



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-335/79-32

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
 9250 West Flagler Street
 Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: St. Lucie Unit No. 1

Docket No. 50-335

License No. DPR-67

Inspection at St. Lucie Site, near Fort Pierce, Florida

Inspected by: J. A. Dyer
 J. A. Dyer

1/3/80
 Date Signed

Approved by: R. D. Martin
 R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch

1/3/80
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on December 10-13, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 22 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of previously identified noncompliances and open items, IE Bulletins, Circulars and Notices and Licensee Event Reports.

Results

Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.



DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

C. M. Wethy, Plant Manager
J. E. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent
M. B. Vincent, Assistant Plant Supervisor Electrical
R. R. Jennings, Technical Supervisor
A. J. Collier, I&C Supervisor
C. L. Wilson, Maintenance Supervisor
*J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
C. A. Wells, Operations Supervisor
P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
*N. G. Roos, QC Supervisor
C. F. Leppla, I&C Engineer
D. A. Culpepper, I&C Engineer
H. S. Ruff, QC Engineer
F. G. Becker, QC Engineer
F. W. Gross, Maintenance Planner
R. M. Valentine, Maintenance Planner
R. B. Adams, Electrical Planner

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room and QC vault personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 13, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Noncompliance (79-23-01): Inventory record sheet 2 of 2 of Procedure HP-90 not performed for months January, February and May 1979. HP-90 Rev 2 approved on November 9, 1979 incorporated record sheets one and two into one sheet to preclude further occurrences. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
- b. (Closed) Noncompliance (79-06-04): 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation not performed on control element assembly withdrawal prohibit function changed by Plant Change Modification (PCM) 446-78. A re-evaluation of PCM 446-78 performed on April 26, 1979 determined that the change was not an unreviewed safety question. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

- c. (Closed) Noncompliance (79-06-05): The FRG did not review the step-by-step retest procedure associated with PCM 359-78. The FRG reviewed the retest procedure in meeting 79-36 and determined the retest procedure to be satisfactory. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Previously Identified Areas of Concern

- a. (Closed) 78-06-02: NRC approval of Technical Specification change to "Thermal Margin Low Pressure Setpoints" (LER 78-07) Amendment No. 27 to License DPR-27 incorporates the required changes to the Technical Specifications.
- b. (Open) 78-09-05: Licensee to review reactor building polar crane related procedures for conformance to ANSI B30.2. Corrective Action Reports (CAR) 06-07-78, 06-08-78 and 06-09-78 pertaining to the polar crane were reviewed by the inspector. Procedure listed in the CAR's will be reviewed by regional personnel. I&C procedure I-139 has not been written.
- c. (Closed) 78-14-01: Licensee to install additional neutron shielding as required by License Condition D. Completed PCM 326-77 package documents the installation of the required shielding.
- d. (Closed) 78-15-03: Licensee to revise I&C Maintenance Calibration Procedures to list "equipment to be used" at the beginning of the procedure. All operating procedures, with one exception, pertaining to instrumentation calibration have been revised and changed to I&C procedures and include an "equipment to be used" section.
- e. (Closed) 78-19-08: Documentation of fuel transfer tube radiation survey. Surveys were conducted from April 14-27, 1979 and documented in corrective action Request 06-25-78.
- f. (Closed) 78-22-04: Licensee to confirm that all hydraulic snubbers have ethylene propylene (EP) seals. The inspector reviewed documentation from Bergen Paterson, ITT Grinnell and Combustion Engineering dating from April 22, 1974 through August 10, 1979 confirming that all hydraulic snubbers have EP seals.
- g. (Closed) 78-22-05: Develop written guidelines for selecting representative snubber sample. A memo dated January 3, 1979 to the snubber correspondence file and current plant work orders (PWO) describe how the representative sample shall be chosen.

- h. (Closed) 78-22-06: Determine minimum fluid level for snubbers. Maintenance Procedure M-0006 Revision 5, dated January 11, 1979 includes the vendor criteria for minimum fluid level.
- i. (Closed) 79-01-02: Formally change dead weight tester calibration schedule and cross check a sampling of instruments calibrated with tester PSL-203. The inspector reviewed the calibration records of five gauges calibrated by PSL-203 and then re-checked using PSL 204. One gauge was out of tolerance when checked. A review of PSL 393 records indicate that the gauge was not used to calibrate any Technical Specification instruments.
- j. (Closed) 79-19-02: LER-15 supplemental report. Report was submitted to clarify the original LER.
- k. (Closed) 79-23-02: Procedure to perform PM on the battery/110 AC emergency lighting on a monthly basis. The testing has been added to the monthly PM schedule. The first test was conducted in November.
- l. (Closed) 79-23-04: IEB 79-18 Audibility problems during evacuation. The response to IEB 79-18 closes this item.

6. IE Bulletins

The following IE Bulletins were reviewed to determine whether they had been received and reviewed by appropriate management, responses, where necessary, were accurate and complete, and that action taken, if required, was complete.

- a. (Closed) IEB 78-08: Radiation Survey of Fuel Transfer Tubes. Surveys were conducted from April 14-27, 1979.
- b. (Open) IEB 79-09: GE AK-2 Circuit Breakers. The measurement of the trip shaft torque on TCB 1-9 was completed on September 23, 1979. The periodic switchgear maintenance procedure has not been updated to include the checks recommended in the GE Service Advice Letter.
- c. (Closed) IEB 79-16: Vital Area Access Controls.
- d. (Closed) IEB 79-18; Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High Noise Areas.
- e. (Closed) IEB 79-21: Temperature Effects on Level Measurements. "Loss of Coolant" and "Main Steam Line Break" procedures have been revised to include information on erroneous instrument indication due to containment environment changes subsequent to a LOCA or main steam line break. Tables and figures of the effects on level measurements have been placed in the plant curve book. With one exception, all licensed personnel have received training by reviewing the licensee response to the bulletin. The one exception is on temporary assignment at Turkey Point and will go through a re-training program when he returns.

- f. (Closed) IEB 79-24: Frozen Lines. I&C procedure G-1 and C-3, "Temporary Freeze Protection" lists all vital instrumentation requiring protection in the event of a freeze.

8. IE Circulars

The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determine whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for applicability and appropriate action had been taken or planned:

- a. IEC 78-17, Inadequate Training of Guards.
- b. IEC 79-17, Contact Problem In SB-12 Switches - GE Metalclad Circuit Breakers.
- c. IEC 79-18, Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves.
- d. IEC 79-19, Loose Locking Devices on Intersoll Rund Pump Impellers.
- e. IEC 79-20, Failure of GTE Sylvaina Relay Type PM Bulletin 7305.
- f. IEC 79-21, Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity.
- g. IEC 79-22, Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves.
- h. IEC 79-23, Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate.
- i. IEC 79-24, Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Equipment on BWRs.

8. IE Notices

The following IE Information Notices were reviewed to ensure their receipt and review by appropriate management:

- a. IEN 79-20, NRC Enforcement Policy - NRC Licensed Individuals.
- b. IEN 79-21, Transportation and Burial of Radioactive Material.
- c. IEN 79-22, Qualifications of Control Systems.
- d. IEN 79-23, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Coolers.
- e. IEN 79-24, Overpressurization of PWR Containment After Main Steam Break.
- f. IEN 79-25, Reactor Trips at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
- g. IEN 79-26, Break of Containment Integrity.



- h. IEN 79-27, Steam Generator Tube Rupture at two PWR Plants.
- i. IEN 79-28, Overloading of Structural Elements Due to Pipe Support Loads.
- j. IEN 79-29, Loss of Nonsafety Related RCS Instrumentation During Operation.
- k. IEN 79-30, Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS).

9. Licensee Event Reports Review

The following LER's were reviewed to verify that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.

- a. LER 79-15, Dilution of RCS - Steam Generator Repair.
- b. LER 79-25, "C" In the Core Protection Calculator Power Supply Failed.
- c. LER 79-26, "A: In the Core Protection Calculator Power Supply Failed.
- d. LER 79-27, CEA 65 Dropped During Rod Exercise.
- e. LER 79-28, Events During Hurricane David.
- f. LER 79-29, Safety Injection Tank Low Level.
- g. LER 79-30, Steam Generator Level Instrument Non-Conservative.
- h. LER 79-31, Welding on Containment Vessel.

10. Review of Licensee Response to NRR Letter dated September 21, 1979 - Inadvertent Safety System Actuation.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated November 8, 1979 and verified that the requested actions were completed. The licensee's response was reviewed by the Facility Review Group (FRG) on October 24, 1979. The licensee's review was documented in FRG minutes 79-90. During the inspectors review of the "Reactor Trip Log" it became apparent that the Region II interpretation of a "challenge to a safety system" differed from that of the licensee. The inspector stated he would discuss these differences with regional and headquarters management personnel for clarification.

At the present time, events of the nature described in the NRR letter receive an informed review. The licensee is currently developing a program



to formally pursue and analyze such events that may occur in the future.
The inspector will review this formal program during a future inspection.
(335/79-32-01)

