

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 13 17 Page (3) 1 of 0 4

Title (4) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Actuation Due to Procedural Deficiency

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)											
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)										
0	1	3	1	8	9	8	9	0	3	0	2	8	9	N/A	0	5	0	0	0		
														N/A	0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9) N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Keith Polson, Technical Staff Engineer Ext. 2665 TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 -2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 31, 1989 at 2210 hours with Unit 2 shutdown for a refueling outage and all control rods at their full in position, the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) System actuated. The Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) received the following alarms: ATWS Channel A or B Trip, Reactor Vessel Low Level, and Scram Valve Air Supply Low Pressure. The actuation was a result of the water in the variable leg of the reactor level ATWS transmitters being bled off due to Technical Specification required maintenance on flow check valve 2-263-2-17B. The root cause was determined to be a procedural deficiency, in that no procedure existed to give adequate direction on how to properly isolate the ATWS level transmitters. The safety significance was deemed to be minimal based on the fact that ATWS Channel B had failed in the conservative direction and ATWS Channel A was operable at all times. All equipment functioned as designed during the event. The equalizing valves for level transmitters 2-263-23B and 2-263-23D were opened by the Operations Department Shift Supervisor, allowing the ATWS System to automatically reset. Additionally, the Operations Department will prepare a procedure for isolating similar level transmitters. The last ATWS trip occurred June 14, 1988 as reported by LER 88-016 on Docket 050-249.

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LICENSE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	/	Sequential Number	/	Revision Number				
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 9	-	0 0 3	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4	
TEXT	Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]									

The root cause has been identified as an improper valve-out sequence for isolating the reactor level ATWS transmitters. This was due to procedural deficiency in that no procedure existed to give proper guidance on the proper method to take the ATWS transmitters out of service.

The equipment outage checklist contained an out-of-service card specifying closing the 2-263-2-16B isolation valve. Caution cards were used on the level transmitters high and low side valves which stated to close the high and low side valves "as needed" and to open the equalizing valve "as needed". Subsequently, the high, low, and equalizing valves were left in their as-found positions: high and low side valves open and equalizing valve closed. The equipment outage checklist did not give adequate direction in regards to isolating the ATWS transmitter, which was also a contributing factor to this event. Due to a similar event on Unit 3 in June 1988, training had been given to Operations Department personnel on how to properly valve out a differential pressure (dP) instrument. The training stated that the proper valve-out sequence for reactor level ATWS transmitters was to close both the high and low valves and to open the equalizing valve. The Equipment Operator and Shift Supervisor failed to follow the sequence described in the training session and no procedure existed to take the reactor level ATWS transmitters out of service. If Operations Department personnel had specific procedural guidance on how to properly isolate the reactor level ATWS transmitters, this event would have been avoided.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this event is minimal since ATWS Channel B failed in the conservative direction and ATWS Channel A was operable at all times. In addition, the Reactor Protection System [JC] was available to respond to an actual scram signal and scram the reactor if required. All associated equipment operated as designed during the event.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective action consisted of opening the equalizing valves of reactor level ATWS transmitters 2-263-23B and 2-263-23D. This caused the level signal to go upscale permitting the ATWS ARI signal to automatically reset.

To prevent this event from recurring, the Operations Department will prepare a new procedure specifying the proper valving sequence required to take various level transmitters out-of-service (237-200-89-01901). This event will be included in the continuing Licensed Operator training program (237-200-89-01902).

F. PREVIOUS OCCURENCES:

The last occurrence of an ATWS trip was reported by License Event Report 88-016 on Docket 050-249. On June 14, 1988, while Unit 3 was shutdown for a refueling outage, an ATWS Channel B trip occurred from a false low reactor level signal. The root cause of this event had been identified as inadequate operator training on how to properly take a level transmitter out-of-service.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Not applicable.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

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
Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number
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Dresden Nuclear Power Station

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TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]



Channel B ATWS Level Piping Diagram

Figure 1




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March 2, 1989

EDE LTR #89-165

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
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Licensee Event Report #89-003-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).


E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/ade

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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