

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) Failure to Maintain Continuous Fire Watch in the Auxiliary Electric Room Due to Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	0 9	8 7	8 7	0 1 1	0 0	0 4	3 0	8 7	Dresden Unit 3		0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9
									N/A		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0	20.402(b)			20.408(e)			88.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.408(a)(1)(i)			88.73(a)(1)			88.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
	20.408(a)(1)(ii)			88.73(a)(2)			88.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)		
	20.408(a)(1)(iii)			X 88.73(a)(2)(i)			88.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
	20.408(a)(1)(iv)			88.73(a)(2)(ii)			88.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)					
	20.408(a)(1)(v)			88.73(a)(2)(iii)			88.73(a)(2)(x)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)						TELEPHONE NUMBER					
NAME S. Merritt Technical Staff Engineer (X-421)						AREA CODE 8 1 5		9 4 2		- 2 9 2 1 0	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 4/04/87 at 0920 hours, while Unit 2 was shut down and Unit 3 was in the run mode at 52% power, the Halon 1301 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) Fire Suppression System was inadvertently actuated by contractor personnel. The AEER Halon System was declared inoperable due to the Halon bottles being discharged and a continuous fire watch was established in the area immediately in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12.H.2. At 0245 hours on 4/09/87 with Unit 2 shut down and Unit 3 in the run mode at 100% power, and the AEER fire watch required, it was discovered that the AEER fire watch had left his post unattended to find a relief person. An Operator was posted in the room immediately in order to resume the fire watch. Investigation found the root cause of the event to be personnel error by the fire watch individual who left the AEER post unattended for approximately 45 minutes. Corrective action included taking disciplinary action against the involved personnel and notifying all station personnel of this event. Safety significance of the event was minimal since the fire watch was unattended for a relatively short period of time and the AEER fire detection and a backup manual carbon dioxide suppression system was operable. This is the first occurrence of this type, where an established fire watch left his post unattended.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED DATE: 8/31/85
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000237	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		87	011	00	02	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2527 Mwt rated core thermal power. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

Failure to maintain continuous fire watch in the Auxiliary Electric Room due to personnel error.

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit 2 - Mode: N - Shutdown Reactor Power: 0%
Reactor Temperature/Pressure: 138°F/0 psig

Unit 3 - Mode: N - Run Reactor Power: 100%
Reactor Temperature/Pressure: 540°F/1000 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 4/04/87 at 0920 hours, while Unit 2 was shut down and Unit 3 in the run mode at 52% power, the Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System [KQ] in the Unit 2/3 Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) was inadvertently actuated by contractor personnel while troubleshooting the XL3 Fire Detection Alarm System [IC]. The Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System [KQ] was declared inoperable until the Halon cylinders could be recharged. A continuous fire watch was established in the AEER immediately in accordance with Technical Specification 3.12.H.2.

At 0245 hours on 4/09/87 with Unit 2 shut down and Unit 3 in the run mode at 100% power, it was discovered by a Stationman Foreman that no one was present in the AEER. The Stationman Foreman immediately called the Shift Supervisor and reported this finding. An Operator was promptly posted in the AEER to resume the continuous fire watch and an investigation was initiated as to how the fire watch post had been left unattended. Discussion with the fire watch personnel revealed that the AEER had been left unattended for approximately 45 minutes.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

An investigation has attributed the root cause of this event to personnel error on the part of the Stationman who left the AEER fire watch post unattended. The individual performing the AEER fire watch had left his post unattended in order to find a relief person for the continuous fire watch and proceeded to perform a roving fire watch for the Unit 3 Reactor Building [NG] without ensuring that the AEER fire watch post was attended. The roving Unit 3 fire watch was required as an interim compensatory measure until certain modifications that are associated with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements are completed. Due to a miscommunication between the firewatch personnel, a relief schedule had not been developed. All personnel performing continuous fire watches are instructed not to leave their post except for personnel safety reasons. If a relief person does not report, the Foreman or Shift Supervisor is to be notified. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) requirements.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

Although the Halon 1301 System [KQ] was inoperable and the continuous fire watch was interrupted for a short period of time, the safety significance of the event was considered minimal. A fire would have been detected by the cross zone smoke detectors [IC] located in the Auxiliary Electric Room, which would have initiated a Control Room alarm. The Auxiliary Electric Room is also protected by a total flooding carbon dioxide (CO₂) suppression system [KQ] which is manually operated. Also, the exposed non-IEEE 383 rated cabling in the room is protected with a fire-resistant coating.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As an immediate corrective action, an Operator was promptly posted to resume the AEER fire watch. An investigation was promptly begun in order to determine the root cause and appropriate corrective action. A disciplinary meeting was held with the involved Stationman personnel, a union representative, the Stationman Department Supervisor, and the Station Industrial Relations Representative. This resulted in the disciplinary action being taken against the individual who left the fire watch post unattended. This event was also reviewed with all station personnel in order to emphasize the importance of adherence to Technical Specification requirements. A new administrative procedure is also being developed to improve the fire watch program. This procedure will be implemented by July 30, 1987.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE:

This is the first occurrence of this kind at Dresden Station in which a continuous fire watch was left unattended.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

N/A



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

April 30, 1987

EDE LTR #87-285

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C, 20555

Licensee Event Report #87-011-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(A).

E.D. Eenigenburg
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

EDE/kjl

Enclosure

cc: A. Bert Davis, Acting Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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