

# WRITTEN / ORAL / ONLINE EXAMINATION KEY COVER SHEET

Examina	tion Number/Title: PDA 17-1 I	NRC E	kam S	RO, Rev. 0				
Training Program: Operations								
Course/Lesson Plan Number(s): 60006								
Total Po	tal Points Possible: 25 PASS CRITERIA: ≥ 70% Exam Time: 120						120	
		Yes	No				Yes	No
This is ar at least 3 different f exam (e.g training e weeks). F a segmen	a alternate examination; verified 0% of the questions are from other forms/versions of this g., Forms A, B, C; continuing xam versions for consecutive For LOCT weekly exams during nt, verified <u>&gt;</u> 50% difference.			<ul> <li>This is a remediation exam. Verified the questions are different from the failed exam by at least the following criteria listed below:</li> <li>70% for Maintenance/Technical</li> <li>90% for Operations training programs</li> </ul>				
This is ar verified a different the same	i initial training examination; t least 30% of the questions are from previous administration of exam.		This is a LOCT annual operating exam or biennial comprehensive remedial exam, verified the questions are 100% different from the failed exam.					
This is a from an e out or ad least 30% from othe (e.g., For exam ver For LOC segment,	non-randomly generated exam electronic exam bank, printed ministered online. Verified at of the questions are different forms/versions of this exam ms A, B, C; continuing training sions for consecutive weeks). Weekly exams during a verified > 50% difference.			<ul> <li>This is a randomly generated exam from an electronic exam bank, printed out or administered online. Verified the exam bank has 3 questions per objective if one test item on exam for the objective. If 2 or more test items on exam for an objective, then 6 questions are in bank.</li> </ul>				
<ul> <li>See Deve and r</li> <li>NRC inform spec</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>NOTE:</li> <li>See TR-AA-230-1003, SAT Development, for exam development and review guidelines.</li> <li>NRC exams may require additional information. Refer to fleet and site specific procedures.</li> <li>Key should contain the following:         <ul> <li>Learning Objective Number</li> <li>Test Item</li> <li>Question or Statement</li> <li>All possible answers</li> <li>Correct Answer Indicated</li> <li>Point Value</li> <li>References (if applicable)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>							
EXAMIN	ATION REVIEW AND APPROV	AL:						
Developed by: Date:								
Instructional Review of Written Exam (Qualified Instructor): Date:								
Technical Review (SME): Date:								
Approved by Training Supervisor: Date:								
Approved by Training Program Owner (or line designee):       Date:								
Indicate in	the following table if any change	es are i	nade t	to the exam after a	pproval:	DDCDAD		
#	DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE		REASC	ON FOR CHANGE	AR/TWR# (if applicable)	SUPERVIS	R D	DATE



Trainee Name:						
Employee Number:	Site:	PDA				
Examination Number/Title: PI	DA 17-1 NRC Exam SRO, Rev.	0				
Training Program: Operations						
Course/Lesson Plan Number(s): 60006						
Total Points Possible: 25 PASS CRITERIA: ≥ 70%			Grade: <u>/25</u> =%			
Graded by:		Date:				
Co-graded by (if necessary):			Date:			

# **EXAMINATION RULES**

- 1. References may not be used during this examination, unless otherwise stated.
- 2. Read each question carefully before answering. If you have any questions or need clarification during the examination, contact the examination proctor.
- 3. Conversation with other trainees during the examination is prohibited.
- 4. Partial credit will not be considered, unless otherwise stated. Show **all** work and state **all** assumptions when partial credit may be given.
- 5. Rest room trips are limited and only one examinee at a time may leave.

6. For exams with time limits, you have **<u>120 minutes</u>** to complete the examination.

7. Feedback on this exam may be documented on TR-AA-230-1004-F03, Examination Feedback Form. Contact Instructor to obtain a copy of the form.

#### EXAMINATION INTEGRITY STATEMENT

Cheating or compromising the exam will result in disciplinary actions up to and including termination.

"I acknowledge that I am aware of the Examination Rules stated above. Further, I have not given, received, or observed any aid or information regarding this examination <u>prior to</u> or <u>during</u> its administration that could compromise this examination."

#### **Examinee's Signature:**

Date:

#### **REVIEW ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

"I acknowledge that the correct answers to the exam questions were indicated to me following the completion of the exam. I have had the opportunity to review the examination questions with the instructor to ensure my understanding.

#### Examinee's Signature:

Date:

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #		1	
	Group #		1	
	K/A #	295001	AA2.04	
	Importance Rating		3.1	

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: Individual jet pump flows: Not-BWR-1&2 Proposed Question: SRO Question 1 (76)

The plant was operating at full reactor power when an event occurred. The Operator at the Controls reported that Total Core Flow lowered from 49.5 Mlbm/hr to 44 Mlbm/hr.

The following indications were observed, after the event, at 1C38:



What action is required?

A. Establish single loop operations within 24 hours.

- B. Be in MODE 3 within 12 hours.
- C. TRIP the "A" Recirc pump in 2 hours
- D. Be in MODE 4 in 37 hours

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect IF the applicant assumes the indications are due to a pump trip, single loop operations are required to be established within 24 hours per LCO 3.4.1.
- B. Correct These indications are consistent with Jet Pump failure. This condition requires the plant to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours per LCO 3.4.2.
- C. Incorrect If the applicant believes a speed mismatch due to a recirc pump runback has occurred, the action would be to trip the running pump within 2 hours per LCO 3.4.1
- D. Incorrect The applicant may perceive an unanalyzed condition based upon the indications, the applicant may elect to enter LCO 3.0.3 which requires MODE 4 in 37 hours.

255.2 Power/Reactivity	
ormal Change rev. 43 Bases 3.4.2 Safety Analysis rev. 2	(Attach if not previously provided)
)	255.2 Power/Reactivity ormal Change rev. 43 Bases 3.4.2 Safety Analysis rev. 2

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: L3.4.1, L3.4.2						
Learning Objective:					(As ava	ilable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	d Bank #	x	(N	lote chan	ges or attach parent)
Question History:			Last NRC Ex	am:		
Question Cognitive I	_evel:	Memory Compret	or Fundamental nension or Analys	Knowledg sis	je X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	itent:	55.41 55.43	5			
Boy 0						

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #		1	
	Group #		1	_
	K/A #	295016	AA2.02	_
	Importance Rating		4.3	_

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT: Reactor Water Level

Proposed Question: SRO Question 2 (77)

The plant was operating at full reactor power when a fire in the cable spreading room has resulted in heavy smoke in the control room.

- All efforts to extinguish the fire have been unsuccessful
- An immediate evacuation of the control room is required

Transfer of control to the remote shutdown panel must be completed within 20 minutes to

- A. close a spuriously opened SRV
- B. raise RPV water level for natural circulation
- C. depressurize the RPV to its lowest energy state
- D. prevent spurious operation of the ECCS Low Pressure Injection Pumps

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct Control of Time Critical Tasks states that transfer of 1C388 must be completed within 20 minutes to close a spuriously opened SRV to control RPV inventory in this condition...
- B. Incorrect Plausible since it is a mitigating action for loss of core flow and to promulgate flow through the core. In the given circumstance however, these conditions are not present. In addition this is not the basis for the time critical operator action.
- C. Incorrect while plausible since this is a mitigating action, it is not the basis for the time critical operator action.
- D. Incorrect while plausible since this is a mitigating action, it is not the basis for the time critical operator action.

Technical Reference(s):	ACP 103.10 Control of Time Critical Tasks, Rev. 11	(Attach if not previously provided)
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Proposed Reference	es to be	provided to	o applicants	during examinat	tion:	Ν
Learning Objective:				(	(As avai	lable)
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Question History:			Last NR(	C Exam:		
Question Cognitive I	_evel:	Memory	or Fundame	ntal Knowledge	Х	
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	itent:	55.41 55.43	1			

Comments: Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	295019	AA2.02
	Importance Rating		3.7

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR: Status of safety-related instrument air system loads Proposed Question: SRO Question 3 (78)

The plant is operating at full reactor power with 1K4, CB/SBGTS Instrument Air Compressor, INOPERABLE.

- 1K4 Day 2 of maintenance for planned repairs
- At 1600 1A311, 1A3 Bus Feeder Breaker from SBDG 1G-31 indications have been lost
- At 1630 Electricians determine that the control power fuses for 1A311 have been blown
- Repairs cannot be completed for 6 hours

What action is the CRS first required to comply with?

- A. Declare 1K3 INOPERABLE immediately
- B. Declare 1K3 INOPERABLE by 2000
- C. Restore 1K4 to OPERABLE within 7 days
- D. Restore "A" SBDG 1G-31 to OPERABLE by 1600 the following day.

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect 4 hours is allotted when the required redundant feature is
- B. Correct 1K4 is INOPERABLE. With the "A" SBDG INOPERABLE, 4 hours is allotted before the required redundant feature (1K3) must be declared INOPERABLE.
- C. Incorrect Although still in this specification, there are other actions that are required to be "first" taken.
- D. Incorrect This may be true as well however there are other actions that are required to be taken first.

Technical Reference(s):	LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating rev. 272, LCO 3.7.9 CB/SBGT Instrument Air System rev. 229	(Attach if not previously provided)
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Proposed Reference	es to be	provided	to applica	ants during e	xamination:	<mark>L3.7.9, L3.8.1</mark>
Learning Objective:					(As ava	ilable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifi New	# ed Bank #	x		(Note chan	ges or attach parent)
Question History:			Last	NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive	Level:	Memory Compre	or Funda	amental Kno <sup>.</sup> or Analysis	wledge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	ntent:	55.41 55.43	2			

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	295023	2.2.22
	Importance Rating		4.7

Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits: Refueling Accidents Proposed Question: SRO Question 4 (79)

The plant is in MODE 5 with the fuel pool gates installed for a RFO with the following conditions:

• Fuel is being moved in the Spent Fuel Pool

Then, annunciator FUEL POOL COOLING PANEL 1C-65/1C-66 TROUBLE 1C04B (D-2) alarms. The following plant conditions exist:

- The cause of the alarm is Skimmer Surge Tank Low Level
- Spent Fuel Pool level is 35 feet and slowly lowering
- Refuel Floor ARMs have increased by 2 mrem / hr and **not** alarming

(1) What actions are required?

# AND

(2) What, if any, EAL is required to be declared?

- A. (1) Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool may continue indefinitely provided contingencies in place.
   (2) An Alast sugget has dealered.
  - (2) An Alert must be declared.
- B. (1) Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool must be suspended immediately.
  - (2) An Unusual Event must be declared.
- C. (1) Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool must be suspended immediately.
  - (2) An Alert must be declared.
- D. (1) Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool may continue indefinitely provided contingencies in place.
   (2) An Unusual Event must be dealared
  - (2) An Unusual Event must be declared.

Proposed Answer: B

. '				_				
Α.	<ul> <li>Incorrect – The LCO has been exceeded and UE is required IAW EAL-02, R02.1,</li> <li>Unplanned valid Refuel Floor ARM reading increase with an uncontrolled loss of reactor cavity, fuel pool, or fuel transfer canal water level with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water as indicated by any of the following:         <ul> <li>Report to control room</li> </ul> </li> </ul>							
	<ul> <li>Valid fuel pool level indication (LI-3413) LESS THAN 36 feet and lowering</li> </ul>							
В.	<ul> <li>Valid WR GEMAC Floodup indication (LI-4541) coming on scale</li> <li>Correct – IAW ARP 1C04B A-4 Section 3.7 &amp; 3.8. TS 3.7.8 LCO limit is 36 feet, action is required to immediately suspend fuel movement. An Unusual Event must be declared because fuel pool level indication (LI-3413) LESS THAN 36 feet and lowering.</li> </ul>							
C.	Incorrect - A	UE mu	st be decla	ared				
D.	Incorrect – N	loveme	nt of irradi	ated fuel r	nust be susp	ended imm	ediately.	
TS 3.7. Technical Reference(s): EAL-02 Rev 9				oent Fuel S rev. 224, I ∟ Matrix -	Storage Pool EPIP Form Cold MODE,	(Attach if i	not previously prov	vided)
Propos	ed Reference	es to be	provided t	o applicar	nts during exa	amination:	EPIP Form EA EPIP Form EA	<mark>L-01</mark> L-02
Learnir	ng Objective:					(As av	vailable)	
Questio	on Source:	Bank #	£					
		Modifie	ed Bank #	х		(Note cha	nges or attach par	ent)
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Questio	on History:			Last N	IRC Exam:	2	011 NRC	
Questio	on Cognitive	Level:	Memory	or Fundaı	mental Knowl	edge		
			Compret	nension or	Analysis	Х		
10 CFF	R Part 55 Cor	ntent:	55.41					
			55.43	2				
Comm	ents: Facility	operatin	g limitatio	ns in the t	echnical spec	ifications a	nd their bases.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #		1	
	Group #		1	
	K/A #	295025	EA2.03	_
	Importance Rating		4.1	_

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: Suppression pool temperature

Proposed Question: SRO Question 5 (80)

The following conditions were present following a Reactor SCRAM:

- Reactor pressure is 910 psig and stable
- Torus water level is 10.4 feet and stable
- Torus water temperature is 1600F and rising slowly
- Drywell pressure is 6 psig and rising slowly
- Drywell air temperature is 2200F and rising slowly

The CRS will\_\_\_\_\_.

- A. anticipate emergency depressurization
- B. emergency depressurize
- C. lower reactor pressure 200 psig
- D. vent the Drywell

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect The HCL curve has been exceeded. This requires emergency depressurization.
- B. Correct Since the HCL curve has been exceeded, emergency depressurization is required.
- C. Incorrect Since the HCL curve has been exceeded, emergency depressurization is required.
- D. Incorrect Group 3 isolation prevents venting the drywell. Venting containment is not yet required.

# EOP 1 RPV Control rev.20, EOP 2

Technical Reference(s): Primary Containment Control rev. (Attach if not previously provided) 18

Proposed Reference	provided t	ants during exa	amination:	EOP Graph 4 - HCL		
Learning Objective:					(As av	ailable)
Question Source:	Bank #	£				
	Modifie	ed Bank #			(Note cha	nges or attach parent)
	New		Х			
Question History:			Last	NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive I	Level:	Memory	or Fund	amental Knowl	edge	
		Compret	nension	or Analysis	Х	
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	itent:	55.41				
		55.43	5			

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	295028	G2.4.8
	Importance Rating		4.5

Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.: High Drywell Temperature

Proposed Question: SRO Question 6 (81)

A loss of offsite power occurs and the following conditions are present:

- 1A3 and 1A4 4160VAC Essential Busses are being supplied by "A" and "B" SBDGs
- Drywell Pressure is 6 psig rising slowly
- Drywell air temperature is 2800F and rising slowly

What if any action(s) must the CRS direct?

- A. No additional actions are required
- B. Emergency Depressurize the RPV
- C. Initiate Drywell Sprays
- D. Restore power to 1B33, 1B43, 1B35, and 1B45

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect to restore drywell cooling, power must be restored to Well Water and to drywell cooling fans.
- B. Incorrect This would be true if drywell air temperature exceeded 340F
- C. Incorrect Outside the allowable Drywell spray initiation limit curve.
- D. Correct LOOP/LOCA Load shedding has occurred requiring restoration of power to 1B33,35,43, and 45. AOP 301 directs these actions.

Technical Reference(s):	AOP 301 Loss of essential electrical power, rev. 71 Restoration of Power to essential busses. Page 34 step d(1)	(Attach if not previously provided)
	busses. Page 34 step d(T)	

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examinat						EOP Graph 7 - DWSIL
Learning Objective:					(As avail	able)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie	d Bank #		(No	te chang	es or attach parent)
	New		х	(110	to onling	
Question History:			Last NRC Exa	am:		
Question Cognitive I	₋evel:	Memory of Compreh	or Fundamental I ension or Analys	Knowledge sis	х	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	5			

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #		1	
	Group #		1	
	K/A #	295037	G2.4.34	
	Importance Rating		4.1	

Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects: SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown

Proposed Question: SRO Question 7 (82)

- An Electrical ATWS has occurred.
- Both SBLC Pumps fail to run from the control room

The CRS shall direct \_\_\_\_\_\_ to inject Boron to the RPV.

- A. OI 153 Standby Liquid Control System
- B. AIP 406 Injection with SBLC
- C. SEP 304 Boron Injection using RWCU
- D. OI 261 Reactor Water Cleanup System

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect The Operating instruction does not provide the procedural guidance for alternate injection of boron but does provide direction to inject boron to the RPV.
- B. Incorrect The AIP could inject Boron into the RPV however it requires the use of SBLC pumps which are not available
- C. Correct per EOP ATWS step /Q-
- D. Incorrect Although RWCU system is used to inject Boron to the RPV, the Operating instruction does not provide the procedural guidance for alternate injection of boron

# EOP ATWS rev. 23, SEP 304

Technical Reference(s): Boron Injection using RWCU rev. (Attach if not previously provided) 16

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: N

Learning Objective:

(As available)

Question Source:	Bank #						
	Modifie	d Bank #			(Note changes or attach parent)		
	New		Х				
Question History:			Last NF	RC Exam:			
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory o	or Fundam	ental Knowle	dge X		
		Compreh	ension or <i>i</i>	Analysis			
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41					
		55.43	5				

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		2
	K/A #	295007	G2.1.20
	Importance Rating		4.6

Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps: High Reactor Pressure Proposed Question: SRO Question 8 (83)

- 10:00 While performing a plant walkdown at full reactor power, the Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator reports that the "B" EHC Pressure Regulator is in service.
- 10:02 The At the Controls Operator reports that Reactor Pressure is 1030 psig.
- 10:17 Attempts to lower Reactor Pressure were unsuccessful.

(1) The CRS will direct \_\_\_\_\_\_ to mitigate this condition?

# AND

(2) What is the first action that must be completed?

- A. (1) AOP 693 Main Turbine/EHC Failures(2) Be in MODE 3 within 12 hours
- B. (1) AOP 693, Main Turbine/EHC Failures(2) Reduce Thermal Power to <21.7% within 4 hours</li>
- C. (1) AOP 262, Loss of Reactor Pressure Control (2) Be in MODE 3 within 12 hours
- D. (1) AOP 262, Loss of Reactor Pressure Control
  (2) Reduce Thermal Power to <21.7% within 4 hours</li>

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect AOP 693 does not provide the guidance for a failed pressure regulator. The first action required to be completed is thermal power to <21.7% within 4 hours in accordance with LCO 3.2.2
- B. Incorrect AOP 693 does not provide the guidance for a failed pressure regulator.
- C. Incorrect The first action required to be completed is thermal power to <21.7% within 4 hours in accordance with LCO 3.2.2

D. Correct – AOP 262 provides the guidance for a failed pressure regulator. Step 6 directs lowering power <21.7% to comply with the MCPR spec 3.2.2.

Technical Reference	A P e(s): Lu 3 P	OP 262 Loss of ressure Control CO 3.2.2 MCPF 4.10 Reactor S ressure Rev. 22	f Reactor , rev. 8 step 6, R rev. 244, LCO team Dome 24	(Attach if no	t previously provided)
					1322
Proposed Reference	es to be	provided to app	olicants during ex	amination:	L3.4.10
Learning Objective:				(As avai	lable)
Question Source:	Bank #	£			
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Question History:		L	ast NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge			
		Comprehensi	on or Analysis	Х	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41			
		55.43 2			

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		2
	K/A #	295010	G2.4.21
	Importance Rating		4.6

Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. : High Drywell Pressure

Proposed Question: SRO Question 9 (84)

- Station Blackout conditions exist
- The RPV has been Emergency Depressurized and Reactor Pressure is being maintained 150-350 psig
- Torus Water level is 12.2 feet and rising slowly
- Containment Pressure is 40 psig and rising slowly
- All available support systems are operating as designed

The CRS directs \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to lower containment pressure to 10 psig.

- A. SEP 307, Rapid Depressurization with Bypass Valves
- B. SEP 301.3, Torus Vent via Hard Pipe Vent
- C. SEP 301.2, Drywell Vent via SBGT
- D. SEP 301.1, Torus Vent via SBGT

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect This action would remove energy from the containment making it plausible.
- B. Correct With RPS lost, the other choices are not possible. The CRS would direct use of the Torus Hard Pipe Vent to lower containment pressure.
- C. Incorrect RPS is not available. Torus venting is preferable if available
- D. Incorrect RPS is not available.

	EOP 2 Primary Containment	
	Control rev. 18, SEP 301.1 Torus	
Technical Reference(s):	Vent via SBGT rev. 10, SEP 301.2 (Attach if	f not previously provided)
	Drywell Vent via SBGT rev. 6,	
	SEP 301.3 Torus Vent via	

Hardpipe vent, rev. 10

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided to	o applicants durir	ng examination:	Ν
Learning Objective:				(As ava	ailable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	d Bank #	x	(Note char	ges or attach parent)
Question History:			Last NRC Exa	am:	
Question Cognitive I	₋evel:	Memory of Compreh	or Fundamental I ension or Analys	Knowledge is X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	5		

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		2
	K/A #	295014	AA2.02
	Importance Rating		3.9

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION: Reactor period

Proposed Question: SRO Question 10 (85)

During a reactor startup, control rod 26-27 is withdrawn one notch. Reactor period is observed to change from 150 seconds to 50 seconds.

Which one of the following describes the appropriate action to be taken?

The CRS should direct the RO to \_\_\_\_\_\_.

- A. immediately SCRAM the reactor
- B. re-insert control rods as necessary to go to a subcritical hold point
- C. shutdown the reactor until a thorough assessment can be performed
- D. re-insert control rod 26-27 to obtain a stable period of greater than 60 seconds

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect Reactor Scram is not required at this time.
- B. Incorrect Inserting control rods to a subcritical hold point is only valid if the reactor remained subcritical
- C. Incorrect –.Reactor shutdown is not required for a double notched rod.
- D. Correct The CRS would direct the RO to reinsert control rods as necessary to maintain a manageable period.

Technical Reference(s): IPOI 2 Startup P&L 12 rev 154, (Attach if not previously provided)

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: N

Learning Objective:

(As available)

Question Source:	Bank #			
	Modified	d Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	2	x	
Question History:			Last NRC Exam:	
Question Cognitive L	evel:	Memory c	or Fundamental Know	<i>l</i> ledge
		Compreh	ension or Analysis	Х
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	5	

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	206000	A2.02
	Importance Rating		3.5

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Valve closures: BWR-2,3,4 [High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System]

Proposed Question: SRO Question 11 (86)

The plant is in MODE 2 and Reactor Pressure is 940 psig and stable

- A through wall piping leak is identified in the HPCI steam supply line.
- The leak has been isolated by closing MO2238 and MO2239 HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valves.

Mode change to MODE 1 is \_\_\_\_\_.

- A. allowed by LCO 3.0.4a
- B. allowed by LCO 3.0.4b
- C. allowed by LCO 3.0.4c
- D. not allowed

Proposed Answer: D

- A. HPCI is INOPERABLE when isolated. MODE change to MODE 1 is not allowed.
- B. HPCI is INOPERABLE when isolated. MODE change to MODE 1 is not allowed.
- C. HPCI is INOPERABLE when isolated. MODE change to MODE 1 is not allowed.
- D. Correct: A throughwall leak in the HPCI Steam Supply Line LCO 3.7.3 Condition A applies. Isolate the piping to exit the applicability to the action statement. Isolating HPCI makes HPCI INOPERABLE, MODE change to MODE 1 is not allowed with LCO 3.5.1 Condition.

Technical Reference(s):	TRM 3.7.3 Structural Integrity rev. 8, LCO 3.5.1Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) 259, LCO 3.0.4 LCO Applicability rev.	(Attach if not previously provided)
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Proposed Reference	es to b	e provided to applicants during e	amination: N
Learning Objective:		5.01.01.07, State when the HPCI System is required to be OPERA by Technical Specifications and describe the bases of the HPCI System LCO's	BLE (As available)
Question Source:	Bank Modi	# fied Bank #	(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:		Last NRC Exam:	
Question Cognitive L	evel:	Memory or Fundamental Knov Comprehension or Analysis	vledge X
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43 2	

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

266

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	209001	G2.2.37
	Importance Rating		4.7

Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment: Low Pressure Core Spray System

Proposed Question: SRO Question 12 (87)

- The plant is operating at full reactor power
- RHR Pump "B" supply breaker is racked down and removed for maintenance on the breaker
- During testing it is determined that the "B" Core Spray Pump could not develop more than 2650 gpm at 110 psig.

Which one of the following satisfies the most limiting action?

- A. Enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately
- B. No additional actions are required
- C. Restore RHR Pump "B" to OPERABLE within 72 hours
- D. Restore Core Spray Pump "B" to OPERABLE in 7 days

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect Since LCO 3.5.1 condition N is modified by a note that allows for condition C therefore performing this action is overly conservative and not in accordance with provisions allowed in the spec.
- B. Incorrect The data provided makes the "B" Core Spray Pump INOPERABLE therefore additional actions are required
- C. Correct With 2 Low Pressure ECCS Pumps INOPERABLE, a 72 hour LCO is required to be entered. Restoration of one of the 2 pumps to OPERABLE is the most restrictive action for the given conditions.
- D. Incorrect This is a required action however, it is not the most limiting action required at this time.

#### LCO 3.5.1Emergency Core

Technical Reference(s): Cooling Systems (ECCS) rev.259 (Attach if not previously provided) SR3.5.1.4

Proposed Reference	es to be p	provided t	o applicants during	g examination:	L3.5.1
Learning Objective:				(As ava	iilable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie	d Bank #		(Note chan	ges or attach parent)
	New		х	<b>,</b>	<b>5</b> ,
Question History:			Last NRC Exa	m:	
Question Cognitive I	_evel:	Memory Compreh	or Fundamental K nension or Analysis	nowledge s X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	itent:	55.41 55.43	2		

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases. Had to redraw the KA. Unable to write to original. EM 3/22/2017

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	212000	A2.02
	Importance Rating		3.9

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: RPS bus power supply failure Proposed Question: SRO Question 13 (88)

The plant was operating at full reactor power when an electrical transient occurred resulting in an automatic reactor scram.

The following are plant conditions:

- All control rods are fully inserted
- Reactor level has recovered to 178 inches and is slowly rising
- Reactor Pressure is 1000 psig and rising slowly
- The Main Turbine is tripped
- The SBDG's are running unloaded with the Essential Buses on their normal supply
- RPS is **deenergized**

The CRS shall direct which of the following pressure control strategies?

- A. Cool down the RPV with the Main Turbine Bypass Valves utilizing EHC pressure set. Defeat isolation interlocks as necessary
- B. Place RWCU in operation using SEP 302.1, RWCU in Recirc mode, or using SEP 302.2, RWCU in Drain mode
- C. Place RCIC or HPCI in pressure control mode. Defeat isolation interlocks as necessary
- D. Install Defeat 17 Hi Condenser Backpressure Bypass and utilize MSL Drains MO-4423 and MO-4424 for pressure control

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect A group 1 isolation is present with the loss of RPS power making this pressure control mode unavailable
- B. Incorrect RWCU is not available due to the loss of RPS power and the system being isolated

C. D.	Correct – HF Drywell press Incorrect – R	PCI and sure sig PS pow	RCIC are av nal making f ver is lost. C	vailable in pressure co this a possible strateo Cannot override the is	ontrol mode Jy olation signal	There is no 2 psig
Technie	cal Reference	e(s): E	OP 1 RPV C	Control rev.20.	(Attach if no	t previously provided)
Propos	ed Reference	es to be	provided to	applicants during exa	mination:	Ν
Learnir	ng Objective:	5. ar de st	11.01.02, E nd control ro etermine neo rategies (AC	valuate plant conditio om indications and cessary mitigative OP 358)	ns (As avai	lable)
Questio	on Source:	Bank # Modifie New	d Bank #	50632	(Note chang	ges or attach parent)
Questic	on History:	PDA 18 Comp	5-1 Workup	Last NRC Exam:		
Questic	on Cognitive L	evel:	Memory or Comprehe	<sup>-</sup> Fundamental Knowle nsion or Analysis	edge X	
10 CFF	R Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	5		

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #		2	
	Group #		1	
	K/A #	217000	2.4.6	
	Importance Rating		4.7	

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Proposed Question: SRO Question 14 (89)

An event has occurred and the plant is in a station blackout condition. The following are plant conditions:

- Reactor pressure is being maintained 150 to 350 psig
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) has been maximized for reactor vessel injection
- HPCI is unavailable
- Drywell air temperature will reach 340°F in 90 minutes
- Torus water temperature is rising such that Heat Capacity Limit (HCL) will be exceeded in 45 minutes
- Two unisolable steam leaks are raising local area temperatures and will exceed max safe in both areas in 55 minutes
- Portable Diesel Driven Fire Pump will have reactor vessel injection capabilities in 70
  minutes

Given these plant conditions and times, when is the Control Room Supervisor **first** required to perform a full reactor vessel depressurization?

A full reactor depressurization will be required when \_\_\_\_\_\_.

- A. alternate injections sources are available
- B. two area temperatures are greater than max safe
- C. the Heat Capacity Limit curve has been violated
- D. drywell air temperature reaches 340°F

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct Full depressurization is not allowed until alternate injections sources are available
- B. Incorrect Continue full depressurization when two areas are greater than max safe
- C. Incorrect Continue full depressurization when HCL has been exceeded

D. Incorrect - Continue full depressurization when 340F

Technical Reference(	(s): D E R C	OP Emergency RPV Depressurization, rev. 11 OP 3 Secondary Containment / Cad Release Control, rev. 22 OP 2 Primary Containment Control rev. 18	(Attach if not	previously provided)
Proposed References	s to be	provided to applicants during exa	mination:	Ν
Learning Objective:			(As avail	able)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	# ed Bank # X	(Note chang	es or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive Lo	evel:	Memory or Fundamental Knowle Comprehension or Analysis	edge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Cont	ent:	55.41 55.43 5		

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	262001	A2.06
	Importance Rating		2.9

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Deenergizing a plant bus

Proposed Question: SRO Question 15 (90)

Following a loss of Essential AC power, the crew has entered the LOSS OF BOTH ESSENTIAL 4160V BUSES section of AOP 301, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL POWER.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes:

(1) The impact on Station Fire Protection?

# AND

- (2) The procedure which dictates the establishment of "compensatory" fire patrols?
- A. (1) All Fire Detection Systems become NON-FUNCTIONAL
   (2) EN-AA-202-1004, FIRE PROTECTION SCREENING
- B. (1) Loss of Fire Barrier when fire doors are blocked open
   (2) EN-AA-202-1004, FIRE PROTECTION SCREENING
- C. (1) Loss of Fire Barrier when fire doors are blocked open
  (2) ACP 1412.4, IMPAIRMENTS TO FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
- D. (1) All Fire Detection Systems become NON-FUNCTIONAL
  - (2) ACP 1412.4, IMPAIRMENTS TO FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect Some fire detection systems are supplied by their own batteries and would not be INOPERABLE and therefore would not require "compensatory" fire patrols.
- B. Incorrect EN-AA-202-1004, FIRE PROTECTION SCREENING. and the DAEC Fire Plan describe the overall fire protection program at the Duane Arnold Energy Center. There is no specific guidance for impairments in EN-AA-202-1004, FIRE PROTECTION SCREENING..
- C. Correct IAW AOP-301, page 11, Consult with Security, establish natural/temporary ventilation by opening room/panel doors as follows: Battery Room doors, Nonessential

Rev. 0 60006\_PDA 17-1 NRC Exam SRO\_xm\_60Day.docx Switchgear Room doors, Control Room doors, and Essential Switchgear Room doors. A caution in this step is "This step affects the integrity of some plant fire zones. FPIRs and fire watches may be required." ACP-1412.4, Impairments to Fire Protection Systems, provides the requirement for establishing "compensatory" fire patrols.

D. Incorrect - Some fire detection systems are supplied by their own batteries and would not be INOPERABLE and therefore would not require "compensatory" fire patrols.

Technical Reference(s):	AOP 301 Loss of Essential Electrical Power, Rev. 71	(Attach if not previously provided)
ACP 1412.4, Rev.		

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided to	applicants during exa	amination:	Ν
Learning Objective:	5. ar de 30	.04.01.02, E nd control ro etermine the 01	valuate plant condition oom indications and e actions directed by a	ons AOP <sup>(As</sup> avail	able)
Question Source:	Bank #	£	50469		
	Modifie	ed Bank #		(Note change	es or attach parent)
	New				
Question History:			Last NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory or	r Fundamental Know	edge X	
		Comprehe	nsion or Analysis		
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41			
		55.43	2		

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	201006	G2.2.40
	Importance Rating		4.7

Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system: Rod Worth Minimizer System (Plant Specific)

Proposed Question: SRO Question 16 (91)

Reactor Power is at 8% with the Rod Worth Minimizer out of service. Operators inserting control rods inadvertently skipped several rod sequence control pages resulting in seven rods out of the allowable sequence.

Which one of the following is the maximum time to correct the condition?

- A. 2 Hours
- B. 4 Hours
- C. 8 Hours
- D. 12 Hours

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect The applicant could correlate a violation of thermal limits which has a 2 hour completion time to correct the condition
- B. Incorrect The applicant could consider LCO 3.1.3 condition D which has a 4 hour completion time for 2 or more INOPERABLE control rods not within the BPWS
- C. Correct LCO 3.1.6 condition A required action A.1 move control rods to correct position within 8 hours.
- D. Incorrect LCO 3.1.6 Condition C states Be in MODE 3 if required actions not completed. This could be construed by the applicant since numerous rods are out of sequence. 8 hours is allowed to correct the condition.

#### LCO 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control

Technical Reference(s): rev. 224, LCO 3.1.3 Control Rod (Attach if not previously provided) Operability rev. 271

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided t	o applicant	s during exa	mination:	<mark>L3.1.6, L3.1.3</mark>
Learning Objective:					(As ava	ilable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	d Bank #	X		(Note chan	ges or attach parent)
Question History:			Last NI	RC Exam:		
Question Cognitive I	₋evel:	Memory Compret	or Fundam nension or	iental Knowle Analysis	edge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	2			

Comments: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	216000	A2.07
	Importance Rating		3.5

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Reference leg flashing

Proposed Question: SRO Question 17 (92)

A normal plant Shutdown and Cooldown from full power operations is in progress.

- The reactor is shutdown
- RPV Pressure is 940 psig
- RPV Level is 190 inches and stable
- Cooldown has just started
- The GEMAC Reference Leg Backfill System has been out of service for 3 weeks

(1) What compensatory actions are directed to address these plant conditions?

#### AND

(2) Which procedure is directed if "NOTCHING" is observed?

- A. (1) When RPV pressure reaches 500 psig direct the operating crew NOT to use the Yarway instruments on 1C05 for level indication
   (2) OI 880, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System
- B. (1) When RPV pressure reaches 500 psig direct the operating crew NOT to use the Yarway Instruments on 1C05 for level indication
   (2) IPOI 4, Shutdown
- C. (1) Direct enhanced RPV Level monitoring during the plant cooldown (2) OI 880, Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System
- D. (1) Direct enhanced RPV Level monitoring during the plant cooldown
   (2) IPOI 4, Shutdown

Proposed Answer: C

A.	Incorrect - Yarways share instrument lines with the GEMAC instruments but these directions would be given for a rapid pressure decrease. OI 880 is the correct OI for the action required						
В.	Incorrect - Yarways share instrument lines with the GEMAC instruments but these directions would be given for a rapid pressure decrease. IPOI 4 does direct action be performed IAW OI 880 for these conditions but does not have directions if Notching is observed.						
C.	Correct - Anytime the Reference Leg Backfill system is out of service for 7 days performance of OI-880, J-1 section 6.1 is required. Notching is expected when reducing RPV pressure during a shutdown. The Narrow range GEMAC level instruments are susceptible. OI-880 directs these actions for the given plant conditions.						
D.	Incorrect - IPOI 4 does direct action be performed IAW OI 880 for these conditions but does not have directions if Notching is observed. Enhanced level monitoring is the correct direction for these conditions.						
OI-880 Non Nuclear Technical Reference(s): Instrumentation System section J- (Attach if not previously pro					(Attach if not previously provided)		
IPOI 4,	Rev.		́ I				
Propos	ed Reference	es to be	provided to	applicants during exa	amination: N		
Learnir	ng Objective:	4 CI CI	.18.03, Dire ontrol RPV ooldown.	ct operator actions to level throughout the	(As available)		
Questic	on Source:	Bank #	<i>‡</i>	Х			
		Modifie	ed Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)		
		new					
Questic	on History:			Last NRC Exam:	2009 NRC		
Questic	on Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory o	r Fundamental Knowl	edge		
			Comprehe	ension or Analysis	X		
10 CFF	R Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41				
			55.43	5			

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	290001	G2.4.6
	Importance Rating		4.7

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.: Secondary Containment Proposed Question: SRO Question 18 (93)

With the plant operating at full power, a spent resin spill from the RWCU Phase Separator occurs in the reactor building. The following conditions are present:

- RWCU Spent Resin Room ARM, RI-9173, is reading 3,500 mR/hr
- RWCU Phase Separator Room ARM, RI-9177, is reading 850 mR/hr
- North Refuel Floor ARM, RI-9163, is reading 210 mR/hr

Which one of the following actions will be directed by the CRS?

- A. Perform a fast power reduction and SCRAM the reactor
- B. Anticipate Emergency Depressurization
- C. Perform a plant shutdown per IPOI 3
- D. Emergency Depressurize

Proposed Answer: C

- A. A: Incorrect would be true if reactor were discharging into the Secondary Containment (SC-3). The conditions present represent a resin spill that would not be affected by lowering the energy state of the Reactor. The applicant may choose this condition due to exceeding Max Safe Operating Limits in ONE area per EOP 3, Secondary Containment Control/Rad Release Control.
- B. Incorrect would be true if reactor were discharging into the Secondary Containment (SC-3) and Max Safe Operating Limits were bing approached.
- C. Correct Answer: It is required to perform a plant shutdown due to exceeding Max Safe Operating Limit in TWO areas. (SC-9)
- D. Incorrect would be true if reactor were discharging into the Secondary Containment. (SC-7)

B Technical Reference(s): C C		Bases- EOP Containmen Control, rev.	3 / EOP 4 Secondary t / Rad Release 22	(Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed Reference	es to b	e provided to	o applicants during exa	mination: EOP Table 6
Learning Objective:		6.68.02.01, or 5 to perfor performing E	Justify the use of IPOI rm a plant shutdown w EOP 3.	3,4, hile (As available)
Question Source:	Bank Modit New	# fied Bank #	52213	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	PDA Com	17-1 ЕОР р	Last NRC Exam:	
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory of	or Fundamental Knowle	edge
		Compreh	ension or Analysis	Х
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41		
		55.43	4	

Comments: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		
	Group #		
	K/A #	G1	G2.1.5
	Importance Rating		3.9

Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO Question 19 (94)

The plant is operating at full reactor power during a weekend night shift. The Shift Technical Advisor's (STA) wife just called to say she is headed to the hospital to have a baby. The STA asks to leave the site to accompany his wife prior to watch relief.

Is this permitted per ACP 1410.1, Operations Working Standard?

- A. No, a qualified relief must first be on-site and relieve the STA.
- B. Yes, the only action necessary is to obtain the Operations Director's approval to secure the STA for the remainder of the shift.
- C. Yes, as long as an immediate callout is made for watch relief and the relief arrives within 2 hours. The Operations Director must be notified.
- D. Yes, as long as an immediate callout is made for watch relief and the relief arrives within 4 hours. The Operations Director must be notified.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect It is allowed.
- B. Incorrect Ops Manager approval not necessary, just notification
- C. Correct IAW T.S. 5.2.2: Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirement for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements. IAW ACP 1410.1, Operations Director must be notified.
- D. Incorrect An immediate call out is necessary, and the relief must be on site within 2 hours.

	ACP 1410.1, Rev. 104, Sect. 3.2,	
Technical Reference(s):	Step (4) (a) & (b) LCO 5.2.2	(Attach if not previously provided)
	Organization rev. 274	

T.S. 5.2.2, Amendment 274

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: N					
1.11.03, ensure plant activities areLearning Objective:performed in compliance with the ACP (As available)1400 Manual.					able)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	d Bank #	50878	(Note chang	es or attach parent)
Question History:	PDA 13 DAEC (	8-1 SRO Cert	Last NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive L	₋evel:	Memory or Comprehe	Fundamental Knowle	edge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 55.43	1		

Comments: Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		
	Group #		
	K/A #	G1	G2.1.36
	Importance Rating		4.1

Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. Proposed Question: SRO Question 20 (95)

Whose permission is required to commence Irradiated Fuel Handling?

- A. Site Director
- B. Operations Shift Manager
- C. Control Room Supervisor
- D. Radiation Protection Manager

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect The Site Director permission is not required
- B. Correct The OSM must approve commencement of fuel handling
- C. Incorrect The CRS permission is not required
- D. Incorrect The RPM persmission is not required

Technical Reference(s): RFP 403 rev 60 Attachment 1 step (Attach if not previously provided) 21.

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination: N

Learning Objectives	1.04.01.03, describe the information found in the Fuel Moving Plan and	
Learning Objective:	explain how minor changes are made to the Fuel Moving Plan,	(As available)

Question Source:	Bank #			
	Modifie	d Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	2	x	
Question History:	PDA 15 Workup	-1 SRO Comp A	Last NRC Exam:	
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory c	or Fundamental Knowle	edge X
		Compreh	ension or Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41		
		55.43	6	

Comments: Procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading, alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination of various internal and external effects on core reactivity.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #			
	Group #			
	K/A #	G2	G2.2.6	
	Importance Rating		3.6	

Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures.

Proposed Question: SRO Question 21 (96)

While performing a section of Operating Instruction (OI) 410, River Water Supply System, the reactor operator comes across this step:

# (27) Place Traveling Screen Wash Pump 1P-112A[B] in service by placing handswitch HS-2906A[B] to the AUTO position on breaker 1B9106 [1B2106].

This step is unable to be performed. The Reactor Operator (RO) has determined performance of the step is **NOT** required.

Which one of the following meets the approval requirements to place an "NA" in the block for this step?

- A. Two Senior Reactor Operators
- B. Only the Operations Shift Manager
- C. The STA and the RO performing the procedure
- D. The Control Room Supervisor and the RO performing the procedure

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Correct: Two (2) SROs are required to review, approve, and initial an NA to a step in a work instruction or procedure that are for safety related equipment or equipment that supports technical specifications.
- B. Incorrect: The OSM would need a second SRO
- C. Incorrect: Two SROs are required to perform this action
- D. Incorrect: The CRS would need a second SRO

# AD-AA-100-1006 Procedure Work

Technical Reference(s): Instruction Use and Adherence, page 28 section 4.8 step 5D, (Attach if not previously provided)

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided	o appl	icants during exa	mination:	Ν
Learning Objective:					(As a	available)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	ŧ ed Bank #	x		(Note ch	anges or attach parent)
Question History:			La	st NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive	Level:	Memory Comprel	or Fun nensiol	ndamental Knowle n or Analysis	edge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	itent:	55.41 55.43	3			

Comments: Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO	
	Tier #			
	Group #			_
	K/A #	G2	2.2.44	
	Importance Rating		4.4	_

Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and | operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

Proposed Question: SRO Question 22 (97)

The plant is operating at 100% power with the following conditions:

- Instrument and Control Technicians determine that all Torus Water Level indications are indicating 6 inches higher than actual Torus Water Level.
- Currently Torus Water Level indicates 10.35 Feet

#### What is required?

- A. Fill the Torus
- B. Scram the Reactor and enter EOP 1
- C. Emergency Depressurize the RPV
- D. Increased monitoring of Torus Water Level indication

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Correct Torus water level actual is 9.85 Feet which is below the entry condition of 10.1 feet in EOP 2. LCO 3.6.2.2 applies. This condition must be corrected within 2 hours.
- B. Incorrect This action is not required for the given conditions. Level is stable but low.
- C. Incorrect This action is not required for the given conditions. Level is stable but low.
- D. Incorrect This action in itself is not required. The required action is to fill the Torus to the appropriate level per Technical Specifications and EOP guidance.

#### EOP 2, TS LCO 3.6.2.2

Technical Reference(s): Suppression Pool Water Level rev. (Attach if not previously provided) 224

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided t	o applicar	nts during exa	amination:	L3.6.2.2
Learning Objective:					(As ava	ilable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	ed Bank #	x		(Note chan	ges or attach parent)
Question History:			Last N	IRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive	Level:	Memory Compret	or Fundar nension or	mental Knowl <sup>-</sup> Analysis	edge X	
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	itent:	55.41 55.43	5			

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		
	Group #		
	K/A #	G3	G2.3.5
	Importance Rating		2.9

Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO Question 23 (98)

An accident has occurred which has caused entry into the RPV Flood EOP. All control rods are fully inserted.

- Drywell area Rad monitors are now reading 450 and 500 R/Hr and slowly rising
- Torus area Rad monitors are now reading 45 and 50 R/hr and slowly rising
- The TSC is NOT manned at this time

Table 5	Core Damage Indications			
Para	meter	Value		
Primary containment hydrogen concentration		Drywell OR torus H <sub>2</sub> concentration above 0.4% (minimum detectable)		
Primary containment radiation		Drywell Area Hi Range Rad Monitor RIM-9184A/B above 7E+2 R/hr OR Torus Area Hi Range Rad Monitor RIM-9185A/B above 3E+1 R/hr		
Reactor coolant activity		Chemistry samples above 300 μCi/gm dose equivalent I-131		
Fuel damage assessment (PASAP 7.2)		At or above 5% fuel clad damage		

Given these plant conditions and EOP Table 5, which of the following actions is required at this time?

- A. Continue to perform RPV/F actions. SAG entry is not required until multiple Core damage indications are seen
- B. Continue to perform RPV/F actions; since core flooding indications exist, enter the SAGs and then exit the EOPs
- C. Continue to perform RPV/F actions until RPV reactor water level indications are observed. Once the TSC is operational, exit the EOPs and enter the SAGs
- D. Enter the SAGs and transition from RPV/F to SAG 1, Primary Containment Flooding. Continue to monitor the plant for degrading conditions and report them to the TSC once

#### manned and operational

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Incorrect RPV/F actions must continue however there is a SAG entry condition on primary containment radiation. Plausible because RPV/F action must continue and the candidate may misinterpret Table 5.
- B. Incorrect EOPs should not be exited until there is evidence of core flooding and the TSC is operational. With reactor pressure still lowering and SRV tailpipe temperatures stable there is NO evidence of core flooding, with the core NOT flooded and the TSC NOT operational the EOPs should NOT be exited at this time. Plausible because there is an SAG entry condition on primary containment radiation.
- C. Correct Based upon the containment Rad levels during RPV flooding fuel damage is occurring. This requires entry to SAGs. The transition to SAGs is performed by continuing the EOP actions until there is evidence that the core is flooded or reactor water level indication is available and the TSC is operational. Once the TSC is operational, The SAGs are entered at the appropriate point and directed by the TSC and then the EOPs are exited and EOP actions terminated.
- D. Incorrect EOPs should NOT be exited until the TSC is operational. The transition to SAGs is performed by continuing the EOP actions until there is evidence that the core is flooded.

Technical Deference(c):	RPV/F RPV Flooding , Rev. 15	(Attach if not previously provided)
recifical Reference(3).	Table 5	(Attach in not previously provided)

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective:	6.85.06.01, required to Severe Acc procedures	discuss the process that transition from EOPs to ident Management	t is (As available)
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	52275	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	PDA 15-1 SRO Workup Comp A	Last NRC Exam:	
Question Cognitive I	_evel: Memory	or Fundamental Knowle	dge

	Compre	hension or Analysis	Х	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41			
	55.43	4		

Comments: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		
	Group #		
	K/A #	G4	G2.4.37
	Importance Rating		4.1

Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan. Proposed Question: SRO Question 24 (99)

- An event has resulted in an unisolable leak and lowering level in the fuel pool.
- The Shift manager declared an ALERT due to abnormal rising radiation levels on the refuel floor 60 minutes ago.
- All onsite and offsite personnel have responded to their designated emergency response organizations.
- The Technical Support Center is staffed but not yet operational.
- The EOF is staffed but **not** yet operational.

It has been determined a task on the refuel floor is required to be performed by two operators.

Which one of the following personnel are required to approve access to the refuel floor?

- A. Shift Manager
- B. Site Director
- C. Site Radiation Protection Coordinator
- D. Emergency Response and Recovery Director

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation (Optional):

- A. Correct EPIP 2.5 Control Room Emergency Response Operation, Revision 21 page 11: If suspected abnormal radiation conditions exist the Emergency Coordinator must approve the dispatch of all personnel into the plant. The SM is the EC until the TSC is fully staffed and has command and control
- B. Incorrect The Site Director is not the listed approval required
- C. The SRPC, while this person does assess radiation conditions on and off site, the decision is made be the EC
- D. The ERRD is not in command of the event at this point

EPIP 2.5 Control Room

Technical Reference(s): Emergency Response Operation, (Attach if not previously provided) Revision 21

Proposed Reference	es to be	provided t	o applic	cants during exan	nination:	None
Learning Objective:					(As a	/ailable)
Question Source:	Bank # Modifie New	ed Bank #	x		(Note cha	inges or attach parent)
Question History:			Las	t NRC Exam:		
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Comprehen		or Func	damental Knowled or Analysis	dge X		
10 CFR Part 55 Cor	itent:	55.41 55.43	4			

Comments: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		
	Group #		
	K/A #	G4	G2.4.38
	Importance Rating		4.4

Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

Proposed Question: SRO Question 25 (100)

An event has occurred at the DAEC and the following conditions are now present:

- A Steam leak in the Steam Tunnel has caused temperatures to rise to 250°F
- Steam Tunnel Temperatures continue to rise
- The "A" Main Steam Line Isolation Valves failed to close automatically and will not close from the control room

Which one of the following EAL declarations should be made?

- A. FU1
- B. FA1
- C. FS1
- D. FG1

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation (Optional):

A. Incorrect: Plausible in that the candidate may determine that only the Primary

Containment barrier has failed.

- B. Incorrect: Plausible in that the candidate may determine that only RCS barrier was lost or potentially lost requiring declaration of FS1. The Fuel Clad Barrier remains intact.
- C. Correct: EPIP EAL Hot Matrix... Failure and loss of the primary containment barrier and RCS Barrier resulting
- D. Incorrect: Plausible in that the candidate may determine all 3 fission product barriers are lost.

Technical Reference(s):	EPIP 1.1 Determination of	(Attach if not previously provided)
	Emergency Action Levels, Rev. 29	

Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective:		3.01.01.01, Explain the Responsibilities and Instruction contained in EPIP 1.1	ns (As available)
Question Source:	Bank	#	
	Modif	ied Bank #	(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:		Last NRC Exar	n:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Know		nowledge	
		Comprehension or Analysis	s X
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41	

55.43 5

Comments: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.