Commonwealth Edison
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September 19, 1975

Regulatory File Cy



Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors - Branch 2
Division of Reactor Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3
Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2
ECCS Valve Failure Analysis
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249,
50-254, and 50-265

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

The ECCS single valve failure analysis Table 1, submitted June 23, 1975, has been revised to provide a more comprehensive listing and to more accurately describe the valves.

Please replace Table 1 with those enclosed in this letter. This revised table has received Onsite and Offsite Review.

Enclosed are one (1) signed original and 59 copies for your information.



Very truly yours,

G. A. Abrell
Nuclear Licensing Administrator
Boiling Water Reactors

Enclosure

10110

Revised 9/18/75

TABLE 1

DRESDEN 2 & 3

ECCS SINGLE VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS

SYSTEM	TOTAL NO. OF VALVES AT STA.	VALVES*	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION CLOSED	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION OPEN	CONSEQUENCES OF VALVE FAILURE ASSUMED TOGETHER WITH DESIGN BASIS LOCA
Core Spray	(4)	Suction e.g. M27 (MO-2-1402-3A)		X	Negate use of one core spray loop
	(8)	Injection e.g. M27 (MO-2-1402-24B & 25B)	X	X	Negate use of one core spray loop
	(4)	Test Return e.g. M27 (MO-2-1402-4B)	X		Negate use of one core spray loop
	(4)	Minimum Flow e.g. M27 (MO-2-1402-38A & 38B)		X	Partial flow loss in one loop
High Pressure Coolant Injection	(2)	Condensate Suction e.g.M51 (MO-2-2301-6)		X	Utilize Suppression Pool Water
	(4)	Suppression Pool Suction Valve e.g. M51 (MO-2-2301-35 & 36)	X		Utilize Condensate Storage Tank Water
	(4)	Injection e.g. M51 (MO-2-2301-8&9)	X	X	Negates HPCI
	(6)	Turbine Inlet e.g. M51 (MO-2-2301-3,4, & 5)	X	X	Negates HPCI
	(4)	Test Return e.g. M51 (MO-2-2301-10&15)	X		No consequences (negates HPCI if both valves fail open)
	(2)	Minimum Flow e.g. M51 (MO-2-2301-14)	X		Partial loss of flow

* Numerical designation following valves titles refer to P&ID sheets and an example of a particular valve.

Revised 9/18/75

TABLE 1

DRESDEN 2 & 3

ECCS SINGLE VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS

SYSTEM	TOTAL NO. OF VALVES AT. STA.	VALVES*	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION CLOSED	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION OPEN	CONSEQUENCES OF VALVE FAILURE ASSUMED TOGETHER WITH DESIGN BASIS LOCA
Low Pressure Coolant Injection	(8)	Injection e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-21B & 22B)	X	X	Negate use of LPCI
	(4)	Minimum Flow e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-13A & 13B)	X		Partial flow loss in one loop due to flow to Suppression Pool
	(8)	Test Return e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-38B & 20B)	X		No consequences (negates loop if both valves fail open)
	(4)	Cross Tie e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-32B & 32A)		X	Negate one LPCI loop (two pumps per loop)
	(4)	HX Bypass e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-11B & 11A)		X	Reduce flow due to HX pressure drop
	(8)	Pump Suction e.g. M29 (MO-2-1501-5A, B, C, D)		X	Negate one out of four pumps
Automatic Depressurization System (Design is changing; safety/ relief valves will be installed)	(10)	Relief Valve e.g. M12 (MO-2-203-3A)	X		Vessel depressurizes faster, increases rate of HPCI injection.

* Numerical designation following valves titles refer to P&ID sheets and an example of a particular valve.

Revised 9/18/75

TABLE 1

QUAD-CITIES 1 & 2

ECCS SINGLE VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS

SYSTEM	TOTAL NO. OF VALVES AT STA.	VALVES *	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION CLOSED	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION OPEN	CONSEQUENCES OF VALVE FAILURE ASSUMED TOGETHER WITH DESIGN BASIS LOCA
Core Spray	(4)	Suction e.g. M36 (MO-1-1402-3B)		X	Negate use of one core spray
	(8)	Injection e.g. M36 (MO-1-1402-24B & 25B)	X	X	Negate use of one core spray
	(4)	Test Return e.g. M36 (MO-1-1402-4B)	X		Negate use of one core spray loop
	(4)	Minimum Flow e.g. M36 (MO-1-1402-38A & 38B)		X	Partial flow loss in one loop
High Pressure Coolant Injection	(2)	Condensate Suction e.g. M46 (MO-1-2301-6)		X	Utilize Suppression Pool Water
	(4)	Suppression Pool Suction Valve e.g M46 (MO-1-2301-35 & 36)	X		Utilize Condensate Storage Tank Water
	(4)	Injection e.g. M46 (MO-1-2301-8&9)	X	X	Negates HPCI
	(6)	Turbine Inlet e.g. M46 (MO-1-2301-3,4,5)	X	X	Negates HPCI
	(4)	Test Return e.g. M46 (MO-1-2301-10&15)	X		No consequences (negates HPCI if both valves fail open)
	(2)	Minimum Flow e.g. M46 (MO-1-2301-14)	X		Partial loss of flow

* Numerical designation following valves titles refer to P&ID sheets and an example of a particular valve.

Revised 9/18/75

TABLE 1

QUAD-CITIES 1 & 2

ECCS SINGLE VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS

SYSTEM	TOTAL NO. OF VALVES AT. STA.	VALVES*	POSITION FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION CLOSED	OPEN	CONSEQUENCES OF VALVE FAILURE ASSUMED TOGETHER WITH DESIGN BASIS LOCA
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (Mode of the RHRS)	(8)	Injection e.g. M39 (MO-1-1001-28B & 29B)	X	X	Negate use of LPCI
	(4)	Minimum Flow e.g. M39 (MO-1-1001-18A)	X		Partial flow loss in one loop due to flow to Suppression Pool
	(8)	Test Return e.g. M39 (MO-1-1001-34A & 36A)	X		No consequence (negates loop if both valves fail open)
	(4)	Cross Tie e.g. M39 (MO-1-1001-19B)		X	Negate one LPCI loop (two pumps per loop)
	(4)	HX Bypass e.g. M39 (MO-1-1001-16B)		X	Reduce flow due to HX pressure drop
	(8)	Pump Suction e.g. M37 (MO-1-1001-7A,B C, D)		X	Negate one out of four pumps
Automatic Depressurization System (Design is changing; safety/ relief valves will be installed)	(10)	Relief Valve e.g. M13 (1-203-3A)	X		Vessel depressurizes faster, increases rate of HPCI injection.

* Numerical designation following valves titles refer to P&ID sheets and an example of a particular valve.