



**Commonwealth Edison**  
 One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
 Chicago, Illinois 60690

June 5, 1985

Mr. H. R. Denton  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
 Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3  
 Zion Station Units 1 and 2  
 LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2  
 Byron Station Units 1 and 2  
 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2  
 Generic Letter 83-28-Item 1.1 Post Trip Review  
 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237/249,  
50-295/304; 50-373/374; 50-454/455; and 50-456/457

- Reference (a): April 24, 1985 J.A. Zwolinski Letter to  
 D.L. Farrar Requesting Additional Information-Dresden
- (b): May 3, 1985 S.A. Varga Letter to D.L. Farrar  
 Transmitting SER and Requesting Additional  
 Information-Zion
- (c): April 22, 1985 A. Schwencer Letter to D.L. Farrar  
 Transmitting SER and Requesting Additional  
 Information-LaSalle
- (d): May 17, 1985 B.J. Youngblood Letter to D.L. Farrar  
 Transmitting SER and Requesting Additional  
 Information-Byron, Braidwood

Dear Mr. Denton:

References (a) through (d) requested additional information to  
 address Item 1.1 of Generic Letter 83-28, Post-Trip Review. Each of the  
 documents contained the same questions, so the answers contained in the  
 attachment apply to all stations. An extension of time to reply was granted  
 by Dr. Bournia for LaSalle County Station so that one reply could be docketed.

One original and forty copies are being supplied for your use.

If you or your staff have any additional questions, please address  
 them to this office.

Sincerely,

*Greg Alexander*

Greg Alexander  
 Nuclear Licensing Administrator

8506140044 850605  
 PDR ADOCK 05000237  
 P PDR

Attachment

- cc: NRC Resident Inspectors-Byron  
 " -Braidwood  
 " -Dresden  
 " -LaSalle  
 " -Zion

0227K

*A055  
 1/40*

ATTACHMENT

1. The method and criteria for comparing the event with expected plant performance.

RESPONSE:

Commonwealth Edison's response to Generic Letter 83-28 (reference 1) included a copy of a Corporate directive addressing post trip review entitled "Plant Startup After Trip". Paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this directive describe the method and criteria for comparing the event with expected plant performance and state, in part:

- "5.2 . . . restart analyses should include, as a minimum, a review of pertinent strip chart recorder traces and process computer outputs (e.g., sequence-of-events printout, alarm typer printout, and trend summaries). This data review should identify the following items:
  - 5.2.1 Abnormal or degraded trends in equipment performance
  - 5.2.2 Events occurring out of normal or anticipated sequence
  - 5.2.3 Failed or degraded response of equipment to control signals
  - 5.2.4 Unanticipated alarm conditions
- 5.3 The causes(s) of any degraded, abnormal, or unexpected performance of safety-related equipment should be sufficiently understood (and corrected, if necessary) to permit a judgement to be made regarding the readiness of the plant to return to operation."

The normal or expected performance or response of safety-related equipment to which degraded performance is compared is that required by each plants' Technical Specifications. The Technical Specifications provide Limiting Safety System Settings and Operability requirements which reflect FSAR data.

Unscheduled reactor trips are reportable (as License Event Reports) under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as events that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The content of the License Event Report includes reference to any previous similar events at the same plant.

2. The criteria for the need of independent assessment of the event following the trip.

RESPONSE:

As noted above in the response to Item 1, reactor trip are reportable events and therefore, as required by the Administrative Controls section of each stations' Technical Specifications, all reactor trips are assessed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function and again by the Offsite Review and Investigative Function.

3. A systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips.

RESPONSE:

The Corporate directive provided in the response to Generic Letter 83-28 describes a systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips. This directive includes the features listed in Action Item 1.1 of the Generic Letter, as well as the items included in Review Guideline A.

0227K