

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-389/79-11

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company

9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: St. Lucie Unit 2

Docket No. 50-389

Licensee No. CPPR-144

Inspection at St. Lucie Site, Hutchinson Island

Inspected by: R. W. Wright

T. E. Burdette

SUMMARY


Inspected on July 17-20, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 52 inspector-hours at the FP&L general offices and construction site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings; independent inspection of construction activities; turnover of principal inspector responsibilities; observation of concrete placements; and Inspection and Enforcement bulletins.

Results

Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.



DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- ★B. J. Escue, Site Manager
- *N. T. Weems, Assistant QA Manager
- *W. M. Hayward, QA Supervisor
- *B. M. Parks, QA Engineer
- *E. W. Sherman, QA Engineer
- *M. Villar, Licensing Engineer
- C. S. Kent, Project Manager
- J. E. Vessely, Director QA
- A. E. Siebe, Assistant QA Manager
- R. F. Englemeier Assistant QA Manager
- J. W. Brown, Assistant QA Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, and office personnel.

Other Organization

- *W. J. Taylor, Project Superintendent (EBASCO)
- *R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer (EBASCO)


*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 20, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The liceusee was advised that no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. The inspector discussed the licensee's interim actions in regard to the noncompliance on document control reported in an earlier inspection (50-389/79-09). The inspectors also discussed the unresolved item reported in paragraph 6c.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Open) Infraction (398/79-09-01): Failure to follow document control procedures. The inspectors held discussions with licensee management in regard to actions taken or planned to correct document control problems in plant construction. The licensee is preparing a response to this infraction and to additional concerns expressed by RII in Report No. 50-389/79-09 dated July 9, 1979. To assure correct drawings in the field, the licensee reported that daily checks of drawings in use would be implemented effective July 20, 1979. The inspector expressed concern with hardware installations in view of the problems with drawing control. The inspector requested that the licensee address this area in their response. This infraction will



remain open pending receipt of the licensee response and review by RII.

- b. (Closed) Deficiency (389/78-10-01): Failure to report safety significant deficiencies. The licensee's response to this deficiency (two examples) was contained in their letter (L-78-391) dated December 19, 1978 to RII. The RII inspector subsequently met with responsible General Office and site personnel (reference RII Report 50-389/79-01) to discuss their response, what constitutes reportable matters and IE's interpretation of 10CFR 50.55(e) regulations. Based on further discussions, inspections, and reevaluation RII hereby withdraws these examples of the stated deficiency for the following reasons:
 - (1) Ultimate responsibility for determining reportability is the licensee's. The Target Rock Safety Injection Valve example was found to have been evaluated in accordance with FPL's QA procedures and although determined not reportable the licensee clearly met the basic evaluation requirement.
 - (2) Plant St. Lucie 2 was issued a construction permit on May 2, 1977. FPL took initiative on its own on November 21, 1975 (prior to obtaining its CP) to have the vendor, Ingersoll-Rand (I-R) provide assurance that PSL-2 would not have lock nut assemblies which may work loose on their LPSI and CS pumps. Internal correspondence subsequently inspected by the RII inspectors, between I-R and CE letter dated March 23, 1976 inferrs that no problem really existed. The shaft/impeller locking nut loosening was attributed to either improper installation after maintenance or operation of the unit in wrong rotation while installing motor leads. Hence it is RII's opinion that FPL rightfully assumed no design problem existed.

RII's withdrawal of the subject deficiency deletes it from the licensee's enforcement history.

c. (Closed) Infraction (389/79-08-01): Failure to properly cure concrete test cylinders in the field and laboratory. The RII inspector verified during his last inspection (reference RII Report No. 50-389/79-09) and during this inspection that FPL is implementing the commitments made in their response letter (L-79-191) dated July 13, 1979. These corrective actions are acceptable. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 6.c.


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5. Inspector Follow-up Items

(Closed) Inspector Follow-Up Item (389/79-10-02): Anchor/ Darling (A/D) Tilting Disc Check Valve Deficiency - Part 21 Identification No. 78-055-000. The subject two check valves were returned to the vendor for rework on 9/19/78 (reference RII Report No. 50-389/78-10, paragraph 5). Modification was required on one valve S/N E-6047-27-2 only and the two valves were shipped back to the site on 2/24/79. A/D has provided certificates of compliance that the subject valves have been manufactured, tested, and inspected in accordance with the requirements of the applicable contract and Code and Specification requirements. Futhermore A/D certified that all required tests, inspections, NDT, and welding requirements have been performed by qualified personnel using approved procedures and certified materials. Receiving Inspection Report 79-684-SL, vendor certificates of compliance, certified material test reports, and documentation for the network were examined by the RII inspector. This item is closed.

6. Independent Inspection Effort

- a. The inspectors conducted an inspection of the reactor containment building and auxiliary building to observe construction progress and construction activities. The inspectors observed a concrete placement in the reactor containment building. The inspectors also inspected the warehouses for safety related equipment and observed concreted mixing operations at the batch plant.
- b. At the CB&I (Chicago Bridge and Iron) field office, the inspector selected four CB&I drawings to check approval by the architect/engineer (EBASCO). CB&I's Quality Assurance Manual requires approval of the drawings by the purchaser. In all four cases, EBASCO had reviewed and approved the CB&I drawings for the purchaser.
- During an inspection of the reactor containment building, the inspecc. tors performed a general inspection of three reactor reactor coolant pump restraints. The inspectors identified two problem areas in welds for two of the restraints. The inspectors identified an apparent grind mark area in a structural weld for one bottom stop assembly and a void area in the seal weld area of another bottom stop assembly. Discussions with FP&L inspection personnel revealed that the bottom stop assemblies were originally fabricated by Lakeside Steel but Precision Metal Service completed the fabrication work due to schedule problems at Lakeside Steel. Further discussions and review of receiving records revealed that a bottom stop assembly had been delivered to the site by Precision Metals Services but the assembly was subsequently rejected due to a crack in a weld area. On July 20, 1979 the licensee committed to an inspection of welds for the three reactor coolant pump restraints. This item will remain open pending completion of licensee inspection of the reactor coolant pump restraint welds and resolution



of the two problem areas in welds for two of the restraints. This item will be identified as an unresolved item 389/79-11-01; Reactor coolant pump restraint welds.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Principal Inspector Turnover

The inspectors met with the licensee's management at the FP&L general offices in Miami and the St. Lucie Unit #2 construction site on Hutchinson Island. The licensee was informed that the principal inspector responsibilities were being transferred to T. E. Burdette of RII. The inspectors reviewed the licensee corporate and site organizations. The inspectors held discussions with the licensee on the status of construction. The inspectors reviewed the licensees open NRC items summary to ensure agreement on the status of open items.

8. Observation of Work - Concrete Placements

The RII inspectors examined various stages of preparation, in-process testing and documentation, delivery of pumped concrete, placement and consolidation of placed concrete for interior reactor continment building mat placements numbered 44 and 48. The following documents governing concrete placement activities were used as inspection criteria:

- PSAR Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.3
- FPL Quality Insptruction (QI) 10.3, 10.6, 10.71
 - EBASCO Concrete Specification FLO-2998.473
- Drawing Numbers 2998-G-495, 496-S01

Within the above areas of observation of work activities inspection, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's)

(Open) IEB 79-02: Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts.

On July 2, 1979 FP&L provided a response to this bulletin in a letter to RII. This bulletin will remain open pending further review by RII.

