



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-335/79-15

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
 9250 West Flagler Street
 Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Docket No. 50-335

License No. DPR-67

Inspectors: W. A. Ruhlman 6/22/79
 W. A. Ruhlman Date Signed

H. D. Jenkins 6-22-79
 H. D. Jenkins Date Signed

Approved by: W. A. Ruhlman _____
 W. A. Ruhlman, Acting Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 29-30, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of training and retraining programs (nonlicensed plant personnel); licensed operators' requalification training program, and licensee response to IE Bulletin 79-06B.

Results

Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency - Failure to Follow Procedures - Paragraphs 6.b and 7.b); one apparent deviation was found in one area (Failure to comply with NRC Documentation Requirements - Paragraph 7.c).



DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
- *H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- *P. Chemes, Chemistry Training Coordinator
- *P. Fincher, Training Coordinator
- J. Lenz, I & C Training Coordinator
- R. Mayhen, Electrical Training Coordinator
- *H. Mercer, Health Physics Training Coordinator
- *C. Moore, Chemistry Supervisor
- D. St. John, Mechanical Maintenance Training Coordinator
- *C. Wells, FPL Superintendent
- J. West, Security Supervisor
- *C. Wethy, Plant Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 30, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. With respect to the item of noncompliance discussed in Paragraphs 6.b and 7.b, the deviation discussed in Paragraph 7.c and the new open item in Paragraph 8.b, the Plant Manager acknowledged the inspector's findings with no comment.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Open Items

Open items, as utilized in this report, are items for which corrective action has been established and completion dates have been assigned. Further evaluation is required before a finding of acceptable implementation can be made. An open item identified during the conduct of this inspection is discussed in paragraph 8.b.



6. Training and Retraining Programs - Nonlicensed Plant Personnel

References: a) QI 2-PR/PSL-2, Revision 5, Dated 3/77

a. Review Conducted

There were no changes made to the licensee's training procedures during the period since the last inspection. The following areas were reviewed with respect to maintaining the implementation of the licensee's commitments for:

- (1) General employee training for new employees
- (2) General employee retraining
- (3) Temporary employee training
- (4) On-the-job training for: auxiliary/craftsmen; technicians; QA/QC personnel, and technical/staff QA/QC personnel, and technical staff.

The inspector reviewed training records for two individuals in each category above to verify that the described training program was provided. The inspector interviewed one employee from each category above to verify that the individual actually received the training which was documented in the training records. As a result of these reviews, one example contributing to one item of noncompliance is documented in Paragraph 6.b below.

b. Failure to Establish Qualification Standards

During the record reviews referenced above, the inspector also included a review of the individual departmental training programs as they related to Reference (a). Four (4) of five (5) departments had a training plan, however three (3) of the five (5) departments lacked the requisite qualification standards of Reference (a). Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, and I & C departments did not have qualification standards for their departments as required by Section 4.3.

This failure to follow procedures is combined with the item discussed in Paragraph 7.b to collectively constitute an item of noncompliance (335/79-15-01).

7. Licensed Operators' Requalification Training Program

References: a) Accepted Requalification Program, Administrative Procedure No. 0005720, Revision 6

b) Letter from Collins to Harris dated December 9, 1977



a. Review Conducted

There were no changes made to the licensee's requalification program during the period since the last inspection of this area. The inspector reviewed: the licensee's prepared schedule for conducting lectures; the licensee's prepared lesson plan or equivalent for three lecture topics; and the licensee's inclusion in the requalification program of deficient areas identified by evaluation of the annual examinations. The inspector determined which licensed operators: failed all or portions of the annual examinations; received unsatisfactory performance evaluations; or did not perform licensed duties for a period of four months or longer. The inspector verified the completion of appropriate follow through action for each of these individuals. The inspector reviewed the training records for six (6) NRC licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators to verify that they included: copies of annual written examinations and the individuals' responses, documentation of attendance at all required lectures, documentation of the required control manipulations, the results of performance evaluations, documentation of required additional training to satisfy deficient performance, documentation of completion of required procedure reviews and/or self-study. Additionally, the inspector interviewed three (3) operators to verify that the training records reflected the actual training received.

As a result of these reviews, one example contributing to one item of noncompliance is documented in Paragraph 6.b below and one deviation is documented in Paragraph 6.c below.

b. Failure to Follow Procedures

AP 0005720, Revision 6 dated March 25, 1977, contains a description of the accepted Requalification Program. Section 8.2.4 of that procedure requires that persons making less than 80% on any section of the annual examination attend lectures on the deficient area(s) until they pass a quiz at the end of the lecture series with a grade of at least 80%. Following the 1977 annual examination (given at the end of calendar year 1977), 17 licensed personnel were identified as deficient in one or more areas. Of these persons, 5 failed to attend lectures during 1978 in the deficient areas. However, each of these men did take and pass a quiz on the lecture material with a grade of more than 80%.

This failure to follow procedure AP 0005720 has been combined with a similar example of failure to follow procedures to collectively constitute an item of noncompliance (335/79-15-01).

c. Failure to Comply With NRC Documentation Requirements

In a letter dated December 9, 1977, from Mr. Collins of the Operator Licensing Branch to Mr. Harris of the St. Lucie Plant, the licensee was instructed to assure that (page 2, second paragraph) applications for the renewal of operator/senior operator licenses contained accurate

statements of the actual participation of each licensee in the requalification program. The letter specifically required that each area of nonparticipation or inadequate participation be listed along with the actions taken or planned to compensate for the nonparticipation. In applications for renewal of two licenses submitted by licensed personnel on February 23, 1979, no statement regarding failure to attend required lectures was made. These two (2) individuals were included in the five (5) individuals referenced above for failure to attend required lectures.

These applications were deviations from the requirements stated in the NRC's letter of December 9, 1977, and together they constitute a deviation (335/79-15-02).

8. Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 79 - 06B

a. Review Conducted

The inspectors conducted a review of licensee actions to verify the effectiveness of operator training conducted in response to IE Bulletin 79-06B. The inspector reviewed: Emergency procedures, six (6) related to a small break LOCA; management controls implemented to incorporate plant modifications into the operator training and requalification programs; management controls implemented to incorporate the operational knowledge gained from the Three Mile Island incident into the operator training and requalification programs; management controls implemented to increase the standard of operator knowledge required in the area of plant transient responses; management controls implemented to assess the effectiveness of the training conducted, including, but not limited to, auditing of training presentations, examination content, and examination grading. The inspectors interviewed reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and auxiliary feed pump operators to establish the operators' subjective evaluations of the effectiveness of training received in conjunction with incidents at the same or other facilities.

As a result of these reviews, one open item is discussed in Paragraph 8.b below.

b. Inadequate Distribution of Information and Training

In reviewing the licensee's response to Bulletin 79-06B, the inspector noted that a Control Center Operator was designated as the individual responsible for assuring a supply of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators if the event required such action. In interviewing personnel in this position, the inspector found that none of those interviewed knew what action to take on loss of DC control power; one of three knew where and how to reset the overspeed trip on the turbine (which is necessary to allow the turbine to operate), and one of four interviewed knew precisely what flow was indicated on all three auxiliary feedwater flow meters on the control board. The Nuclear Watch Engineer did know how to reset the trip and of the indications being displayed

on the control board. The Turbine Operator (who would be available under most circumstances) was aware of how to reset the overspeed trip and what actions were necessary to compensate for a loss of DC control power.

Since several operators would be at the simulator for training in the immediate future, all personnel could not obtain all of the required information as soon as desired by the licensee. However, the Plant Manager endorsed the date provided by the Operations Supervisor of June 15, 1979, for the distribution of information relative to the above areas, and a date of July 30, 1979, for completion of hands-on-training of all "B" CCO's and those who could be assigned such a position in areas of resetting the overspeed trip and remote/local operations of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump including simulated loss of DC Control Power. Until these actions have been completed and evaluated for adequacy, this item (335/79-15-03) is open.

c. Interference With Auxiliary Feedwater Valves

During a tour of the facility, the inspector noted that new "cage" structures were being completed over the auxiliary feedwater valve penetrations in the turbine deck. While construction had been stopped, the design would have prevented reasonable and expeditious access to these valves if completed. The licensee stated that this undesirable interference with access had been noticed by the plant staff before the inspector's arrival, and that a redesign of the cages was being completed. Construction had been halted pending completion of the new design.

The completed "cages" will be reviewed during a future inspection. This inspector follow item is designated (335/79-15-04).