

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 FACIL: 50-389 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000389
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 UHRIG, R.E. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 EISENHUT, D.G. Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: Forwards revised response to Question 410.48 re associated circuits. Response will be incorporated into FSAR in future amend.

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	LIC BR #3 LA	1 0	NERSES, V. 01	1 1
INTERNAL:	ELD/HDS2	1 0	IE FILE	1 1
	IE/DEP EPDS 35	1 1	IE/DEP/EPLB 36	3 3
	NRR/DE/CEB 11	1 1	NRR/DE/EQB 13	3 3
	NRR/DE/GB 28	2 2	NRR/DE/HGEB 30	2 2
	NRR/DE/MEB 18	1 1	NRR/DE/MTEB 17	1 1
	NRR/DE/QAB 21	1 1	NRR/DE/SAB 24	1 1
	NRR/DE/SEB 25	1 1	NRR/DHFS/HFEB40	1 1
	NRR/DHFS/LQB 32	1 1	NRR/DHFS/OLB 34	1 1
	NRR/DHFS/PTRB20	1 1	NRR/DSI/AEB 26	1 1
	NRR/DSI/ASB 27	1 1	NRR/DSI/CPB 10	1 1
	NRR/DSI/CSB 09	1 1	NRR/DSI/ETSB 12	1 1
	NRR/DSI/ICSB 16	1 1	NRR/DSI/PSB 19	1 1
	NRR/DSI/RAB 22	1 1	NRR/DSI/RSB 23	1 1
	NRR/DST/LGB 33	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 04	1 1
	RGN2	2 2	RM/DDAMI/MIB	1 0
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 41	10 10	BNL (AMDTS ONLY)	1 1
	DMB/DSS (AMDTS)	1 1	FEMA-REP DIV 39	1 1
	LPDR 03	1 1	NRC PDR 02	1 1
	NSIC 05	1 1	NTIS	1 1

Aperture Card Dist.

Drawings


To: Reg File - 1 set

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July 30, 1982
L-82-321

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-389
Final Safety Analysis Report
Response to ASB Question 410.48

Attached is Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) revised response to ASB Question 410.48 which has not been formally submitted on St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket. This response will be incorporated into the St. Lucie Unit 2 FSAR in a future amendment.

Very truly yours,

Robert. E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology

REU/RAK/jea

Attachment

cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire


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Drawings

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Question No.

410.48 The documentation on associated circuits is incomplete. Enclosed is a staff position regarding associated circuits entitled "Associated Circuit Guidance. Using the staff position, provide a discussion of associated circuits which identifies each associated circuit and the means to protect these circuits for every fire area. A fire area is an area which is surrounded by three hour rated fire barriers, including floors, ceilings, floor to ceiling walls, and all penetrations.

Response:

410.48 The staff's position on associated circuits is as follows:


1. Have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix "R", and;
2. Have one of the following:
 - a. a common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by co-ordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices, or
 - b. a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVs, steam generator atmospheric dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.), or
 - c. a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, junction) with the shutdown cables (redundant and alternative) and,
 1. are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or
 2. will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure, (see diagram 2c).


410.48

All circuits that do not meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2 of Appendix "R" and have a common power source with safe shut-down equipment are provided with circuit breakers or fuses. Therefore, they are excluded from the staff's definition of associated circuits as outlined above in item 2a. Three such examples are shown on Control Wiring Diagrams (CWDs) 237, 507 and 287. These non-essential components are isolated from the vital power source (4.16 KV SWGR 2A3) by means of circuit breakers and protective relays.

All circuits for equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect safe shut-down capability are addressed in the responses to question 410.47, 410.49 and 280.30. Three examples are shown on CWDs 1629 249 and 1626. Spurious operation of this equipment through adverse interaction with associated circuitry is prevented by circuit breakers and isolation devices.

For all circuits that do not meet the separation criteria of section III.G.2 of Appendix "R" and have a common enclosure, propagation of a fire into the common enclosure (see figure 2c attached) is prevented by the provision of fire stops at all fire boundaries and by the use of IEEE-383 qualified cable which will not propagate fire. In addition all circuits are protected by circuit breakers or fuses. Therefore, all circuits are excluded from the staff's definition of associated circuits as outlined above in item 2c. Three examples of non-essential components whose circuitry shares a common enclosure (MCC-2A5) with essential equipment are shown on CWDs 167, 270 and 522. Protection of the essential components is provided by circuit breakers and thermal overloads.





A FIRE IN FIRE AREA 1 WILL NOT AFFECT THE TRAIN B CABLES IN THE COMMON ENCLOSURE BECAUSE THE FIRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE INTO FIRE AREA 2 BECAUSE CABLES ARE FIRE RETARDANT AND A 3HR. FIRE BARRIER IS PLACED IN THE TRAY WHERE THE CABLE PENETRATES THE WALL.

EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED		FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY	
DIV. _____	DR. E.M.	ST. LUCIE NO. 2	
DATE _____	CH. _____	APPROVED	
SCALE _____		ASSOCIATED CABLES	
			FIG-2C

