



Con Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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November 20, 1989

EDE LTR #89-894

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #89-004-0, Docket #050249 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/jt

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 14 19 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

Title (4) High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room Cooler Fan Drive Belts

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)											
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)										
1	0	2	8	9	0	0	1	1	2	0	8	9	None	0	5	10	10	10	1	1

OPERATING MODE (9) N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name: Jerry F. Lizalek, Technical Staff System Engineer Ext. 2421

TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 -12 9 2 10

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	B	J	F	A	N	B	5	1	5	N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) Month Day Year

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0833 hours on October 22, 1989 during normal Unit 3 operation at 93% rated core thermal power, it was determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HCPI) system room cooler drive belts had failed. The HPCI system was then declared inoperable in accordance with Station policy. The root cause of this event was determined to be component failure of the drive belts. Immediate corrective actions were initiated to replace the drive belts. In addition, long term corrective actions have been initiated to prevent recurrence.

The safety significance of this event was determined to be minimal since the HPCI system remained capable of automatically initiating and fulfilling its design basis operational requirements before system isolation on high area temperature. A similar previous occurrence was reported by LER 89-002 on docket 050237.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year		Sequential Number		Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9	8 9	-	0 0 4	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Although the HPCI system was declared inoperable in accordance with Station policy as a conservative operating practice following the room cooler failure, its automatic function was not hindered. Upon automatic initiation to mitigate the consequence of a small high energy line break (HELB), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) figure 6.2.5:5 indicates that the HPCI system will reduce reactor pressure to 350 psig in approximately 300 seconds. Nuclear Fuel Services Department report RSA-D:89-01 indicates that the HPCI system can operate approximately 80 hours at full capacity prior reaching the high room temperature HPCI system isolation setpoint even with the room cooler inoperable. In addition, the Isolation Condenser system [BL], the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) [SB], and the Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCSs) [BO, BM] were available to mitigate the consequences of a small HELB.

For these reasons, the safety significance of this event was minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective actions included replacement of the HPCI room cooler drive belts and replacement of the shaft bearing. Additionally, a second bearing was placed adjacent to the original bearing. This allows a greater bearing surface for the shaft and will help maintain the shaft in proper alignment. These repairs were performed under the direction of Work Request 88016 and temporary alteration number III-43-89 (249-200-89-09701).

Additionally, to help prevent recurrence, a procedural inquiry has been initiated to include guidance within DEP 5700-4 to denote the proper belt tension. The Electrical Maintenance Department will revise DEP 5700-4 to include the proper belt tension information (249-200-89-09702).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER/Docket Numbers Title

89-002/050237 HPCI System Inoperable Due to Room Cooler Broken Drive Belts

The HPCI system was declared inoperable as a result of the room cooler being inoperable due to broken drive belts. The cause of the broken drive belts was due to the increased operating frequency of the room cooler due to increased HPCI room ambient temperatures. The drive belts were replaced and HPCI was returned to service.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer Nomenclature Model Number Mfg. Part Number

OPTI Belt V-Belt B-51 N/A

The drive belt is not reportable to NPRDS data base.