in a margin of safety.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAND OFFICE

IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE 12TH MARCH 1881

AND TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE 12TH MARCH 1881

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Insert # 17

- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

* If the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door is permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air lock door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.

Insert # 27

- a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying the seal leakage is $< 0.01 L_a$ as determined by precision flow measurement when the volume between the door seals is pressurized to greater than or equal to:
1. For the personnel air lock, greater than or equal to P_a , ~~39.6~~ ~~43.4~~ psig for at least 15 minutes if not tested with the automatic tester.
 2. For the emergency air lock, greater than or equal to ~~43.4~~ ^{10.0} psig for at least 15 minutes.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY

CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a (39.6 psig). As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to $\leq 0.75 L_a$ or $\leq 0.75 L_t$ (as applicable) during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and ^{containment} leak rate, given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2. ~~The limitations on the air locks allow entry and exit into and out of the containment during operation and ensure through the surveillance testing that air lock leakage will not become excessive through continuous usage.~~

Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.