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August 10, 1979
L-79-221

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-335
IE BULLETIN 79-06B

The attached information relative to the subject bulletin is submitted in response to your request for additional information. The attachment provides clarification and updating relative to our responses to Items 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 contained in I&E Bulletin 79-06B.

Very truly yours,

REU/DKJ/paf
for Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/DKJ/paf

Attachment

cc: R. W. Reid
Division of Operating Reactors
H. F. Reis, Esquire

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ATTACHMENT

Response 2 (Revised)

To address the concerns specified by Item 2 of I&E Bulletin 79-06B, we have accomplished the following:

- (1) The training program described in Response 1 has been implemented and administered to all licensed operators.
- (2) All licensed operators attended a one week casualty training course at Combustion Engineering's Simulator Facility. Formal lectures were given on accidents and transients with the potential for void formation in the Reactor Coolant System. The operators received simulator instruction in coping with these accidents. Included in the simulator training were instrumentation and equipment failures and the plant response to these failures.
- (3) To determine the status of possible core voiding, operators have been instructed to monitor specific parameters, particularly hot and cold leg temperatures and pressurizer pressure and level instrumentation. Saturation pressure versus temperature curves have been mounted prominently in the control room to aid the operator in his assessment.
- (4) All operators have been instructed to verify adequate core cooling flow during natural circulation by observing that hot and cold leg temperatures and pressurizer pressure and level stabilize following the tripping of the reactor coolant pumps. Additionally, steam generator feedwater flows are regulated to maintain core ΔT at or less than 44° F (full power core ΔT) and subcooling equal or greater than 50° F.

Response 6b. (Supplemented)

Please add the following statement to our response to Item 6 of the subject bulletin:

"In regard to the operation of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps, specific procedures require HPSI pumps, once automatically actuated, to run for 20 minutes regardless of the amount of subcooling existent. As the HPSI pumps have a shut-off head of 1375 psia, there is no concern, at temperatures greater than 200° F, relative to vessel integrity or lifting of the PORV's or safety valves."

Response 7 (Revised)

The position of safety-related valves is verified on a quarterly basis by specific surveillance procedure. Additionally, this surveillance is conducted prior to mode changes. Particularly critical systems, such as auxiliary feedwater and portions of the high and low pressure safety injection and containment spray systems, have safety-related valve positions verified by procedure on a monthly basis. Related procedures, such as maintenance and test procedures, have been reviewed to ensure that these valves have been returned to their proper positions following such maintenance or testing.

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Response 8 (Revised)

The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) has been added as an input to the containment isolation (CIAS) design in order to close the valves identified in Item 3. Therefore, CIAS will be initiated on SIAS, high containment pressure, or high containment radiation to ensure against the inadvertent release of radioactive fluids from the containment.

It should be further noted that:

- (1) Neither containment isolation nor safety injection actuation can be reset with the associated actuation signal still present.
- (2) All isolation valves will remain closed if containment isolation or safety injection actuation is reset.
- (3) Periodic Testing as required by St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications will ensure continued operability of the above.

Response 9 (Revised)

Please revise our response to Item 9 to reflect the fact that existing procedures require that a senior licensed operator must be notified prior to removing safety-related equipment from service,

Response 10 (Revised)

Please revise our response to Item 10 to indicate that a dedicated telephone has been installed in the St. Lucie Unit 1 control room, and that this telephone will be utilized to ensure that the NRC is notified of all situations in which St. Lucie Unit 1 is in an uncontrolled or unexpected condition of operation whether or not a determination has been made that a threat is posed to the health and safety of the public.

