



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450

Telephone 815/942-2920

January 11, 1990

EDE LTR #90-034

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk

Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #89-011-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/jt

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3						Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 14 19			Page (3) 1 of 0 1 3		
Title (4) Unplanned Primary Containment Group II and Group III Isolations											
Due to a Labeling Deficiency											

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)						
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)					
1	2	16	8	9	8	9	0	1	1	0	1	1	9	0	N/A	0 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10

OPERATING MODE (9) M		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/>				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Vikram Kanal, Technical Staff System Engineer						TELEPHONE NUMBER					
Ext. 2349						AREA CODE 8 1 1 5 9 1 4 1 2 1 2 1 9 1 2 1 0					

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						Expected Submission Date (15)		Month	Day	Year
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 16, 1989 at 0353 hours, with Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, while performing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 7500-1, Standby Gas Treatment System Automatic Actuation, unplanned Primary Containment Group II and Group III Isolations occurred. At the time of the event, all fuel was removed from the reactor vessel. The root cause of this event has been attributed to a labeling deficiency. The labels on the panel did not clearly identify a terminal block resulting in the wrong terminal block being jumpered. The isolations occurred as designed; therefore, the event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance. Subsequent actions consisted of relabeling the terminal blocks with the appropriate labels and clearly identifying the actual physical location of the terminals. The last unplanned Primary Containment Group II and III Isolations occurred on June 8, 1988 as reported by LER 88-014-0 on Docket 050249.

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 MWt rated core thermal power.

Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) tracking code numbers are identified in the text as (XXX-XXX-XX-XXXX).

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Unplanned Primary Containment Group II and III Isolations Due to a Labeling Deficiency

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 3

Event Date: December 16, 1989

Event Time: 0353 hours

Reactor Mode: N

Mode Name: Shutdown

Power Level: 0%

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure: 0 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On December 16, 1989 at 0353 hours, with Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, while performing Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) 7500-1, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) [BH] System Automatic Actuation, unplanned Primary Containment Group II and III Isolations [JM] occurred. As a result of the isolation signals, the Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) [BR] and the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWC) [CE] System isolated. The DIS 7500-1 procedure was being performed to verify the automatic actuation of SBGT on its initiation signals of Reactor Vessel [AC] Low-Water Level, Primary Containment Drywell [NH] High Pressure, Fuel Pool [ND] High Radiation, or Reactor Building Ventilation [VA] High Radiation. Although DIS 7500-1 required installation of jumpers to prevent the unplanned Primary Containment Group II and Group III isolations, the jumpers were inadvertently not landed on the proper locations due to a labeling deficiency. The labels behind Control Room panel 903-4 did not clearly identify the appropriate terminal block numbers with the end result being that the jumpers were not landed on the right locations. The Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) was requested per DIS 7500-1 to pull fuses 595-704A and B in the 903-15 and 903-17 panels. Upon pulling the first fuse, alarms were initiated as expected. Upon pulling the second fuse, the SDC and RWC systems isolated along with the expected start of SBGT. The terminal board was relabeled, the jumpers were landed on the right locations and DIS 7500-1 was performed satisfactorily.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. The root cause of the event was attributed to a labeling deficiency. The label behind the 903-4 panel did not clearly identify the terminal block locations. Procedurally, the jumpers were to be installed at terminals DD-15 to DD-12, LL-9 to LL-12, DD-16 to DD-20, DD-13 to DD-10, LL-14 to LL-11, and BB-58 to BB-61. Instrument Maintenance Department (IMD) personnel misidentified a terminal block as "DD" while they actually inadvertently jumpered the "DDA" terminals due to the labeling deficiency. When the fuses were pulled by the NSO, the unplanned Group II and Group III isolations occurred.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT: Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The reactor was in cold shutdown and all fuel was out of the reactor vessel. There was no work in progress with the potential of draining the reactor vessel. The Unit 3 Diesel Generator [EK] was operable and capable of supplying power to Division II loads. The B Core Spray [BM] and the C and D Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [BO] systems could have been utilized to inject water into the reactor vessel if necessary. The Group II and Group III isolations occurred as designed when challenged by the misplaced jumpers. Therefore, this event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective actions were to put the fuses back in place, reset the Group II and Group III isolations and secure SBTG. Subsequent actions consisted of relabeling the terminal blocks with the appropriate labels and clearly identifying the exact physical location of the terminals. An immediate review of the labels identifying all other control room terminal blocks was done and was found to be acceptable. Additionally, DIS 7500-1 was verified to specify the proper terminal block nomenclature. Since this is an isolated incident, no further corrective action was deemed necessary at this time (249-200-89-12101).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER/Docket Numbers Title

88-009/050249 Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Management Deficiency

With Unit 3 Shutdown for a refueling outage, an unplanned Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolation occurred while executing an out-of-service for the Analog Trip System (ATS) [JE] panel. The root cause was determined to be a management deficiency for failure to fully implement corrective actions from a previous event.

88-014/050249 Group II and Group III Primary Containment Isolations Due to a Procedure Deficiency.

During the event a 480V bus tie breaker failed to close due to dirty control switch contacts.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

As this event did not involve any known component failures, this section is not applicable.