



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-335/80-12

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33101

Facility Name: St. Lucie

Docket No. 50-335

License No. DPR-67

Inspection at site near Ft. Pierce, Florida

Inspector: A. H. Johnson
A. H. Johnson

5/29/80
Date Signed

Approved by: C. M. Upright
C. M. Upright, Acting Section Chief
RONS Branch

5/29/80
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 29 - May 2, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours on site in the areas of surveillance activity on pipe support and restraint systems, including examination of procedure test results and installed restraints, and examination of records.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager
- *J. E. Bower, Maintenance Superintendent
- *C. L. Wilson, Maintenance Supervisor
- G. M. Vaux, QC Supervisor
- *C. A. Wells, Operations Supervisor
- *L. W. Pearce, Nuclear Plant Supervisor
- *A. W. Bailey, QA Supervisor
- *G. V. Papalexiou, PRN Specialist
- *D. A. Sager, Senior Plant Engineer
- *N. G. Roos, QC Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

EBASCO

R. Christain
T. Tart

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 2, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee was also contacted by telephone on May 7, 8 and 9, 1980. In these discussions the licensee committed to perform a visual inspection of accessible (outside containment) mechanical and hydraulic snubbers prior to going to full power. The licensee also agreed to develop a program for checking the operability of snubbers prior to closing up the containment for plant startup.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

The inspector closed out open items 80-03-01 and 80-03-02 concerning the small break loca (SBLOCA) procedure and training. The licensee had completed SBLOCA procedure changes and training committed to during inspection 50-335/80-03 and the inspector had no further questions or comments.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or

deviations. New unresolve items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6 and 7.

5. Hydraulic Snubbers and Restraints

The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program for safety-related hydraulic supports and restraints. This included; (1) review of procedure M-0006, Rev 6, Inspection of Hydraulic and Mechanical Seismic Restraints; (2) review of procedure M-0007, Rev 2, Functional Testing of Hydraulic Seismic Restraints (snubbers); (3) visual examination of various (random sample) installed dynamic and fixed pipe supports and restraints; and, (4) examination of recent (during April 1980) surveillance records. The inspector had no further questions regarding the licensee's inspection of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers which had been completed prior to refueling maintenance activities.

6. Potential Hydraulic and Mechanical Snubber Problems

During visual inspection of installed supports and restraints, the inspector accompanied by licensee personnel identified mechanical snubbers on a safety-related system that might possibly be locked up or misaligned. The licensee's investigation identified misalignment on two snubbers between the shafts and pipe clamps. The slight misalignments did not render these snubbers inoperable. Other discrepancies identified during the inspection included snubber shafts which were loose in the clevis and loose lock nuts. A cotter pin had not been bent and was working loose on one snubber.

The inspector performed the first random visual inspection in the containment on April 29, 1980, and found above mentioned problems with approximately 50% of the snubbers inspected. The licensee took immediate corrective action to remedy the identified problems and required maintenance personnel to verify operability of snubbers in the pressurizer cubicle after maintenance in that area was completed. The inspector's second random visual inspection was performed outside of containment on April 30, 1980 and again found the above mentioned problems with approximately 50% of the snubbers inspected. On April 30 and May 1, 1980, the licensee quality control (QC) visually inspected an additional 20 safety-related snubbers inside containment and found no problems. Also, the licensee performed a visual inspection of all accessible (outside containment) snubbers and found no significant problems.

The inspector expressed concern that the licensee did not have a formal inspection program for snubbers on safety-related systems after maintenance had been performed in the areas of snubbers and identified this matter as an unresolved item 335/80-12-01. The licensee agreed to develop a program for checking snubber operability prior to plant startup.



7. Inservice Inspection and IEB 79-14 Requirements

During review of inspection requirements for piping supports and restraints, the inspector found that inspections performed to meet IE Bulletin 79-14 had been used to meet ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection (ISI) requirements for certain support components. For categories B-K-2 and C-E-2, tables IWB-2500 and IWC-L520 of ASME Section XI require verification of support settings of constant and variable spring type hangers, snubbers, and shock absorbers for piping support components.

An EBASCO letter, SL-BF-80-064 dated March 3, 1980 states that the IEB 79-14 inspections performed at St. Lucie 1 satisfy Section XI ISI requirements except that support settings of constant and variable spring type hangers, snubbers, and shock absorbers were not verified. These restraints were only verified to be "on scale" (springs not bottomed out and snubbers not fully extended or retracted).

During a telephone discussion with A. Herdt and B. Crowley on May 12, 1980, G. Gotch of the FP&L Power Resources Nuclear (PRN) staff stated that FP&L considers the inspections performed by EBASCO to meet the ASME Section XI requirements; i.e., the code did not intend that specific setpoints be verified. He further stated that FP&L would ask for a code interpretation to verify their position. This matter is considered unresolved pending the outcome of the code interpretation and is identified as unresolved item 335/80-12-02.