



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

DMB

September 20, 1985.

DJS LTR: 85-914

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Director of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

- References:
- 1) DJS Ltr. 85-449 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated May 16, 1985.
 - 2) DJS Ltr. 85-653 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated June 12, 1985.
 - 3) DJS Ltr. 85-720 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated July 9, 1985.
 - 4) DJS Ltr. 85-836 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated August 23, 1985.

Dear Sir:

This letter is in reference to Confirmatory Action Letter 85-04 regarding the Main Steam Line Snubber Monitoring System for Dresden Unit 2. Item 2 of this Confirmatory Action Letter requires a verbal notification to Region III within 2 working days followed by a written report and safety evaluation within 30 calendar days.

One occurrence has been identified during this reporting period.

Occurrence #15 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg on August 28, 1985.

The written report and safety evaluation for this occurrence is attached.

Sincerely,

D. J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS:JA:hjb

Enclosure

cc: J. Almer
B. Schroeder
J. Achterberg
R. Stachniak
File/Numerical

8510040142 850920
PDR ADOCK 05000237
S PDR

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Occurrence #15 (August 28, 1985)

Dresden Unit 2 scrammed on August 16, 1985 on low reactor water level which was caused by a loss of off-site power (Occurrence #13). The unit remained in the shutdown condition until August 25, 1985. At that time a normal unit startup was commenced with criticality being achieved at 1740 hours. On August 26, 1985 the unit was synchronized to the system grid.

During the unit startup several snubber instrumentation monitor actuations were noted. After reviewing the sequence of events during the startup it was determined that the snubber instrumentation triggers occurred during the withdrawal of the source range monitors (SRM's) and the intermediate range monitors (IRM's). Again these traces were compared to those obtained during testing on June 3, 1985, which is described in Occurrence #5 and were found to be similar in magnitude and duration. Therefore, this event is believed to have been caused by electrical interference generated from the movement of the SRM's and IRM's.

Since the unit startup progressed normally with no known steamline transients and the fact that the traces were identified to be generated from a specific plant evolution, the safety significance of this occurrence is minimal. Confirmation of this will be made by a visual inspection during the Technical Specification required visual inspection. The inspection is tentatively scheduled for September 30, 1985.