

ATTACHMENT A

PROPOSED CHANGES TO DPR-25

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3. E. Restrictions

Operation in the coastdown mode is permitted to 40% power. Should off-normal feedwater heating be necessary for extended periods during coastdown (i.e. greater than 24 hours) the Licensee shall perform a safety evaluation to determine if the M CPR Operating Limit and calculated peak pressure for the worst case abnormal operating transient remain bounding for the new condition.

Am. 42  
4/16/80

F. Deleted

G. The licensee may proceed with and is required to complete the modification identified in Paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.23 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (SE) dated March 1978 on the facility. All modifications are to be completed by start-up following the 1979 Unit 3 refueling outage. In addition, the licensee shall submit the additional information identified in Table 3.1 of the SE in accordance with the schedule contained therein. In the event these dates for submittal cannot be met, the licensee shall submit a report, explaining the circumstances, together with a revised schedule.

Am. 33  
3/22/78

H. Physical Protection

The licensee shall full implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the following Commission approved documents, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). These approved documents consist of information withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d).

(1) "Security Plan for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station", dated November 19, 1977, as revised May 19, 1978, May 27, 1978, July 28, 1978 and February 19, 1979.

Am. 49  
2/11/81

(2) "Dresden Nuclear Power Station Safeguards Contingency Plan", dated March 1980, as revised June 27, 1980, submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.40. The Contingency Plan shall be fully implemented, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.40(b), within 30 days of this approval by the Commission.

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3.6 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  
(Cont'd.)

2. Flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps shall be verified prior to initiation of reactor startup from a cold shutdown condition.
3. The indicated core flow is the sum of the flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps. If flow indication failure occurs for two or more jet pumps, immediate corrective action shall be taken. If flow indication for all but one jet pump cannot be obtained within 12 hours an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch

4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT  
(Cont'd.)

- b. The indicated total core flow is more than 10% greater than the core flow value derived from established power-core flow relationships.
2. Additionally, when operating with one recirculation pump, the diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure shall be checked daily and the differential pressure of any jet pumps in the idle loop shall not vary by more than 10% from established patterns.
3. The baseline data required to evaluate the conditions in Specifications 4.6.G.1 and 4.6.G.2 will be acquired each operating cycle.

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch

ATTACHMENT B

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Description of Amendment Request

Current plans for the upcoming Dresden Unit 3 outage includes deletion of existing Recirculation Equalizer Valves and their associated piping. The valves have been required to be closed during reactor operation as License Condition 3.F. This proposed amendment requests deletion of the License Condition and reference to these valves in Appendix A.

The NRC has required these valves to be closed since Amendment No. 5, issued in 1975. The removal of these valves and the associated piping meets the intent of the NRC's previous requirement. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated nor create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Accordingly, Commonwealth Edison has determined that this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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