


USNRG REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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September 21, 1979
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
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-335
IE Bulletin 79-18

We have reviewed the subject Bulletin and a response for St. Lucie Unit 1 is attached.

Very truly yours,



Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/MAS/cph

Attachment

cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of
Reactor Operations Inspection
Harold F. Reis, Esquire

Handwritten initials/signature

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OFFICIAL COPY
PEOPLE...SERVING PEOPLE

ATTACHMENT

Re: RII:JPO
50-335
IE Bulletin 79-18

We have assessed the situation at St. Lucie Unit 1 with respect to paging and alarm systems, and have determined that existing systems, supported by administrative controls for personnel accountability, provide assurance that personnel can be evacuated in a timely manner during evacuation situations. Our assessment was based on the following information:

1. A pre-operational test was performed during initial plant startup which functionally checked the plant communication system including alarm and evacuation announcement systems. Part of the test acceptance criteria required that the page systems be audible. Subsequently, additional units have been added in areas where it was felt that communications capability should be upgraded.
2. A modification to the communication system has been installed to provide a volume override for the paging system. This provides for an automatic volume increase above normal on all paging units when an alarm is initiated. The control room also has the option to manually initiate the volume override if required for an evacuation announcement.
3. St. Lucie does not rely solely on the paging system to ensure that all personnel are evacuated. For those instances in which such action is necessary, Plant Operating Procedure 3100026E (Evacuation and Personnel Accountability) requires the control point guard to supply to the emergency coordinator records of personnel who have not evacuated the security controlled area. The emergency coordinator would then initiate a search for personnel not accounted for.
4. Critiques of annual plant emergency drills to date have not indicated any personnel audibility problems concerning alarms or evacuation instructions.

