



**Commonwealth Edison**  
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
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 Morris, Illinois 60450  
 Telephone 815/942-2920

June 12, 1985

DJS LTR: #85-653

James G. Keppler  
 Regional Administrator  
 Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
 Region III  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 799 Roosevelt Road  
 Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reference: DJS Ltr. 85-449 to J.G. Keppler from D.J. Scott dated 5/16/85

Dear Sir:

This letter is in reference to Confirmatory Action Letter 85-04 regarding the Main Steam Line Snubber Monitoring System for Dresden Unit 2. Item 2 of this Confirmatory Action Letter requires a verbal notification to Region III within 2 working days followed by a written report and safety evaluation within 30 calendar days.

Three occurrences have been identified during this reporting period. They are:

- Occurrence #4 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg on 5/21/85.
- Occurrence #5 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg on 6/3/85.
- Occurrence #6 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg on 6/11/85.

The written report and safety evaluation for each occurrence is attached.

Sincerely,

D.J. Scott  
 Station Manager  
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station

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 PDR ADOCK 05000237  
 S PDR

DJS/JA/crf  
 Attachment  
 cc: J. Almer  
 W. Pierce  
 B. Schroeder

J. Achterberg  
 J. Brunner  
 File/NRC  
 File/Numerical

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OCCURRENCE #4 (5-18-85)

A Technical Specification required monthly surveillance was being performed on the turbine control valves on 5/18/85 with Unit 2 operating at 675 MWe. Ordinarily when the control valves are tested they slow close the first 90% of travel then fast close the remaining 10%. However, when the #3 control valve was tested it fast closed the entire length of travel. This resulted in a neutron flux spike and subsequent reactor scram at 0430 hours. Immediately following the scram the snubber instruments responded several times. A meeting was held the following Monday to examine these pulses. The pulses were of such magnitude and short duration that it was concluded they were caused by electrical interference from the operation of nearby equipment and valve actuation in the drywell. These traces were also compared to those generated following a scram on 5/2/85 and were found to be similar. All snubber indications returned to normal valves.

During startup of the unit, additional snubber triggers were noted, and again the magnitude of the pulses was greater than what the snubber strain gage/LVDT could produce. The consensus of the meeting was electrical interference due to startup.

OCCURRENCE #5 (6-1-85)

Dresden Unit 2 was on line and holding steady load at 760 MWe. At 1135 hours several snubber instrumentation triggers occurred. A review of the NSO and Shift Engineer logs found no evidence of plant transients. The only activity of interest noted at this time was an entry which identified a problem with the Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) drive motor control circuitry. After the control circuitry was repaired, testing was required to verify proper movement and position indication. During the testing process several snubber instrumentation triggers also occurred.

Examination of the snubber instrumentation pulses revealed the loads to be of extreme magnitude and short duration. Due to the fact that the only activity occurring at the time of the triggers was the movement of the SRM's and IRM's, it was believed that these events caused the electrical noise which triggered the snubber instrumentation.

A test was performed on 6/3/85 which required moving the IRM's and SRM's. The movement triggered the snubber instrumentation and produced traces almost identical in magnitude and duration as those which occurred on 6/1/85. This test confirms Dresden Station's belief that this event was caused by electrical noise generated from the movement of the SRM's or IRM's.

OCCURRENCE #6 (6-9-85)

Unit 2 was holding steady load on 6-8-85 when at 1933 hours the 2B recirculation pump generator field breaker tripped. The recirculation pump drive motor breaker was then manually opened. After an investigation of the event, several attempts were made to restart the recirc pump but were unsuccessful. An orderly shutdown was then commenced to further investigate the problem with the recirc pump. During the shutdown on 6-9-85, several snubber instrumentation triggers occurred. A review of the U-2 operators log revealed that the source range monitors (SRM's) and intermediate range monitors (IRM's) were being inserted during the snubber instrumentation triggers. These events were compared to those obtained during testing on 6-3-85 which is described in Occurrence #5 and were found to be similar in magnitude and duration.

The safety significance of these three occurrences is minimal since there is no evidence of actual loads on the main steam line snubbers. Confirmation of this will be made by a visual inspection during the snubber inspection required by the Technical Specifications.