

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2
 Docket Number (2) 0 5 10 10 10 12 13 17
 Page (3) 1 of 0 4

Title (4) Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Due to Personnel Error During 125V DC Ground Checking

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)						
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)					
0	3	0	8	9	0	1	2	0	3	3	0	8	9	N/A	0 5 10 10 10
0	3	0	4	8	9	0	3	3	0	8	9	N/A	0 5 10 10 10	N/A	0 5 10 10 10

OPERATING MODE (9) N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 2

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name: Lawrence Bihlman, Technical Staff Engineer
 Telephone Number: 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0
 Ext. 2549

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) _____

Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 4, 1989 with Unit 2 in the Run mode at 92% rated core thermal power, the reactor scrambled on low reactor water level following the trip of both operating Reactor Feedwater Pumps (RFPs). At the time, Operations Department personnel were ground checking on the 125V DC battery system. The cause of the event has been determined to be personnel error. The High Voltage Operator (HVO) performing the ground check opened the wrong breaker which resulted in the trip of the RFPs. The ground detection procedure states that the breaker is only to be opened with permission of the Operating Engineer. The HVO did not have the procedure in hand at the time of the event. The labeling of the breaker also contributed to the event. The plant responded as designed during the event, therefore the event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance. A discussion was held with the HVO and all other shift personnel to emphasize attention to detail, communications and procedural adherence. The critical breakers have been relabelled so they will stand out from the remaining breakers. The ground detection procedures are being reviewed and will be revised as required to assure that critical breakers are clearly identified and the consequences of their operation understood. These procedures will be posted at the appropriate DC switchgear locations when the revisions are approved. The last reactor scram from power which was caused by personnel error occurred on November 10, 1986 as reported by LER 86-012/Docket 050249.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 9	-	0 1 2	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4	

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted to comply with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. The intermediate cause of the event was the tripping of both operating RFPs at 92% rated core thermal power. The root cause of the event has been determined to be personnel error. The High Voltage Operator (HVO) performing the ground check did not have Dresden Operating Procedure (DOP) 6900-6, 125V DC Ground Detection Unit 2, in his possession at the time of the event. The HVO also failed to notify the Control Room prior to deenergizing each of the individual circuits as required by DOP 6900-6. Current plant labeling also contributed to the event. In the past, circuits which had the potential to cause a Unit scram were labeled red with white lettering and required the Operating Engineer's permission to open. The remaining circuits were labeled white with black letters. Recently, under the new plant labeling program, all the labels were changed to a white background with either red or black lettering. Although the HVO should have noticed the difference, he did not; therefore, labeling contributed to the cause of the event.

The trip of the 2A and 2C RFPs is believed to be the result of low suction pressure when the attempt was made to start the 2A RFP with the 2C RFP in a runout condition. The inboard MSIV closure occurred when the inboard MSIV DC pilot solenoids were deenergized by the HVO ground checking and the AC pilot solenoids deenergizing when house loads transferred due to a voltage dip on the Instrument Bus. The Group II and III Primary Containment Isolations were expected due to low reactor water level. The Group V Primary Containment Isolation also resulted from the HVO ground checking.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The plant responded as expected and designed based on the sequence of events encountered during the transient. The Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCSs) and the Diesel Generators [EK] were operable and would have been able to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident had they been required. Based on these facts this event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective actions consisted of controlling reactor pressure and level in accordance with the Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures (DEOPs) and subsequently, bringing the reactor to a cold shutdown condition in accordance with the Dresden General Procedures (DGPs). Further corrective action consisted of determining the cause of the reactor scram and verifying that the inboard MSIV closure and the Group V Primary Containment Isolations were a result of the ground checking that was in progress. The event was discussed with the HVO and all other shift personnel. Attention to detail, communication and procedural adherence were stressed in the discussion. To prevent recurrence all critical breakers were labeled with red tape prior to the startup of Unit 2. The breakers will be permanently labeled with white letters on a red background (237-200-89-05201). The DC ground checking procedures are being reviewed and will be revised as necessary to assure clarity and proper breaker sequencing (237-200-89-05202). These procedures will be posted at the appropriate DC switchgear locations when the revisions are completed (237-200-89-05203). No further corrective action is deemed necessary at this time.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 9	-	0 1 2	-	0 0	0 4	OF	0 4	

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F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER/Docket Number Title

86-021/050249 Unit 3 Reactor Scram Due to Instrument Maintenance Department Personnel Inadvertently Removing a Power Lead.

Unit 3 scrambled from 100% power when Instrument Maintenance Department personnel lifted the wrong lead. The lifted lead caused the drywell pneumatic supply valve to go closed and the subsequent loss of control air to the MSIVs resulted in them drifting closed. The individual was reprimanded and the event was tailgated to stress the importance of following specific work instructions.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This event did not involve a component failure.



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Telephone 815/942-2920

March 30, 1989

EDE LTR #89-260

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #89-012-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/ade

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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