

Commonwealth Edison Company

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Address Reply to:

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450

September 15, 1970

Mr. Paul F. Collins, Chief
Operator Licensing Branch
Division of Reactor Licensing
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: OPERATOR RESPONSE DURING INCIDENT OF JUNE 5, 1970

Dear Mr. Collins:

The following is in response to your letter of August 20, 1970, pertaining to the Dresden operator response during the Incident of June 5, 1970.

Below is the listing of licensed personnel involved during the period of the Incident up to approximately 12:00 midnight. By this time, the actions that were significant to the Incident had taken place. The period from midnight on was concerned with recovery and repairs and is not included in the below summary.

| | |
|---|------------|
| 1. Worden, W. P. - Assistant Superintendent | SOP 1046-2 |
| 2. Redman, G. L. - Assistant Superintendent | SOP 336-4 |
| 3. Wagner, G. P. - Operating Engineer | SOP 1044-2 |
| 4. Barthelmes, W. G. - Shift Engineer | SOP 331-3 |
| 5. Budzichowski, E. - Shift Foreman | SOP 992-2 |
| 6. Watts, T. E. - Start-Up Engineer | SOP 1045-2 |
| 7. Allred, C. D. - Operations Superintendent | SOP 1213 |
| 8. Zrubek, R. R. - Shift Superintendent | SOP 1218 |
| 9. Reece, D. L. - Nuclear Station Operator | SOP 2153-2 |
| 10. Strobel, D. R. - Nuclear Station Operator | OP 2291-1 |

The items in the Special Incident Report where the word "operators" was used are tabulated in later paragraphs. As you will notice, there is more than one operator noted in each case and also in each case there was at least one Senior Licensed Operator supervising and directing the actions of the Bargaining Unit operators, Messrs. Reece and Strobel. It is very important to note that actions of these Bargaining Unit operators were, at all times, under the supervision of Senior Licensed Operators of the General Electric and Commonwealth Edison Companies.

In addition, we would like to re-emphasize the Dresden Station policy on operator responsibility. In our opinion, there are two basic types of actions required by a nuclear station operator; undirected actions, where he follows a routine procedure or schedule of routine manipulations, or takes emergency action when a supervisor is not present; and directed actions, when he is specifically directed to make a series of manipulations by a supervisor. During a nuclear plant startup and test program, there are very few undirected actions taken by the NSO; a supervisor is present in the control room most of the time for that very reason--to tell the operator what to do should an emergency arise or should a special manipulation be required by a test.

In an emergency such as occurred at Dresden 2 on June 5, 1970, the operators act as an extension of the supervisory team in the control room, who were present during the initiating transient and there-after during the period of concern, calling out the occurrence of alarms, acknowledging them and taking actions which the supervisors direct; calling attention to changing conditions on one panel when the supervisor's attentions are at another point, etc. In this regard, the NSO's do not take any independent actions. They receive and carry out instructions and call attention to off-normal conditions requiring action. Each of the actions taken following the pressure-controller transient on June 5 was directed by and concurred with by General Electric and Commonwealth Edison shift supervision. After the arrival of higher management personnel approximately 45 minutes after the scram, these actions were reviewed and concurred with or modified as necessary in response to the existing conditions.

Item Number, Sect. III,
Special Incident Report

Operators Involved

| | |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|
| B 3, para. 2 | 4, 9, 10 |
| 16 | 8, 9 |
| 17 | 8, 9 |
| 18, para. 1 | 4, 8, 10 |
| 18, para. 2 | 4, 8, 10 |
| 19 | 4, 8, 10 |
| 30 | 4, 6, 8, 9 |
| 32 | 4, 8, 10 |
| 33 | 4, 5, 8, 10 |
| 36 | 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 |
| 39, para. a | 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 |
| 39, para. b | 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 |
| 39, para. c | 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 |
| 40 | 6, 8, 9, 10 |
| 41 | 4, 6, 8, 9 |
| 43 | 4, 5, 6, 8, & an unlicensed operator |
| 44 | 5, 6, 8, 10 |

Particular interest has been indicated in the following operator actions. Please note the page references to "Special Report of Incident of June 5, 1970" which summarize the justification, precautionary steps and results of the actions taken during the period in question.

Item Number, Sect. III
Special Incident Report

Justification as Stated in
Special Incident Report

B-16

Page VIII - 4

B-18

Pages VIII - 3 & VIII - 5

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Please also note that the operators performed in accordance with Procedures so as to lead to a safe and orderly unit shutdown with no detectable effects to the public health & safety or to the personnel involved. However, instances have been cited of departure from procedures; specifically, the failure to actuate containment spray in the drywell as specified in 200-AN-I, 3.a.(11), was discussed by supervision. The decision to not actuate the containment sprays in the drywell (they were actuated in the torus) was made after deciding that the procedure in question was not applicable to the small-leak situation at hand. The senior operators had determined that (a) the leak-size was between 50-100 gpm since the normal CRD cooling flow was maintaining reactor water level; (b) the core had never been uncovered, so the danger of gross fuel cladding failures was not present; (c) LPCI and corespray injection was above the steam nozzles and being maintained. With this information, they decided that initiating containment sprays would only increase the magnitude of the damage to the drywell equipment and sprays would be used only if the drywell could not be repressurized in any other manner.

Subsequent to the incident in question, modified procedures have been issued which more clearly define guidelines for containment spray actuation.

Modification of procedures by two senior licensed operators is permitted by Chapter 30, Administrative Procedures, as long as the modification does not change the intent of the procedure.

In reply to paragraph (3) of your letter, the following information is submitted.

a) W. G. Barthelmes has a thorough knowledge of plant operation, equipment and procedures. He has been assigned to the operation of Dresden Units 1 & 2 since the initiation of the construction of Unit 2. He has been responsible for the direction of plant operation on one operating shift for the above period except for the time spent in study at the BWR Simulator School. He is an experienced, capable engineer, and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.

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b) E. Budzichowski has a thorough knowledge of plant operation, equipment and procedures. He has been assigned to the operation of Dresden Units 1 & 2 since the initiation of the construction of Unit 2. He has been responsible for the direction of plant operation on one operating shift for the above period except for the time spent in study at the BWR Simulator School. He is an experienced, capable engineer, and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.

c) T. E. Watts has a thorough knowledge of plant operation, equipment and procedures. He has been assigned to the start-up of Dresden Unit 2 for almost three years. He has been responsible for the direction of plant operation on one operating shift for the above period except for the time spent in study at the BWR Simulator School. He is an experienced, capable engineer, and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.

d) R. R. Zrubek has a thorough knowledge of plant operation, equipment and procedures. He has been assigned to Dresden 2 Startup since July, 1968, and has been responsible for the technical direction of plant on one operating shift since initial fuel loading. He is an experienced, capable startup engineer, and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.

e) D. L. Reece, a Nuclear Station Operator, has been an operator at Dresden for approximately eleven years. He is an experienced, capable operator and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.

f) D. R. Strobel, a Nuclear Station Operator, has been an operator at Dresden for approximately eleven years. He is an experienced, capable operator and has a thorough knowledge of the FSAR, Technical Specifications and procedures for operation, which he used with good judgment during the period in question.


In reply to paragraph (4) of your letter, all ten of the licensed operators mentioned in the second paragraph of this letter have discharged their responsibilities in a safe and capable manner, consistent with the authority delegated to them by the Commonwealth Edison Company. Please refer to Dresden Units 2 & 3 FSAR, Amendments 13 & 14, pages B.2-1 to B.2-61 and FSAR, Amendment 22, page 5-1 for a summary of Dresden organization and responsibilities.

In summary, we feel it is important to note that the actions taken and decisions rendered were reviewed and concurred with or modified as necessary by Edison and General Electric management as they arrived

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at the plant. The management personnel, consisting of Messrs. G. P. Wagner, G. L. Redman, C. D. Allred and W. P. Worden, were notified of the Incident by phone, as stated in Administrative Procedures, and were present at the plant before midnight on the evening of the Incident.

Sincerely yours,



Harlan K. Hoyt
Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

HKH:dmc

