Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Regulatory File Cy.

July 7, 1975

Mr. D. L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors - Branch No. 2
Division of Reactor Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3
Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2
Dresden Station Special Report No. 40
Quad-Cities Station Special Report No. 15
NRC Dkts. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254, and 50-265

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

In response to discussions with members of your staff and your letter concerning Dresden Unit 2 and Quad-Cities Unit 1 dated June 18, 1975, the following clarifications of the evaluation in the subject Special Reports are provided.

Selection of Largest Break

As described in the subject Special Reports, the break spectrum analysis described in Quad-Cities Special Report No. 15 Supplement C is applicable to the four (4) subject facilities. For this break spectrum analysis, the Design Basis Accident (DBA), Large Break Accident (LBA), and Small Break Accident (SBA) analyses were conducted for breaks in the reactor water recirculation pump suction line at the reactor vessel nozzle. No frictional pressure drop at the break was assumed in this analysis. In these reactors, breaks at other locations in the recirculation system are less severe than those analyzed; because dynamic pressure losses in the pipes, valves, and pump reduce the effective break area. The LBA break spectrum evaluation in Quad-Cities Special Report No. 15 Supplement C demonstrates that smaller break areas are relatively less severe. Thus, for these reactors, the most severe loss of coolant accident has been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K. The results are provided in the subject Special Reports.

The selection of break location and handling of friction pressure drop is the same as used in previous ECCS evaluations for these facilities and are described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

7372

Submerged Valves

For the subject facilities, the arrangement of valve motors inside the primary containment has been reviewed. Valve motors which are required for short and long term emergency core cooling and containment isolation are located to preclude submergence in the event of the postulated loss of coolant accidents.

You are urged to proceed independently of the ECCS evaluation reports with any further review of submerged valves. Your authority to request additional information concerning an existing facility design is unchallenged; however, there is no basis or reason to pursue this matter as part of 10 CFR 50 Appendix K - ECCS evaluation review and approval.

One (1) signed original and 59 copies of this additional information are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

J. S. Abel
Nuclear Licensing Administrator
Boiling Water Reactors

Att.