

February 6, 1981

PRN-LI-81-64


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-81-03  
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1  
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JANUARY 23, 1981

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.9.1.8

MASONRY WALLS



The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

A. D. Schmidt  
Vice President  
Power Resources


PLP/mrs

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)  
Harold F. Reis, Esquire  
File 933.1 SL

*A002  
S 1/1*

8102180656



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(01) | F I L I S I L I | 1 | (2) | 0101-10101010101-1010 | (3) | 41111111 | (4) | | | (5)

CONT

(01) | REPORT SOURCE | L | 5 | 015101010131315 | (7) | 0111213 | 811 | (3) | 01210161811 | (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(012) | During normal full power operation, our re-evaluation of plant masonry  
(013) | walls showed that several walls did not meet the criteria of IE Bulletin  
(014) | 80-11. 14 walls were missing the clip angles required by the design,  
(015) | 3 walls required clip angle reinforcement, 3 walls required reinforcement,  
(015) | and one wall required adding clip angles that were not included in the  
(017) | original design. Considering IE Bulletin 79-14, this is the second event  
(013) | of this type.

(019) | SYSTEM CODE | Z | Z | (11) | CAUSE CODE | B | (15) | CAUSE SUBCODE | C | (13) | COMPONENT CODE | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | (14) | COMP SUBCODE | Z | (15) | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | (16)

(17) | SEQ/PRO REPORT NUMBER | 811 | (18) | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 01013 | (19) | OCCURRENCE CODE | 1 | (20) | REPORT TYPE | T | (21) | REVISION NO. | 0 |  
(22) | ACTION TAKEN | F | (23) | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | (24) | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | (25) | HOURS | 01010101 | (26) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | (27) | VP/OP FORM NO. | N | (28) | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER | A | (29) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | (30)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (37)

(112) | Evaluations were performed to justify operations, priorities were assigned  
(111) | and all immediately required modifications were completed by 2/5/81. All  
(112) | walls, the failure of which under postulated loads and load combination  
(112) | could affect safety related systems, were repaired. Details on findings  
(114) | and corrective action will be included in our final report on Bulletin 80-11.

(115) | FACILITY STATUS | E | (32) | % POWER | 111010 | (29) | OTHER STATUS | NA | (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | C | (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Non Routine Inspection | (33)

(115) | ACTIVITY RELEASED | Z | (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | (36)

(117) | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 01010 | (37) | TYPE | Z | (38) | DESCRIPTION | NA | (39)

(113) | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 01010 | (40) | DESCRIPTION | NA | (41)

(113) | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | (42) | DESCRIPTION | NA | (43)

(210) | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | (44) | DESCRIPTION | NA | (45) | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER P. L. Pace PHONE: (305) 552-3801

ADDITIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION

During the early stages of the Bulletin 80-11 evaluation (September 1980) plant walls were inspected to verify that they were built as designed. 14 walls were found missing clip angles which tie them to surrounding structural members. Although the seismic evaluation had not been started, it was considered prudent to install the missing angles. 13 of the walls were completed by 12/28/80. The 14th wall, forming one side of a cubicle, has sufficient restraint outside the cubicle to preclude its falling outward. There is no safety related equipment inside this cubicle. Since the inner side of this wall is in an inaccessible high radiation area during operation, repair will be completed during the 1981 refueling outage. These walls could not be shown to meet the Bulletin 80-11 reevaluation criteria without the angles so this is considered reportable.

On 1/23/81 our engineering department reported 3 walls which required strengthening. These 3 walls had no safety related equipment mounted on or supported by them but there is safety related equipment adjacent. Due to the nature and inherent strength of this equipment (metal enclosed seismic Class 1 cable trays and metal seismic Class 1 vent ducting), its location relative to the walls (passing through near the top of the walls or running vertically adjacent to the wall) and the fact that the probable failure mode (if any) was cracking or distortion rather than collapse, it was believed in our best engineering judgement that these 3 walls would not render any safety related equipment inoperable if there were to be a seismic event during the interim period required for reinforcement of the walls. Our schedule called for all 3 walls to be completed by midnight Friday 1/30/81. Due to various unforeseen difficulties the last wall was actually completed at about 5 AM Saturday 1/31/81.

On Friday, 1/30/81, it was reported that an additional 19 walls required strengthened clip angles. It was also reported that other walls were in the last stages of analysis with final results in doubt. The engineering department worked to apply new detailed analysis techniques and to evaluate the safety significance of any walls found not to meet the re-evaluation criteria. Of the 19 identified on 1/30/81 Three were confirmed to need strengthened clip angles on 1/31/81 and 2/1/81. Two were reinforced by 6 P.M. Sunday (2/1/81) which was before the safety significance evaluation was completed. The third wall whose (potential) collapse was found not to have any adverse safety effects was completed Tuesday (2/3/81). The other 16 of the 19 did not require any modifications.

Of the remaining plant walls, some were found which would withstand design seismic events, but which required corrective action to restore the safety margin of Bulletin 79-02 for anchor bolts. Since these walls have been shown not to fail and since some are inaccessible high radiation areas at power we have scheduled to complete corrective action by the end of our Fall, 1981 refueling outage.

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Finally during review of the entire wall program three wall sections over doorways were identified (2/4/81) which required strengthened clip angles. One wall had adjacent safety related metal seismic class 1 cable trays and conduit. Our best engineering judgment was that collapse of this three foot wide section would not render any safety related equipment inoperable. This wall was modified by 4 PM 2/5/81. The other two had been conservatively designated safety related in error as there is no mounted or adjacent safety related equipment. These walls will be modified, however, by the end of the 1981 refueling outage.

The following is a summary of walls corrected to date. Details of the re-evaluation and corrective actions taken will be reported in our final response to IE Bulletin 80-11.

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. Walls with missing clip angles<br>13 have been modified - see<br>previous discussion (identified Sept. 1980)                                     | 14 |
| 2. Walls requiring reinforcement<br>completed by 5AM 1/31/81<br>(identified 1/23/81)  | 3  |
| 3. Walls requiring clip angle reinforcement<br>completed by 2/3/81<br>(3 of the 19 discussed on 1/30/81)  | 3  |
| 4. Walls requiring adding clip angles<br>(angles not required per original design)<br>1 done by 2/3/81, 2 not safety related<br>(identified 2/5/81) | *3 |

\* 2 of these conservatively designated safety related in error.