



Commonwealth Edison
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R.R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 Telephone 815/942-2920

PRIORITY ROUTING

First	Second
RA	RC
DRA	EIC
DRP	SPA
DRS	AL
DRSS	OL
DRMA	DT
	IPAN

FILE _____

August 23, 1985

DJS LTR: 85-836

James G. Keppler
 Regional Administrator
 Director of Inspection and Enforcement
 Region III
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 799 Roosevelt Road
 Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

- References:
- 1) DJS Ltr. 85-449 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated May 16, 1985.
 - 2) DJS Ltr. 85-653 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated June 12, 1985.
 - 3) DJS Ltr. 85-720 to J. G. Keppler from D. J. Scott, dated July 9, 1985.

Dear Sir:

This letter is in reference to Confirmatory Action Letter 85-04 regarding the Main Steam Line Snubber Monitoring System for Dresden Unit 2. Item 2 of this Confirmatory Action Letter requires a verbal notification to Region III within 2 working days followed by a written report and safety evaluation within 30 calendar days.

Four occurrences have been identified during this reporting period. They are:

- Occurrence #11 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg on July 29, 1985.
- Occurrence #12 Notification made to J. Streator by J. Achterberg on August 6, 1985.
- Occurrence #13 Notification made to D. Danielson by R. Stachniak on August 19, 1985.
- Occurrence #14 Notification made to J. Harrison by R. Stachniak on August 21, 1985.

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
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The written report and safety evaluation for each occurrence is attached.

Sincerely,



A
D. J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS:RS:hjb

Enclosure

cc: J. Almer
B. Schroeder
J. Achterberg
R. Stachniak
File/Numerical

Occurrence #11 (July 29, 1985)

On July 27, 1985, Unit 2 scrambled due to an east bank scram discharge volume (SDV) high high water level signal. The scram signal was attributed to spurious actuation of temperature sensitive water level instruments installed on the SDV instrument volume. Steam released from a lifted relief valve on the reactor water cleanup system filled a common Reactor Building drain header. The steam flowed through the header into the SDV instrument volume drain line causing a spurious trip of the level instruments.

Immediately following the scram the snubber instruments responded several times. The pulses were of such magnitude and short duration that it was concluded they were caused by electrical interference from the operation of nearby equipment and valve actuations in the drywell. These traces were compared to those generated following a scram on May 18, 1985 (Occurrence #4) and were found to be similar. All snubber indications returned to normal values.

Occurrence #12 (August 6, 1985)

On August 2, 1985, while Unit 2 was being placed in hot standby condition, a Group I primary containment isolation occurred. The main steam isolation valves (MSIV) closed upon receipt of the Group I isolation and the resulting 10% MSIV closure scram tripped the unit. The Group I isolation was attributed to contacts in the reactor mode switch that stuck in the "RUN" mode after the mode switch had been placed into the "STARTUP" mode. When the reactor pressure dropped to less than 850 psig, the Group I isolation circuitry tripped on "less than 850 psig with the mode switch in run!!"

Immediately following the scram the snubber instruments responded several times. The pulses were of such magnitude and short duration that it was concluded they were caused by electrical interference from the operation of nearby equipment and valve actuations in the drywell. These traces were compared to those generated following a scram on May 18, 1985 (Occurrence #4) and were found to be similar. All snubber indications returned to normal values.

Upon startup of the unit, the snubber instrumentation again responded several times. The pulses were caused by the movement of the IRM's and SRM's from the reactor core. All snubber indications returned to normal values.

Occurrence #13 (August 19, 1985)

On August 16, 1985, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Unit 2 tripped from a low reactor water level scram. The trip resulted from a loss of off-site power to reserve auxiliary transformer (TR22). One of two operating reactor feed-pumps and the standby reactor feedpump tripped on loss of power. The low water level scram and complete loss of power to Unit 2 resulted. Unit 2 achieved safe shutdown with the use of the 2 and 2/3 emergency diesel generators until off-site power was restored.

Immediately following the scram the snubber instruments responded several times. The pulses were of such magnitude and short duration that it was concluded they were caused by electrical interference from the operation of nearby equipment and valve actuations in the drywell. These traces were compared to those generated following a scram on May 18, 1985 (Occurrence #4) and were found to be similar. All snubber indications returned to normal values. The Unit 2 drywell became accessible due to maintenance on a 2D electromatic relief valve thermocouple. A visual snubber inspection was performed on the six instrumented snubbers. No abnormal conditions were noted.

Occurrence #14 (August 21, 1985)

Dresden Unit 2 was still shutdown from the August 16, 1985 scram. During surveillance testing of IRM's and SRM's, the snubber instruments responded several times. The pulses are of the same type as the test performed previously (Occurrence #5, dated June 1, 1985). All snubber indications returned to normal values.

The safety significance of these occurrences is minimal since there is no evidence of actual loads on the main steam line snubbers. Confirmation of this was performed by a visual inspection while the Unit 2 drywell was accessible on August 18, 1985. Per Technical Specifications the next required visual snubber inspection will be the 124 day (October 17, 1985 plus or minus 30 days).