



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

AUG 03 1990

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

Docket No. 50-237

CAL-RIII-90-014

Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed
Senior Vice President
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Gentlemen:

This letter confirms the telephone conversation between E. G. Greenman of this office and D. Galle of your staff on August 3, 1990, related to the Target Rock Safety Relief Valve problem leading to the manual scram which occurred on August 2, 1990, at Dresden Unit 2. At that time, operators manually scrambled the reactor after all attempts to close the Target Rock Safety Relief Valve failed. Following the reactor scram, the torus bulk water temperature reached a temperature of 122 degrees F, and during the reactor cooldown the maximum permissible cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour was exceeded.

Subsequent to the reactor scram, you made a drywell entry on August 3, 1990, at 2:00 a.m. (CDT), and discovered a loose terminal box supported only by electrical wires containing electrical leads leading to several valve components, including a separated conduit.

With regard to this event we understand that you either have completed or will:

1. Quarantine the electrical equipment as identified above until such time as NRC Region III has had an opportunity to view the equipment and assess its condition. This equipment was subsequently verbally released for troubleshooting and repair on August 3, 1990.
2. Provide the results of the analysis of the effect of the cooldown rate that the reactor primary system experienced as a result of the thermal transient conditions experienced on August 2, 1990. Your analysis should discuss any long term consequences of the temperature transient and its duration.
3. Provide the results of the analysis of the high temperature reached in the torus (suppression pool). Your analysis should discuss any long term consequences of the temperature transient and its duration.
4. Provide a root cause analysis of the electrical equipment found in a degraded condition as observed on the August 3, 1990, drywell entry.

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

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CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER

CAL-RIII-90-014

5. Conduct a full investigation of the failed valve for a root cause analysis including a review of the maintenance history on this valve.
6. Submit to NRC Region III a formal report of your findings and conclusions including the root cause analysis of the valve failure within 30 days of receipt of this letter.


We also understand that startup of Unit 2 will not occur without concurrence of the Regional Administrator or his designee.

Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude the issuance of an order requiring implementation of the above commitments.

None of the actions specified herein should be construed to take precedence over actions which you feel necessary to ensure plant and personnel safety.

Please let us know immediately if your understanding differs from that set out above.

Sincerely,



A. Bert Davis
Regional Administrator

- cc: D. Galle, Vice President - BWR
Operations
T. Kovach, Nuclear
Licensing Manager
E. D. Eenigenburg, Station Manager
DCD/DCB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspectors LaSalle,
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