

ATTACHMENT

Re: St. Lucie Unit 1
Docket No. 50-335
Proposed Tech Spec Amendment
TMI Lessons Learned

Pages 3/4 3-10, 3-11, & 3-13

SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional units are added to Table 3.3-3 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation).

Pages 3/4 3-14 & 3-15

SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional units are added to Table 3.3-4 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Values).

Page 3/4 3-17

The AUXILIARY FEEDWATER function is added to Table 3.3-5 (ESF Response Times).

Pages 3/4 3-18 & 3-19

SIAS and AUXILIARY FEEDWATER functional units are added to Table 4.3-2 (ESF Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements).

Pages 3/4 3-41 through 3-44

New Specification 3/4.3.3.8 is added to establish Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.

Page 3/4 4-4

The capability of supplying pressurizer heaters with emergency power is added to Specification 3.4.4.

Pages 3/4 4-58

New Specification 3/4.4.12 is added to establish Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for the PORV BLOCK VALVES.

Page 3/4 7-5

Surveillance of the Auxiliary Feedwater automatic start function is added to Specification 4.7.1.2.b.

Page B 3/4 3-1

A paragraph on SIAS is added to the Bases section on ESF Instrumentation.

Page B 3/4 3-3

New Bases Section B3/4.3.3.8 is added to discuss ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.

Page B 3/4 4-2

The capability of supplying pressurizer heaters with emergency power is discussed in Bases Section B3/4.4.4.

Page B 3/4 4-14

New Bases Section B3/4.4.12 is added to discuss PORV BLOCK VALVES.

Page B 3/4 6-3

A sentence is added to Bases Section B3/4.6.3 to indicate that the containment purge inlet and outlet valves are considered containment isolation valves.

Page 6-4

Table 6.2-1 (Minimum Shift Crew Composition) is revised to include the Shift Technical Advisor.

Page 6-5

The minimum qualifications for the Shift Technical Advisor position are added to Specification 6.3.1.

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Verifying that each pump operates for at least 15 minutes.
 4. Cycling each testable power operated or automatic valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
 5. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by cycling each power operated valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flowpath actuates to its correct position upon receipt of the Auto Start actuation signal.
 2. Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts automatically as designed upon receipt of the Auto Start actuation signal.

TABLE 3.3-3

ENGINEERED SAFETEE FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)					
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	8
b. Containment Pressure- High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	9#
c. Pressurizer Presssure- Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3(a)	9#
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)					
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	8
b. Containment Pressure-- High - High	4	2(b)	3	1, 2, 3	10
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIS)					
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	8
b. Containment Pressure- High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	9#
c. Containment Radiation- High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	9#
d. SIAS	----- (See Functional Unit 1 above) -----				
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)					
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	2/steam generator	1/steam generator	2/operating steam generator	1, 2, 3, 4	8
b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	4/steam generator	2/steam generator	3/steam generator	1, 2, 3(c)	9#

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)					
a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	8
b. Refueling Water Tank - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	9#
6. LOSS OF POWER 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Under- voltage relays)	1/Bus	1/Bus	1/Bus	1, 2, 3	9#
7. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AUTOMATIC START Steam Generator (SG) Level Instruments	4/SG	2/SG	2/SG	1, 2, 3	11

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.
- ACTION 11 - Instrument operability requirements are contained in the Reactor Protection System requirements for Reactor Trip on Steam Generator Level. If an Automatic Start channel is inoperable, operation may continue provided that the affected pump is verified to be OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.1.2.a within 8 hours, and at least once per 7 days thereafter; and the Automatic Start channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days or the reactor shall be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

TABLE 3.3-4

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Presssure - High	≤ 5 psig	≤ 5 psig
c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	≥ 1600 psia	≥ 1600 psia
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Pressure - High-High	≤ 10 psig	≤ 10 psig
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Pressure - High	≤ 5 psig	≤ 5 psig
c. Containment Radiation - High	≤ 10 R/hr	≤ 10 R/hr
d. SIAS	----(See FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1 above)----	
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	≥ 485 psig	≥ 485 psig
5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)		
a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Refueling Water Tank - Low	48 inches above tank bottom	48 inches above tank bottom

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TABLE 3.3.-4 (Continued)ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>		<u>TRIP VALUE</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
6.	LOSS OF POWER 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays)	<u>≥</u> 3307 volts	<u>≥</u> 3307 volts
7.	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER	<u>≥</u> 30% level	<u>≥</u> 30% level

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

<u>INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION</u>	<u>RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS</u>
3. <u>Containment Pressure-High</u>	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 30.0^*/19.5^{**}$
b. Containment Isolation	$\leq 30.5^*/20.5^{**}$
c. Shield Building Ventilation System	$\leq 30.0^*/14.0^{**}$
d. Containment Fan Coolers	$\leq 30.0^*/17.0^{**}$
e. Feedwater Isolation	≤ 60.0
4. <u>Containment Pressure--High</u>	
a. Containment Spray	$\leq 30.0^*/18.5^{**}$
5. <u>Containment Radiation-High</u>	
a. Containment Isolation	$\leq 30.5^*/20.5^{**}$
b. Shield Building Ventilation System	$\leq 30.0^*/14.0^{**}$
6. <u>Steam Generator Pressure-Low</u>	
a. Main Steam Isolation	≤ 6.9
b. Feedwater Isolation	≤ 60.0
7. <u>Refueling Water Storage Tank-Low</u>	
a. Containment Sump Recirculation	≤ 91.5
8. <u>Steam Generator Level</u>	
a. Auxiliary Feedwater	$\geq 180, \leq 600$

TABLE NOTATION

*Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

**Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available.

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
d. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N. A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Containment Pressure -- High - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N. A.
b. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3,
c. Containment Radiation - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
d. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
e. SIAS	N.A.	N.A.	R	1, 2, 3
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	S	R	M	N.A.
c. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)				
a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
6. LOSS OF POWER 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays)	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
7. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER				
a. Auto Start			----- (See Surveillance 4.7.1.2.b) -----	
b. Steam Generator			----- (See RPS Table 4.3-1) -----	

INSTRUMENTATION

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.8 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-11, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at last HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. The Provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.8 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-11ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Pressurizer Water Level	3	1	1
2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	1/pump	1/pump	1
3. RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor	1	1	2
4. PORV Position Indicator (Primary Detector)	1/valve	1/valve	3
5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	1/valve	1/valve	3
6. Safety Valve Position Indicator	1/valve	1/valve	3

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by Table 3.3-11, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days.
- ACTION 2 - With the subcooling margin monitor inoperable manually compute subcooling margin daily until the monitor is returned to OPERABLE status.
- ACTION 3 - With any individual channel inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 (in lieu of a report per Specification 6.9.1) outlining corrective action taken or planned.

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TABLE 4.3-7ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Pressurizer Water Level	M	R
2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R
3. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	M	R
4. PORV Position Indicator	M	R
5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	M	R
6. Safety Valve Position Indicator	M	R

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a steam bubble, and with at least 150 kw of pressurizer heaters capable of being supplied by emergency power.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4 In accordance with 4.8.1.1.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PORV BLOCK VALUES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.12 Each Power Operator Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.12 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specific coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) to ensure containment isolation in the event of a small break LOCA.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The operability of the chlorine detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control room emergency ventilation system will automatically isolate the control room and initiate its operation in the recirculation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The chlorine detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release", February 1975.

3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

A steam bubble in the pressurizer ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power operated relief valve against water relief. The power operated relief valve and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal, minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. The required pressurizer heater capacity is capable of maintaining natural circulation subcooling. Operability of the heaters, which are powered by a diesel generator bus, ensures ability to maintain pressure control even with loss of offsite power.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

One OPERABLE steam generator provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat after a reactor shutdown. The requirement for two steam generators capable of removing decay heat, combined with the requirements of Specifications 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.2 and 3.7.1.3 ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities for RCS temperatures greater than 325° F, if one steam generator becomes inoperable due to single failure considerations. Below 325° F, decay heat is removed by the shutdown cooling system.

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.12 PORV BLOCK VALVES

The opening of the Power Operated Relief Valves fulfills no safety related function. The electronic controls of the PORVs must be maintained OPERABLE to ensure satisfaction of Specifications 4.5.1.d.1 and 4.5.2.d.1. Since it is impractical and undesirable to actually open the PORVs to demonstrate reclosing, it becomes necessary to verify operability of the PORV Block Valves to ensure the capability to isolate a malfunctioning PORV.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. This includes the containment purge inlet and outlet valves.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

The containment fan coolers are used in a secondary function to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

TABLE 6.2-1

MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION #

LICENSE CATEGORY	APPLICABLE MODES	
	1, 2, 3, & 4	5 & 6
SOL	1	1*
OL	2	1
Non-Licensed	2	1
Shift Technical Advisor	1	0

*Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling, supervising CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading.

#Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accomodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.3 FACILITY STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

6.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, except for (1) the Radiation Protection Manager who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, and (2) the Shift Technical Advisor who shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plant design and in the response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.

6.4 TRAINING

6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the facility staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Training Supervisor and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 and Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 55.

6.4.2 A training program for the Fire Brigade shall be maintained under the direction of the Fire Protection Administrator and shall meet or exceed the requirements of Section 27 of the NFPA Code-1975, except for Fire Brigade training sessions which shall be held at least quarterly.

6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

6.5.1 FACILITY REVIEW GROUP (FRG)

FUNCTION

6.5.1.1 The Facility Review Group shall function to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

COMPOSITION

6.5.1.1 The Facility Review Group shall be composed of the:

Member:	Plant Manager
Member:	Operations Superintendent
Member:	Operations Supervisor
Member:	Maintenance Superintendent
Member:	Instrument & Control Supervisor
Member:	Reactor Supervisor
Member:	Health Physics Supervisor
Member:	Technical Supervisor
Member:	Chemistry Supervisor
Member:	Quality Control Supervisor
Member:	Assistant Plant Supt. Mechanical
Member:	Assistant Plant Supt. Electrical

The FRG Chairman shall be designated in writing.