## U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## REGION III

Report No. 50-249/86007(DRS)

Docket No. 50-249

#### License No. DRP-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Dresden Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL

J. Key

Inspection Conducted: March 6-7, 12-14, 19; April 1-4, 16-18, 29-30; May 1, 13-15; June 25-27; July 15-19; and August 5-6, 1986

Inspector:

D. H. Danielson, Chief Approved By: Materials and Processes Section

Manietto

Date

Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 6-7, 12-14, and 19; April 1-4, 16-18, and 29-30; May 1 and 13-15; June 25-27; July 15-19; and August 5-6, 1986 (Report No. 50-249/86007(DRS)) Areas Inspected: Unannounced, special inspection of the replacement of IGSCC susceptible piping and the resolution of IE Bulletin No. 83-02. Results: No violations or deviations were identified.



## DETAILS

## Personnel Contacted

1.

2.

#### Commonwealth Edison (CECo)

E. R. Zebus, RPR Superintendent
E. J. Hemzy, Construction Manager
\*D. J. Scott, Station Manager (Dresden)
R. H. Werder, Site Construction Superintendent
\*W. McGaffigan, RPR Project Lead Engineer
\*D. Brown, RPR Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor
D. Gardner, RPR Level III Inspector
\*R. Rickman, Dresden Level III QA Inspector
J. Kotowski, Operation Engineer
M. Karcell, Shift Supervisor
D. Dransfeldt, Shift Engineer
\*D. Adam, Regulatory Assurance
\*R. M. Jeisy, Station QA Supervisor

#### Hartford Steam Boiler Insurance (Hartford)

J. Tetrault, ANII

\*Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

#### Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

(Closed) IE Bulletin No. 83-02 (249/83-02-BB): Due to the intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) identified at Nine Mile Point One in 1982, the NRC issued IE Bulletin No. 82-03, Revision 1 for action to all BWR facilities down for refueling outages or scheduled for refueling outages in late 1982. On March 4, 1983, the NRC issued IE Bulletin No. 83-02 to inform all licensees and CP holders of BWR facilities of the recent generic pipe cracking problems.

On October 20, 1983, the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC identifying welds that would not be examined during the outage and their technical justification for not examining these welds. One hundred and fifty-two welds were examined during the outage, 61 welds were identified with IGSCC indications and would require weld overlay repair. By order the licensee was required to submit to the NRC plans for inspection and/or modification including replacement of recirculation piping 90 days prior to the start of their next refueling outage of Unit 3.

On June 3, 1985, the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC outlining their plan to replace IGSCC susceptible stainless steel piping in the recirculation system and other systems during their 1985 fall refueling outage.

See NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-249/85025, No. 50-249/85037 and this report which document the Region III review of the licensee's replacement of this piping.

This IE Bulletin is considered closed.

Review of the Replacement IGSCC Susceptible Piping

Examination of Field Welds

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Region III has followed licenses activities during the replacement of IGSCC susceptible stainless steel piping. See this report and Inspection Reports No. 50-249/85025, and No. 50-249/85037. During these inspections the NRC inspector reviewed the program, specifications, procedures, observed training and installation activities, and reviewed pertinent quality related records and approximately 90% of all final radiographs.

During radiographic examination of field welds some problems of interpretation arose between the contractor (CB&I) and the radiographers relating to the rejection of welds for root concavity. The ASME Code Section III Sub-Section NB-5320(c), states, "Internal root weld conditions are acceptable when the density changes as indicated in the radiograph is not abrupt." Sub-Section NB-4424(d) states, "Concavity on the root side of a single welded circumferential butt weld is permitted when the resulting thickness of the weld is at least equal to the thickness of the thinner member of the two sections being joined."

At the suggestion of the NRC inspector the licensee made samples of this condition and radiographed them for use as a guide for acceptance of root concavity. These samples are being maintained along with the radiographs and records.

On April 4, 1986, the licensee submitted a letter of inquiry to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee for interpretation and clarification of the sub-sections of the code.

The NRC inspector reviewed the following additional records and radiographs:

Report No. Dwg. No.	Weld No.
	RRB-23F-R/1
RT-82 42	RRB-02F
RT-83	RRB-34F
RT-84	RRB-30F-R/1
RT-85 52	CSA-06F
RT-95	LPA-01F
RT-100 (Base metal repair, valve)	RRA-49F
RT-109	RRA-37F
43	RRB-52F
RT-152 43	RRB-54
RT-176 31	RRA-05F

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RT 182	•	40, 41, 4	12, 44	RRB-01F	
RT-134		63		RWC-26F	
RT-135	· · · ·	42		RRB-09F	
RT-139		78		LPB-01F	-R/3
RT-144	N	78		LPB-05F	
RT-145		42		RRB-13F	-R/1
RT-146	· ·	910	•	1 SO-FW-	·1
RT-151	•	52		CSA-08F	
RT-153		85	· · ·	SDA-06F	
RT-160		42		RRB-32F	-R/1
RT-167		32		RRA-52F	- -
RT-168		52		CSB-07F	
RT-183		901-2	2	LPCI-B-	FW1-R/1
RT-184		901-2	2	LPCI-B-	FW2-R/2
RT-185		143	· . · · · · ·	LPCI-A-	FW-1
RT-188		32/29	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	RRA-59F	-R/1
RT-189		31		RRA-29F	
RT-190	•	85		SDA-04F	
RT-192		52		CSB-03F	
RT-193		85	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SDA-03F	
RT-195		52		CSA-03F	• .
RT-197		63	•	RWC-08F	· ·
RT-198		91		ISO-14F	
RT-199		66(1	Repair)	RWC-374	4A-R-214
RT-200		31		RRA-01F	
RT-202	en at the	33		RRA-71F	
RT-203		.91		ISO-09F	
RT-209		43		RRB-54F	-R/1
RT-215		42		RRB-46F	
RT-217		43		RRB-59F	
RT-225		49		RRB-69F	
RT-226		43		RRB-65F	
RT-227		43		RRB-66F	
RT-228		49	-	RRB-70F	
RT-230		43		RRB-54F	-R/1
RT-232		43		RRB-55F	
RT-233		91		ISO-07F	
RT-234		31		RRA-48F	
RT-235		32/3	30	RRA-57F	-
RT-236		71		1 PA-05F	
RT-237		61		RWC-06F	
RT-238		63		RWC-14F	
RT-239		63		RWC-11F	
RT-240		63		RWC-12F	-R/1
RT-241		63			
RT-242		Q1		TSO-10	Wald noon
RT-243		91		130-101 130-081	: 
NI CTJ				100.001	



RT-244	· · · · ·	31	 RRA-47F
RT-245	· · · ·	78	LPB-07F-R/1
RT-246		.69	 LPA-03F-R/2
RT-247		71	LPA-07F

# System Walkdown

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The NRC inspector performed a walkdown of the systems listed below using CB&I pipe installation and support drawings with attached Emergency Change Notice (ECN) showing spool piece number, weld joint identification and location.

(1)	Core Spray Loop "A" (A	<u>ssembly)</u>	
	CB&I Dwg.	Impell Ref. Dwg.	ECN
	51, Revision 2 52, Revision 5	M-3773, Revision 4 M-3773, Revision 4	329 5, 44, 74, 113, 119, 261, 268
	53, Revision 3	M-3754, Revision 1 M-3778, Revision 1 M-3779, Revision 2	223, 328
· · · ·	Support Dwg.		
	526, Revision 4, sht. 1 527, Revision 3, sht. 1-	3	I 562 I 365, I 564, I 364, I 563, I 587
	528, Revision 3, sht. 1- 529, Revision 4, sht. 1-	23	I 407, I 419, I 408
(2)	Reactor Water Clean-up		
	<u>CBI Dwg.</u>	Impell Dwg.	ENC
	59, Revision 4 Removal Details	D3-RRCI-RPO3, Revision 2	59, 130, 146, 156, 161, 165, 190, 195
· · ·	60, Revision 4 Installation Assembly	M-3702, Revision 6	184, 292, 325, 369, 378
	61, Revision 2 Installation Assembly	M-3702, Revision 6	174, 185, 199 364, 370, 379
	62, Revision 2 63, Revision 4	M-3702, Revision 6 M-3702, Revision 2	183, 365, 380 82, 125, 150, 176, 186, 201,
			226, 230, 245, 270, 280, 285, 299, 366, 381,

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	64, Revision 5	M-3739, Revision 2 M-3740, Revision 4 M-3741, Revision 2	20, 95, 187, 188 210, 335, 346, 347
	65, Revision 5	M-3742, Revision 1 M-3743, Revision 2 M-3745, Revision 1	96, 316, 368, 371 382
	66, Revision 3	M-3795, Revision 2 M-3744, Revision 4	323, 324, 340, 367
	67, Revision 4	M-3784, Revision 2	
(3)	<u>Reactor Water Clean</u>	-up (Pipe Support Dwgs.)	
	Install Dwg	Impell Ref. Dwg	ECN
	500, Revision 2, sh	t. 1-3	1278, 1207, 1303,
	501, Revision 3, sh 502, Revision 3, sh 503, Revision 5, sh 504, Revision 2-3, 505, Revision 4 532, Revision 3	t. 1,2 t. 1 t. 1-3 sht. 1-4	I277 I279, I337, I492 I519, I390, I613 I16 I189
	533, Revision 3 535, Revision 3, sh 549, Revision 2,	t. 1,2	1282
(4)	Isolation Condenser	Detail Drawings	
	CBI Dwg.	Impell Ref. Dwg.	ECN
	88, Revision 4	D3-RRC1-RPO3, Revision 2	62, 69, 104, 128, 118, 115, 164, 194, 385
	89, Revision 4	M-3704, Revision 6	98, 121, 286,
	90, Revision 3	M-3704, Revision 6	289, 375
	91, Revision 4	M-3704, Revision 6	116, 117, 153, 173, 179, 198, 204, 227, 233, 248, 274, 283, 290, 319, 333, 376
	92, Revision 5	M-3790, Revision 2	55, 142
	33, NEVISIUN 3	M-3724, Revision 2	305, 320, 348, 377
		M-3751, Revision 2 M-3758, Revision 3 M-3752, Revision 1 M-3799, Revision 2 M-3819, Revision 3	

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(5) Isolation Condenser Support Dwgs.

CBI Dwg.

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ECN

507, Revision 3, sht. 1-3I 369, I 592543, Revision 2I 312579, RevisionI 312

## c. Mechanical Stress Improvement (MSIP)

During this Unit 3 outage most of the IGSCC susceptible piping was replaced. However, some Class 1 piping that was subject to the requirements of NRC Generic Letter 84-11 remained in place. There are 50 welds subject to these requirements. Thirty-five of these welds were scheduled for ultrasonic examination, since these welds were not being replaced. Stress improvement was applied to the welds most susceptible to IGSCC in systems operating over 200° F. Twenty-eight welds were subjected to MSIP and ultrasonically examined after application of MSIP. The licensee elected to use MSIP, developed by O'Donnel and Associates, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, rather than Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI). The NRC did not object to the use of MSIP; however, the amount of stress improvement credit that will be given for this process will be determined after the NRC evaluates the results of testing that is presently being performed.

Dresden is the first nuclear power plant to use this technique (MSIP) for stress improvement. Westinghouse Electric (W) was awarded the contract for application of MSIP, and set up a training section for training of personnel. The NRC inspector discussed this technique with the (W) site supervisor and contacted O'Donnel and Associates for documentation supporting this technique. The NRC inspector reviewed the (W) MSIP procedures listed below, witnessed the training of personnel, and the application of MSIP to selected welds in the drywell.

- SE-FP-85-228, Revision 2: Field Service Procedure For Application of MSIP Process to 10-"14" Diameter Welds at Dresden Unit 3.
- SE-FP-85-227, Revision 2: Engineering Procedure For Application of the MSIP Process to 10-"14" Diameter Welds at Dresden Unit 3.
- SE-FP-85-226, Revision 1: Training Program For Application of the MSIP Process to 10-"14" Diameter Welds at Dresden Unit 3.
- OQA-GDR-53-1, Revision 2: W NSID Quality Assurance Program For Application of Mechanical Stress Improvement at Dresden Unit 3.

0	OPR-610-3.	Revision	3:	Control	of	Field	Service	Activities
					· · ·			,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

- OPR-610-2, Revision 2: Preparation For Field Services
- ° OPR-215-1, Revision 4: Measuring and Test Equipment
- OPR-210-4, Revision 2: Control of Non-Conformance On NSID Items and Services

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MSIP was applied to the following welds in the systems listed below. MSIP was not applied to any of the welds in the piping that was replaced.

## Class 1 Systems

Isolation Condenser - Line No. 1302

Weld No.	Weld No.	
14-1 14-K1A 14-K2 14-3 14-4 14-5	14-6 14-7 14-8 14-9 14-10 14-12	
Core Spray "A" - Line	No. 1403	
10-10 10-K11 10-K12 10-K12A 10-13 10-K13 10-K14 10-K15		
<u>Core Spray "B" - Line</u>	No. 1404	
10-44 10-44-C 10-44-D 10-44-E 10-44-F 10-45 10-42	۰.	
<u>Class 2 Systems</u>		
<u>Core Spray</u>		
Line No. 1302	ine No. 1302A	<u>Liı</u>
14-1 14-2 14-3 14-4 14-5 14-5.1 14-6 14-7	12-1 12-2 12-3 12-3.1 12-4 12-5 12-6	12-1 12r1.1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5 12-6 12-7

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14-8 14-9

Line No. 1302B

## d. Inservice Inspection Documentation Review

The inspector reviewed the NDE records identified below of examinations performed by CE of items not being replaced; however, these items were scheduled for inservice examination during this outage.

- Feedwater Nozzle A
   Date Sheet No. 1
   Calibration Sheet No. 1 and 2
- ° Feedwater Nozzle B Data Sheet No. 2 Calibration Sheet No. 1 and 2
- ° Feedwater Nozzle D Data Sheet No. 4 Calibration Sheet No. 1 and 2

The following examinations were performed to satisfy actions set forth in NRC Generic Letter 84-11.

- Data Sheet No. D-007 (PT Examination) RX-Head-N18B, 6B-1 Safe-end Flange.
- Data Sheet No. D-009 (PT Examination) RX Head, N8, Head Vent, Nozzle Safe-end.
- Data Sheet No. D-012 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-007 RX Head Vent N8, Safe-end.
- Data Sheet No. D-016 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-013 Rx Head Vent N8, Safe-end.

The following examinations were performed prior to Mechanical Stress Improvement (MSIP):

- Data Sheet No. D-001 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-001 ISO Condenser, Penetration-Pipe Weld No. 1302-14-9
- Data Sheet No. D-002 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-001 ISO Condenser, Pipe-pipe Weld No. 1302-14-10
- Data Sheet No. D-003 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-003 ISO Pipe-valve Weld No. 1302-14-12

Data Sheet No. D-019 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-017 "A" Core Spray, Pipe-valve Weld No. 1403-10-10

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 Data Sheet No. D-020 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-017
 "B" Core Spray, Pipe-elbow Weld No. 1404-10-46

The following examinations were performed after MSIP:

- Data Sheet No. D-081 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-097 ISO Condenser, Pipe-pipe Weld No. 1302B-12-2
- Data Sheet No. D-085 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-109 (Long.), C-111 (Shear) ISO Condenser, Reducer-pipe Weld No. 1302A-12-1
- Data Sheet No. D-087, (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-109 (Long.), C-111 (Shear) ISO Condenser, Elbow-pipe Weld No. 1302B-12-6
- <sup>o</sup> Data Sheet No. D-091 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. 119 (Long.), C-111 (Shear) ISO Condenser, Pipe-elbow Weld No. 1302-12-4
- Data Sheet No. D-096 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-127 (Long.), C-129 (Shear) ISO Condenser, Pipe-elbow Weld No. 1302A-12-5
- ° Data Sheet No. D-117 (UT Examination) Calibration Sheet No. C-168 (L-wave), C-170 (S-wave)

e. Documentation Review (CB&I)

The NRC inspector reviewed the following final CB&I Task Work Packages (TWP) of work performed at Kankakee:

- TWP-NX-50, Control Rod Drive Safe-end Machining at Kankakee shop PC MK 27-M-3798-1 - PC MK 27-M-3798-2
- TWP-1175, Recirculation System loop "B" riser at 245° PC MK, 45-M-3729 to PC MK, 46-M-3731 Weld Joint No. RRB-09F



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- TWP-1154, Isolation Condenser System (ISO) Penetration No. X-109A, Joint No. ISO-11F Valve No. MO-3-1301-1 to PC MK, 93-M-3752 Joint No. ISO-10F Guard pipe to PC MK, 92-M-3790 Joint No. ISO-11F Ext. Penetration to Bellows PC MK 92-1 Joint No. ISO-12F
- ° TWP-1108, Recirculation System loop "B" N2G Safe-end at 215° Joint No. RRB-06F PC MK, 12-M-3764 to 12-M-3765 Joint No. RRB-08F
- TWP-1103, Recirculation System loop "A" Safe-end, Joint No. RRA-06F and RRA-08F PC MK, 12-M-3764 to 12-M-3765 All N2 safe-ends are identified with PC MK, 12-M-3764, 12-M-3765, 1 thru 10, machining documentation in TWP-NX-12
- TWP-1050, Core Spray System, Removal of CS Pipe Support
- TWP-NX 22B, Shop Weld Core Spray Safe-end to thermal sleeve loop "B" PC MK, 18-M-3766 to 18-M-3812 Joint No. 02F

TWP-NX-40 Machining of Isolation Condenser Spool Weld Preps:

PC MK-93-M-3799, Joint No. ISO-04F PC MK-93-M-3719, Joint No. ISO-01F PC MK-93-M-3790, Joint No. ISO-08F PC MK-92-M-3751, Joint No. ISO-09F PC MK, 93-M-3750, Joint No. ISO-06F PC MK, 93-M-3752, Joint No. ISO-09F and 10F PC MK, 910-5, Joint No. FW-1 and FW-2 PC MK, 93-M-3712-2, Joint No. ISO-08F and 14F PC MK, 93-M-3751-A, Joint No. ISO-08F and 14F PC MK, 93-M-3751-A, Joint No. ISO-05F Measuring and polishing reports in package.

TWP-NX20, Machining of Core Spray Spool Weld Preps. PC MK, 53-M-3779 to 53-M-3754, Joint CSA-07F PC MK, 53-M-3754 to Valve A0-3-1402-9B, Joint 08F PC MK, 53-M-3778 to Valve 1402-6B, Joint 05F PC MK, 57-M-3753 to Valve A0-3-1402-9A, Joint CSB-08F PC MK, 57-M-3775 to Valve 3-1402-6A, Joint CSB-06F PC MK, 57-M-3775 to 57-M-3753, Joint CSB-07F PC MK, 57-M-3774 to Valve 3-1402-6A, Joint CSB-05F

- TWP-NX 14A, Recirculation System Loop "A" Shop Weld Header Cross to Discharge Riser/Tee PC MK, 37-M-3716 to 36-M-3713, Joint RRA-2/2F
- <sup>°</sup> TWP-NX 14B, Recirculation System Loop "B" Shop Weld Header Cross to Discharge Riser/Tee PC MK, 47-M-3738 to 46-M-3727, Joint RRB-40F
  - TWP-1189, Recirculation System Valves to Spool Machining and Weld Joint.

MD-3-0202-4A to 38-M-3720, Joint RRA 56F MD-3-1202-4A to 38-M-3722, Joint RRA-57F MD-3-0202-5A to 37-M-3717, Joint RRA-48F MD-3-0202-5A to 37-M-3718A, Joint RRA-49F MD-3-0202-4B to 48-M-3737, Joint RRB-54F MD-3-0202-4B to 48-M-3725A, Joint RRB-55F MD-3-0202-5B to 47-M-3771, Joint RRB-46F MD-3-0202-5B to 47-M-3726A, Joint RRB-47F MD-3-1402-6B to 53-M-3778, Joint CSA 05F MD-3-1402-6B to 53-M-3779, Joint CSA-06F MD-3-1402-6A to 57-M-3774, Joint CSB-05F MD-3-1402-6A to 57-M-3775, Joint CSB-06F AD-3-1501-25A to 74-M-3757, Joint LPA 05F AD-3-1501-25A to 73-M-3758, Joint LPA-06F AD-3-1501-25B to 80-M-3761, Joint LPB-07F AD-3-1501-25B to 80-M-3762, Joint LPB-08F MD-3-1301-4 to 93-M-3719, Joint ISO-01F MD-3-1301-4 to 87-M-3748, Joint ISO-02F MD-3-1501-26A to 74-M-3755, Joint LPA-02F

#### f. Hydrostatic Test

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On July 19, 1986, Unit 3 was hydrostatically tested in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, 1977 Edition, Summer 1979 Addenda and Special Procedure SP-86-5-72, Revision 0, developed in accordance with Dresden Station Procedure DOS-201-2, Revision 10. The NRC inspector reviewed the procedures identified below that are referenced in the hydrostatic test procedure:

- ° DOS-201-1, Reactor Vessel 1000 PSI Leakage Test
- DOS-201-2, Reactor Vessel ASME Hydrostatic Test
- ° DMP-200-23, Saftey Valve Gagging
- ° DMP-200-36, Unit 2 and 3 Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve Gagging
- DIS-500-4, Reactor Process Instrument Line Flow Check Valve Operational Test

Parts or all of the systems identified below were included in this test:

Reactor Recirculation (Recirc)
 Nuclear Boiler (NB)
 Core Spray (CS)

- <sup>o</sup> Reactor Shutdown Cooling (SDC)
- <sup>o</sup> Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU)
- Isolation Condenser (ISOC)
- <sup>o</sup> Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)
- ° Reactor Feedwater (FW)
- ° Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (CRD)
- ° Main Steam (MS)
- <sup>o</sup> High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
- Stand-By Liquid Control (SLC)

System boundaries include all pressure vessels, piping and valves connected to the reactor coolant system to the outer most isolation valves penetrating the primary containment.

A calibrated Heise pressure gage ID No. DK-8 was installed on Rack No. 2203-5 with reactor pressure transmitter No. PT-3-662 used as a backup gage.

Over pressure protection was provided by the SDC heat exchanger relief valve. System test pressure was 1.10 times the normal operating pressure (1005 PSIG) plus a head correction factor of 25 PSIG. Forty PSIG was added as a tolerance for flexibility. Test Pressure = 1.10 (1005 PSIG) +25 PSIG = 1131 +40, -0 PSIG.

Since the insulation was installed the test pressure and temperature was maintained for four hours as required by Article IWA-5213 of Section XI ASME Code, prior to the start of inspection for leakage.

Relief valves were gagged after reaching 600 PSIG. The unit was pressurized at not more than 30 PSIG per minute until test pressure was reached.

System test pressure was reached at 11:45 a.m. and maintained between 1145 and 1150 PSIG.

Inspection personnel were supplied system P&ID and ISI drawings for the performance of their inspection.

The NRC inspector accompanied the inspectors into the containment and inspected portions of the Recirculation, Shutdown Cooling and Core Spray Systems.

The NRC inspector also reviewed the final hydrostatic test documentation. No leakage of welds was identified. There were 13 leaks identified at bolted joints and valve packing.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 4. Recoating of the Torus and Isolation Condenser

During this extended outage the licensee blase cleaned and recoated the torus and isolation condenser. Recoating activities were performed by the J. L. Manta Company. The NRC inspector visually examined the torus following application of the final coat. Coating materials were applied in three applications of four to six mils each, primer, middle coat, and finish coat with a total thickness of 12 to 18 mils. The inspector also reviewed documentation for torus coating activities listed below:

#### Primer Coat

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Report No. T3-102, Bay 5, Interior centipede
Report No. T3-108, Bay 5, Inboard and outboard upper shell vent header
Report No. T3-114, Bay 5, Lower shell
Report No. T3-103, Bay 5, Interior downcomers
Report No. T3-105, Bay 8 and 9, Vent system support columns
Report No. T3-107, Bay 9, Vapor phase inboard and outboard
Report No. T3-113, Bay 10, Upper downcomers dry film thickness readings 4-6 mils
Report No. T3-122, Bay 1 and 16, Emersion phase

#### Intermediate Coat

Report No. T3-117, Bay 10 and 11, Interior centipede Report No. T3-120, Bay 2 and 3, Headers Report No. T3-124, Bay 4 and 5, Emersion bay bottom Report No. T3-135, Bay 3, Under vent header Report No. T3-136, Bay 15 and 16, Interior centipede dry film thickness readings Report No. T3-119, Bay 4 and 5, Upper vapor shell Report No. T3-130, Bay 8 and 9, Girder emersion phase

#### Finish Coat

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Report No. T3-144, Bay 4 and 5, Vapor phase Report No. T3-146, Bay 5 and 6, Vapor phase and emersion phase Report No. T3-161, Bay 1 and 3, SRV pipe interior phase Report No. T3-163, Bay 5 and 9, Tee quncher support brackets (zinc coating) Report No. T3-147, Bay 6 and 7, Emersion phase Report No. T3-149, Bay 10, Inside downcomers Report No. T3-162, All bays, touch-up

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 5. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents as proprietary.