

50-202

Docket Nos. 50-335
and 50-389

April 29, 1985

LICENSEE Florida Power & Light Company

FACILITY: St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AT REGION II WITH
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ON MARCH 28, 1985

The following issues were discussed at the enforcement conference:
Containment Spray System (Turkey Point 4), Containment Isolation Valve
(St. Lucie 1) and Appendix R (St. Lucie 2).

On February 18, 1985, the licensee found that the spring was not charged on the containment spray pump A breaker at Turkey Point 4. Earlier in the month (February 6) the breaker tested satisfactorily, but apparently did not recharge. In this condition, the A breaker would not have automatically performed its function if containment spray were initiated. The licensee identified a number of things that contributed to this problem. On February 15, 1985, the licensee implemented procedures that they believe would have caught the problem on February 6 if the procedures had been in place. The licensee has also taken steps to resolve color coding problems.

On February 28, 1985 the licensee found that a component cooling water containment isolation valve at St. Lucie 1 was blocked open and had been blocked open since December 31, 1984. On December 31, nitrogen was applied to block the valve open while trouble shooting for an electrical ground. After determining that the ground was not in the solenoid, the nitrogen tap could not be removed, the Watch Engineer was notified and a plant work order was issued. The Watch Engineer failed to make an entry in the equipment out-of-service log. Maintenance called and asked for the location and since nothing was heard of the matter, the problem was assumed to be fixed. When the plant work order resurfaced on February 28, 1985, it was realized that the problem had not been resolved. The procedure being followed that led to the testing of the solenoid on December 31, 1984 has been strengthened and now requires sign-offs at the completion of each major step and specific identification as to when the procedure is terminated; i.e., ground has been found.

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
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While conducting their pre-Appendix R audit walkdowns and design reviews for St. Lucie 2, the licensee discovered that an Appendix R fire in the 480V "B" train switchgear room would result in the loss of the "A" train also because there is no way to isolate the "A" train from the fire. The licensee immediately established a 24-hour fire watch in the "B" train switchgear room and initiated efforts to look at alternative ways to resolve this problem. The most likely solution will be the installation of a breaker in the "A" train switchgear room that would permit the isolation of the "A" train.

A copy of the meeting notice is enclosed.


Donald E. Sells, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
Meeting notice

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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