

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	Page (3) 1 of 0 3
---	---	-----------------------------------

Title (4)
Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Within the Required Time Period Due to Personnel Error

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)	
0 9	1 6	8 7	8 7	0 2 7	0 0	0 9	2 8	8 7	N/A	0 5 0 0 0	
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0	

OPERATING MODE (9) N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR
(Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)
--------------------------------------	------------------------------------	--	---	---	---	--	------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--	--	---	--	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------------------------	-----------------------------------	--

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name Lawrence Bihlman Technical Staff Engineer (X-549)	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0
---	---

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
--	---	----	--------------------------------------	--------------	------------	-------------

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 16, 1987 at 0800 hours, with the reactor in the run mode at 93% power, it was found that the six (6) month functional test of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set electrical protection assemblies (EPAs) had exceeded the critical date. This surveillance, Dresden Technical Surveillance (DTS) 500-2, is required by Technical Specification 4.1.A.3.a. The root cause of the event was determined to be personnel error on the part of the cognizant Technical Staff Systems Engineer. DTS 500-2 was performed upon discovery of the violation. Because the RPS system functioned satisfactorily the event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance. Corrective action included discussion of this event with the cognizant Systems Engineer and the Mechanical and Electrical Systems Group Leaders, in order to emphasize their responsibility to complete surveillances in a timely manner. In addition, a critical date surveillance list will be issued weekly to applicable department heads by the surveillance coordinator. A letter describing this event and emphasizing the responsibilities of Technical Staff Engineers and Group Leaders was also issued to all Technical Staff Personnel.

8710060034 870928
PDR ADDCK 05000237
S PDR

Handwritten: 7-22
41

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				Page (3)			
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 TEXT	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 7	-	0 2 7	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power. Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

A Technical Specification required surveillance was not performed within the required time frame due to personnel error.

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Event Date: September 16, 1987
Reactor Mode: N - Run

Event Time: 0800 hours
Reactor Power: 93%

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On September 16, 1987 at 0800 hours, with the Unit 2 reactor in the run mode at 93% power, it was found that Dresden Technical Surveillance (DTS) 500-2, Calibration and Functional Testing of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs), had exceeded its critical completion date of September 6, 1987. The RPS [JE] MG set EPAs are required to be functionally tested at least once every six (6) months per Technical Specification Section 4.1.A.3.a. Upon discovery the surveillance coordinator immediately notified the cognizant Technical Staff Engineer. DTS 500-2 was successfully completed at 1140 hours of the same day.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

This event is being reported to comply with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) which requires the reporting of any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications. The Dresden Technical Specifications require that the RPS MG set EPAs be functionally tested once every six months. DTS 500-2 was to be performed by August 10, 1987 with a critical date of September 6, 1987. The critical date is computed by adding 25% of the surveillance frequency to the due date or 3.25 times the surveillance frequency for the past two surveillances, whichever period is shorter, in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The cognizant Engineer was aware of the due date and attempted to perform the surveillance on August 5, 1987. Due to an Operations Department manpower scheduling conflict, the surveillance had to be delayed. On August 7, 1987 Dresden Unit 3 was shut down due to feedwater system problems (refer to Licensee Event Report 87-013 on Docket No. 050-249) and the cognizant Engineer was involved in feedwater system walkdowns and new instrument installations to be utilized during startup testing. When the Unit 3 startup testing began, he was assigned to the midnight shift. The Technical Staff Electrical Systems Group Leader, who was also aware of the pending surveillance, was assigned to the afternoon shift. This led to a communication breakdown between the cognizant Engineer, Group Leader and the other Electrical Systems Engineers. Prior to the due date the cognizant Engineer acquired the critical date from the surveillance coordinator for the Unit 3 RPS MG set EPA relay surveillance,

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				Page (3)			
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 7	-	0 2 7	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT

which was September 25, 1987. The cognizant Engineer assumed that since both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 RPS MG set EPA relay surveillances had the same due date, that their critical date would also be the same, and marked his calendar as such. Because of the miscommunication which existed between the cognizant Engineer, Surveillance Coordinator, and Group Leader the root cause of this event has been determined to be personnel error. The cognizant Engineer had been assigned the responsibility to perform the surveillance. The Group Leader is responsible for assuring that all surveillances are performed on time.

D. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The RPS MG set EPA relays functioned properly during the surveillance. As a result the RPS system was not operating in a degraded condition. Therefore, the event was deemed to be of minimal safety significance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate corrective action consisted of the successful completion of DTS 500-2. Action to prevent recurrence will consist of the following; Dresden Administrative Procedure (DAP) 11-2, Surveillance Program, will be revised to require the Surveillance Coordinator to issue a weekly update covering two week periods of all impending Technical Specification surveillances and their critical dates to the applicable department heads. This practice began September 23, 1987. This event was discussed with the cognizant Systems Engineer, Mechanical Systems Group Leader and Electrical Systems Group Leader in order to emphasize their responsibility to perform surveillances prior to the due date. A letter was also issued to all Technical Staff personnel describing this event and outlining these responsibilities. The Technical Staff Mechanical and Electrical Systems' Group Leaders are required to review the weekly surveillance schedule and assure that the cognizant Engineers are aware of the pending due dates and critical dates. The Technical Staff Engineers are also required to review the surveillance schedules, and perform the surveillances associated with their assigned systems.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE OF EVENT:

The last occurrence of a missed Technical Specification surveillance is documented by Licensee Event Report No. 87-025 on Docket #050237, "Failure to Obtain Grab Sample of Unit 2/3 Chimney Effluent Due to Personnel Error". Corrective action included emphasizing the importance of completing the required sampling, and implementing improved shift turnover communications for Radiation Chemistry personnel.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

Not applicable.



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

September 28, 1987

EDE LTR #87-636

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #87-027-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C).

E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/kjl

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

0017k

IE22
1/1